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Abstract 
There is growing support for the value of emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility 
in multiple life outcomes. Independently, emotional intelligence facilitates decision making 
and is a strong predictor of work performance. Likewise, psychological flexibility predicts 
job performance and facilitates decision making consonant with personal values. Notably, the 
relationship between these variables and their associated benefits are contextually-bound, 
manifesting to varying degrees for individuals in different circumstances. Despite intuitive 
connections between adaptive emotional functioning epitomised in emotional intelligence 
and the range of adaptive abilities comprising psychological flexibility, some theorists 
propose an inverse relationship. The series of four studies in this thesis aimed to investigate 
the interaction between emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility in promoting 
positive outcomes and to identify the primary mechanisms responsible. Given the contextual 
nature of both these constructs, outcomes were assessed in relation to two applied areas of 
investigation: decision making and workplace functioning. Both emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility are implicated in promoting positive outcomes in these selected 
fields and examination within these contexts strengthens the chances of detecting a 
relationship. Further, decision making and work functioning form pervasive aspects of daily 
life and applicability of findings in these contexts potentially extends widely throughout the 
population. The initial study provided preliminary support for the purported relationships 
between emotional intelligence, psychological flexibility and maximising personality traits 
relevant to decision making processes and outcomes. Administration of a decision 
changeability paradigm showed that emotional intelligence predicted higher psychological 
flexibility, mediated by positive affect, which in turn mitigated ruminative outcomes typical 
of maximising personalities in changeable decision conditions. A workplace intervention 
study experimentally assessed the directional nature of the relationship between emotional 
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intelligence and psychological flexibility. Emotional intelligence causally contributed to 
improved work engagement through enhanced positive affect and work-related psychological 
flexibility following emotional self-efficacy training. However, conflicting results between 
global and work-specific measures of psychological flexibility warranted follow-up. 
Laboratory confirmation of causal components clarified the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and psychological flexibility to some extent. Emotionally intelligent individuals 
were adept at maintaining positive affect following induction conditions that resulted in 
emotional regression for the majority of participants. In these conditions, emotional 
intelligence was related to higher functioning on a performance proxy indicating features of 
psychological flexibility. However, the power of emotional intelligence for facilitating 
flexibility in mood enhancing conditions was equivocal and further research is required to 
test this relationship using positive induction methods with greater efficacy. The intractability 
of the global psychological flexibility measure (Acceptance and Action Questionnaire) in 
conditions commonly considered to facilitate flexibility suggests some limitations in the use 
of this tool. Future directions should explore alternative measurement methods for capturing 
psychological flexibility, particularly brief performance measures or positively keyed global 
self-reports and a range of context-specific assessments. Overall, the thesis offers promising 
insights on the value of emotional intelligence training and potentially positive affect 
interventions for promoting psychological flexibility. Ultimately, this could address some of 
the negative outcomes associated with maximizing tendencies, such as ruminative responding 
in changeable decision conditions, and promote workplace flourishing.  
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Chapter 1 
Aims of the Research Thesis and Overarching Hypotheses 
1.1 Emotional intelligence as a Contextual Facilitator of Psychological Flexibility 
Multiple theoretical connections suggest that emotional intelligence may causally 
influence components of psychological flexibility; however, context may determine the 
nature of the relationship between these variables. Emotional intelligence and psychological 
flexibility are fundamental to health and contribute to outcomes in decision-making processes 
and workplace flourishing (e.g., Damasio, 1994; O‟Boyle, Humphrey, Pollack, Hawver, & 
Story, 2011, Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Bond, Lloyd, & Guenole, 2011). In these 
contexts, emotional intelligence may potentially build psychological flexibility, contributing 
to improved outcomes. For example, the characteristic experience of positive affect may 
promote broadened behavioural repertoires and aspects of executive functioning such as 
attentional control (Schutte, Malouff, Simunek, McKenly & Hollander, 2002; Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005; Posner & Rothbart, 1998). These features could assist outcomes in decision 
making and workplace contexts. 
The experiments in the present thesis aim to clarify how emotional intelligence 
promotes psychological flexibility in decision making and workplace contexts and confirm 
associated positive outcomes, including the attenuation of ruminative thought styles and 
higher levels of work engagement. It is anticipated that these findings will not only inform 
the theoretical relationship between these variables, but raise practical implications for 
parsimonious interventions to improve outcomes in these situations. Identifying the role of 
emotional intelligence and positive affect in generating psychologically flexible thinking may 
expand traditional treatment approaches to include brief, self-directed training programs 
utilising journal writing paradigms common to emotional intelligence and positive 
  
2 
 
psychology interventions (e.g., Kirk, Schutte, & Hine, 2011; Seligman, Steen, Park, & 
Peterson, 2005). Findings relating to these realms of functioning potentially have wide 
application. 
 
1.2 Predictions and Investigative Approach 
The input-context-output model at Figure 1.1 illustrates the hypothesised relationships 
between the primary thesis variables embedded within the contextual features of decision 
making and workplace flourishing. In the current project, it is hypothesised that emotional 
intelligence will facilitate psychological flexibility in decision making with positive affect 
mediating the relationship. In turn, psychological flexibility is expected to lower ruminative 
outcomes associated with maximising personality styles, given that it may prompt selection 
of more adaptive decision strategies and acceptance of internal cognitions without rumination 
(Seligman & Reichenberg, 2012). In the workplace context, it is hypothesised that emotional 
intelligence will increase positive affect and psychological flexibility, measured through 
global (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011) and context-specific (WAAQ; Bond, Lloyd, & Guenole, 
2013) instruments. In these circumstances, both emotional intelligence and psychological 
flexibility are expected to promote improved work engagement as an indicator of workplace 
flourishing.  
A series of four studies are designed to confirm and test the direction of these 
relationships, addressing conceptual overlaps between the primary constructs which are 
described in more detail in the dedicated chapters on emotional intelligence (Chapter 2) and 
psychological flexibility (Chapter 3). The overview at Figure 1.1 contains a global synthesis 
of the thesis studies.  
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Figure 1.1. Input-context-output model of hypothesised relationships.  
 
The four studies investigating the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility, as hypothesised in Figure 1.1, unpack the contextually-bound 
components of this diagram. In the first two studies, the inputs and outputs specific to 
decision making illustrated in the upper half of the figure are examined. The first study is 
intended to establish preliminary correlational support between emotional intelligence, 
positive (and negative) affect, psychological flexibility and rumination. The second study will 
employ a choice changeability manipulation (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002), and examine how the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility affects rumination 
in response to decision making, as a function of maximising personality styles (Schwartz et 
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al., 2002). The lower half of Figure 1.1 is examined in the third study which will assess the 
causal role of emotional intelligence on psychological flexibility and workplace flourishing, 
(operationalized as work engagement on the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale; Schaufeli, 
Bakker, & Salanova, 2006) through administration of an emotional self-efficacy training 
program (Kirk et al., 2011). Finally, the fourth study (Chapter 6) will seek laboratory 
confirmation of causal components influencing the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and psychological flexibility that were identified in the previous studies, in 
particular, assessing the role of positive affect through mood induction procedures. This final 
study focuses on the processes through which emotional intelligence facilitates psychological 
flexibility, divorced from context.  
 
1.3 Summary of Chapters 
Following this introductory chapter outlining the research program, Chapters 2 and 3 
explore the theoretical basis for the present investigation, providing in-depth analysis of 
emotional intelligence and its potential contribution to psychological flexibility. Three 
experimental chapters (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6) present findings from the four 
studies investigating the hypothesised relationships between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility. Chapter 4 incorporates results from two studies investigating 
emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility in relation to maximising personality 
styles and ruminative outcomes in decision making. Chapter 5 outlines a workplace 
intervention study examining the causal role of emotional self-efficacy training on work-
related and global psychological flexibility, and their impact on work engagement. Chapter 6 
describes a mood induction study administered in laboratory conditions to evaluate how 
emotional intelligence influences mood transformations and the causal role of positive affect 
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on psychological flexibility outcomes. Chapter 7 discusses general conclusions and directions 
for future research, summarising the thesis findings on the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and psychological flexibility. This research is expected to inform efficacious and 
low cost interventions that promote positive outcomes particularly relevant to decision 
making and workplace functioning. The theoretical rationale for the hypothesised 
relationships is explored in detail in the following chapters reviewing the emotional 
intelligence and psychological flexibility literature.    
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Chapter 2 
The Origins and Value of Emotional Intelligence 
2.1 Historical Perspectives 
Emotions and intelligence were historically viewed as naturally opposing concepts. 
This tradition largely reflected the common perception of emotional vagaries propagated 
early in the history of written knowledge: “Rule your feelings, lest your feelings rule you” 
(Publilius Syrus, c. 100BC/1961). From this viewpoint, a person could think and behave 
either emotionally or intelligently. The two ideas were mutually exclusive and attempts to 
link emotion with intelligence would introduce a conceptual oxymoron; a fundamental 
contradiction in terms. Early study in psychology tended to support this perspective, 
regarding emotion as disorganised “visceral” responses, disruptive to reasoned thinking and 
behavioural effectiveness (Schaffer, Gilmer, & Schoen, 1940; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). To 
this extent, the absence of emotion was considered a valid manifestation of underlying 
intelligence (Woodworth, 1940). However, alternative perspectives on the function of 
emotion accompanied with developments in theories of intelligence are challenging the 
assumption that emotions and intelligence are necessarily diametric constructs. 
 
2.1.1 A Functional Understanding of Emotion 
Contrary to behavioural or rational disruption, viewpoints emerged characterising 
emotions as “processes which arouse, sustain, and direct activity”; motivational influences 
adaptively redirecting thought and action as part of an organised response to the environment 
(Leeper, 1948, p. 17). These theories explained the origin of emotional experience using an 
evolutionary framework. The adaptive mechanism of emotions endowed early ancestors with 
  
7 
 
a substantial evolutionary advantage, promoting individual and species-level survival (Frijda, 
Kuipers, & Schure, 1989; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Proponents theorised that emotions 
facilitate specific action tendencies (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). The subjective experience of 
emotions co-ordinated physiological, behavioural, and cognitive systems, priming certain 
responses appropriate to environmental pressures. For example, a threat appraisal stimulated 
the emotional response of fear, activating multiple brain regions (such as the amygdala, 
hypothalamus and pituitary gland) and infusing the nervous system with adrenal hormones.  
Rapid heart rate increased blood circulation to muscles important for movement, and 
attention was narrowed to the salient features of the threat. In this scenario, emotions 
mobilised a host of bodily resources (mental and physical) towards successful execution of 
the flight response. Survival of the organism hinged on an effective and efficient emotional 
response to activate these component processes. In this way, emotional responses became an 
innate characteristic of human genetic makeup through natural selection. 
The functional value of positive emotions was somewhat more difficult to situate 
within a coherent and specific thought-action-urge framework than negative emotions. 
Reponses to positive emotions seemed overly generic and vague, eluding theoretical linkages 
to specific survival behaviours (Fredrickon, 1998). Instead, Fredrickson (2001) proposed that 
positive emotions exhibit a distinct pattern to negative emotional processes, broadening 
thought-action repertoires as opposed to narrowing response tendencies to a critical selection. 
Positive emotions generally occur in non-threatening situations, in which specific reactions 
are unwarranted. In these circumstances, it is considered more adaptive for positive emotion 
to broaden the way individuals think and engage in behaviour (Fredrickson, 2001). Positive 
emotions encourage and activate a range of approach behaviours with the environment, 
contributing to the accumulation of personal experience and resources. Analogues in the 
animal kingdom exemplify this process. Creatures experiencing joy instigate play, increasing 
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strength and agility as resources to access in future threatening situations. Translating that 
example into modern terms, joy might promote social connection and enhance relationships, 
providing access to social support when needed (Lopes et al., 2004; Lopes, Salovey, & 
Straus, 2003). Likewise, curiosity could motivate knowledge acquisition, a highly-valued 
resource in the contemporary education-oriented social system and job market. Consequently, 
emotions whether positive or negative, demonstrate functional features, energising action 
towards adaptive outcomes. 
 
2.1.2 Intelligence: From Unifactorial to Multifaceted Approaches 
Simultaneously with an evolving understanding around the functional importance of 
emotion, research investigating human intelligence was developing. Early theories of 
intelligence attributed heightened intellectual functioning to exceptional perceptual abilities 
(e.g., Galton; Smith, Hoeksema, Fredrickson, & Loftus, 2003). Superior sensory faculties 
resulted in more accurate knowledge acquisition and therefore greater intelligence. However, 
tests measuring psycho-physiological processes (such as reaction times, visual acuity, and 
auditory perception) demonstrated no utility in distinguishing presumably intelligent from 
non-intelligent individuals. Other models of intelligence with greater predictive validity 
assumed that mental ability was reflected in reasoning and problem solving skills, capable of 
expression as a function of mental to chronological age (e.g., Stanford-Binet; Youngstrom, 
Glutting, & Watkins, 2003). These early models assumed a single underlying intelligence 
factor (g) that determines individual performance across various domains (Spearman, 1904). 
This perspective was reflected in Weschler‟s (1944, p.3) definition of intelligence as “the 
aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to 
deal effectively with his environment”.  
  
9 
 
A contrasting view emerged describing intelligence as a set of independent mental 
abilities as opposed to a general or global capacity. For example, Thurstone (1938) factor 
analysed intelligence scores and proposed numerous primary mental abilities. Following a 
paradigm shift towards cognitive psychology and a focus on information-processing models 
of human behaviour, contemporary theories of intelligence explored the multifaceted nature 
of the construct. Anderson‟s (1992) theory of intelligence postulated the existence of various 
independent knowledge modules and a separate cognitive processing system. Intelligence 
was viewed as an aptitude for acquiring and processing content-specific information, with 
more efficient processes equating to higher levels of intelligence. Sternberg‟s (1988) triarchic 
theory extended this basic cognitive information processing approach to include aspects of 
learned experience and cultural influences. The environmental context emerged as essential 
to the manifestation of an individual‟s innate potential for intelligence, providing the 
affordances and constraints that interact with the development of cognitive ability (Ceci, 
1996). 
The importance and variety of human social contexts informed Gardner‟s (1993) 
conception of multiple intelligences. Gardner recognised that successful functioning could 
not be reduced to an individual capacity espoused in classical views of intelligence due to the 
sheer diversity of role requirements across cultural communities. Accordingly, intelligence 
reflected an individual‟s potential for accessing, thinking and operating on particular content 
relevant to a cultural or community setting. The seven different forms of intelligence 
(including linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, intrapersonal 
and interpersonal intelligence) were variously distributed across a person‟s unique profile, 
manifesting as individual differences in capacity for the types of performance required in 
socially constructed roles (Gardner, 1993; Walters & Gardner, 1985). Gardner‟s set of inter- 
and intra- personal intelligences, revitalised theories of social intelligence, or “the ability to 
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understand and manage people” including the self (Thorndike & Stein, 1937, p. 275), despite 
research efforts previously concluding that a unitary trait of social intelligence was an 
unviable construct (Cronbach, 1960). The personal intelligences involved the ability to 
recognise and distinguish feelings, intentions and motivations within the self and others, 
respectively (Gardner, Kornhaber, & Wake, 1996). Specification of intelligences featuring 
emotional competencies laid the foundation for later conceptualisations of emotional 
intelligence. 
 
2.1.3 Integrating Emotion and Intelligence 
A raft of theoretical developments paved the way for the emergence of emotional 
intelligence. Modern theorists viewed intelligence as a capacity for the efficient and accurate 
processing of certain types of information, with the implicit recognition that multiple forms 
of intelligence exist. The development of social and personal intelligences in Gardner‟s 
(1993) theory outlined the potential of emotional knowledge as a type of intelligence. 
Coupled with the adaptive value of emotions discussed previously, the juxtaposition of 
emotional intelligence describes an aptitude for acquiring emotional information and a highly 
effective system for processing and operating on that emotional knowledge in order to 
facilitate functional outcomes relevant to an individual‟s success within the environmental 
context (Kornhaber & Gardner, 1991).  
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2.2 Theoretical Evolution and Defining Frameworks 
2.2.1 The Mayer-Salovey Models of Emotional Intelligence  
Salovey and Mayer (1990) presented the first comprehensive framework for 
emotional intelligence as a subset of Gardner‟s (1993) social or personal intelligences, and 
are often credited with labelling the construct despite some earlier disparate references in the 
literature (e.g. Leuner, 1966; Payne, 1986). In this conceptualisation, emotional intelligence 
was operationally defined as “the ability to monitor one‟s own and others‟ feelings and 
emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this information to guide one‟s thinking 
and action” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 189). Accordingly, emotional intelligence essentially 
reflects individual differences in skill applied to the processing of affective information 
embedded in life tasks (Salovey & Mayer, 1990).  
The Salovey and Mayer (1990) classification of emotional intelligence reveals a 
process-oriented approach, focused on the functional aspects of emotion integrated with 
cognition and behaviour. As a subset of intelligence, it aligns with the emerging viewpoint 
that emotions are the conductor of cognitive and physiological processes, adaptively 
motivating and directing human activity towards individual pursuits (Leeper, 1948). 
Emotions were conceived as organised responses to internal or external events, designating 
positive or negative value meanings to experiences, and primarily facilitating adaptive 
responding within the environment. Emotional intelligence was the ability to recognise and 
utilise these emotional states in the self and others as a means of goal-directed problem 
solving and behaviour regulation to successfully navigate the social world (Salovey & Mayer, 
1990; Saloevey & Mayer, 2004). The Salovey and Mayer (1990) emotional intelligence 
model delineated a skillset comprising three branches of adaptive emotional abilities as 
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shown in Figure 1.1. The basic branches include emotional appraisal and expression, emotion 
regulation, and emotion utilisation to facilitate flexible thinking and motivate action. 
 
Figure 2.1. Salovey and Mayer conceptualisation of emotional intelligence.  
Adapted from “Emotional intelligence,” by P. Salovey and J. D. Mayer, 1990, Imagination, 
Cognition, and Personality, 9, p. 190. 
 
The three main branches of emotional intelligence each contain sub-levels of 
emotional skills. The first branch for emotion appraisal and expression includes verbal and 
non-verbal components in relation to the self, and non-verbal perception and empathy applied 
to others (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). This primary skill branch describes the basic 
identification and recognition of emotion, which is an essential element underlying intelligent 
use of emotions across the spectrum. Detecting emotional signals through facial expressions 
or body postures can aid in the selection of socially adaptive behaviours. For example, a 
lecturer may perceive students‟ loss of interest in an oral presentation through various non-
verbal behaviours (e.g., fidgeting or wandering eye gaze) and an empathic understanding of 
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these responses could lead to an adjustment in content or presentation style to reinvigorate the 
audience. 
The second emotion regulation branch refers to emotional management in the self and 
others. Emotionally intelligent individuals theoretically acquire an extensive and accurate 
knowledgebase on the causes and consequents of various emotions through repeated learning 
history (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). This information can be used to engage in behaviours or 
situations that facilitate a desired emotional experience in the self or others, implying that 
emotion regulation is substantially goal-driven. For example, an emotionally intelligent 
individual can use this skill branch to adaptively manipulate the affective responses of work 
colleagues in order to foster a favourable impression or strategically motivate action towards 
achieving team goals (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Hochschild, 1983).  
The third branch for emotion utilisation incorporates four subcomponents: flexible 
planning, creative thinking, redirected attention, and motivation (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). 
Flexible planning involves the use of mood transformations to shift mindsets, expanding 
consideration of possible actions and outcomes, thereby maximising the potential to plan for 
and seize future opportunities. Creative thinking denotes the use of positive moods to 
facilitate cognitive integration and categorisation of information that assists in problem 
solving. Utilisation of emotion relies on aspects of attentional control; using emotion 
adaptively to redistribute attentional resources in response to situational demands.  For 
example, individuals sensitive to emotionally-potent stimuli can redirect attention to the most 
salient features of their environment, devoting finite personal resources to information 
relevant for successful functioning. Finally, emotion utilisation has a motivating purpose; 
emotionally intelligent individuals use moods to motivate persistence towards personally-
held values or goals. For example, performance anxiety preceding exam situations may 
motivate prolonged study sessions resulting in better grades (Alpert & Haber, 1960). Implicit 
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within all branches of the Salovey and Mayer (1990) framework is the idea that emotionally 
intelligent individuals acquire and use a vast skillset of emotional abilities to adapt to 
environmental demands and enhance the potential to achieve personally-valued outcomes.   
Mayer and Salovey (1997) later revised their original framework for emotional 
intelligence, extending it to a four-branch model emphasising cognitive processes and growth 
potential. The scope of the operational definition was re-specified as: 
the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access 
and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand 
emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote 
emotional and intellectual growth. (Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p. 10) 
Self-actualisation of the potential for emotional intelligence involves the acquisition 
of staged ability levels underlying each of the four branches in the model: (1) emotional 
perception in self/others, (2) emotional facilitation in decision making, (3) emotion 
understanding, (4) emotion regulation in self/others (Schutte, Malouff, Thorsteinsson, Bhullar 
& Rooke, 2007). Further, the model is hierarchical in nature, extending from the development 
of basic processes at the lowest level of perception, appraisal and expression of emotion 
towards more complex processes involved in reflective regulation of emotions. For example, 
at the lowest level of emotion processing, a student may perceive anxiety when choosing 
subject majors. Identification of this emotion can help prioritise thinking at the next level and 
direct energy towards problem-solving the various choices in the decision-making process. At 
the third level, emotional attributions can be assigned against various choices to anticipate 
each option‟s potential for satisfying personal needs, facilitating accurate analysis and 
decision-making. Finally, any residual anxiety from the process can be moderated through 
healthy regulation at the fourth level of emotional intelligence, mitigating the negative 
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impacts that anxiety can have on physiological arousal and health (e.g., Amiri, Monzer, & 
Nugent, 2012; Barger & Sydeman, 2005).  
 
2.2.2 Expanded or Mixed Emotional and Social Models 
While the Mayer and Salovey (1990, 1997) model of emotional intelligence provided 
one of the first comprehensive models for the construct, many other conceptual frameworks 
for emotional intelligence now exist. Researchers in the area generally note that alternative 
models for emotional intelligence do not necessarily contradict each other, but contribute 
different perspectives to the overall understanding of the concept (Schutte et al., 1998). 
Goleman‟s (1995) popular book Emotional Intelligence made the concept widely accessible 
to the general community, describing the culmination of various research perspectives on the 
topic, including Bar-On‟s (2006) emotional-social intelligence framework.  
Bar-On‟s (2006, p. 3) conception of emotional intelligence is a “cross-section of 
interrelated emotional and social competencies, skills and facilitators that determine how 
effectively we understand and express ourselves, understand others and relate with them, and 
cope with daily demands”. Practically, Bar-On‟s (1997; 2006) model is based on a foundation 
of intrapersonal self-awareness, an understanding of individual strengths and weaknesses, as 
well as capacity for constructively expressing feelings. Interpersonally, it involves external 
awareness of the emotional expressions and needs of others that nurtures the formation of 
mutually beneficial social relationships. The key outcome attributed to high levels of Bar-
On‟s (1997; 2006) emotional-social-intelligence is the ability to manage and adapt to change, 
whether personal, social or environmental. In this model, high emotional intelligence reflects 
capable and flexible responding to situational demands using the emotional-social-
intelligence competencies for effective problem solving and decision making (Bar-On, 2006). 
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This means managing emotions to achieve desired outcomes and maintain optimism, 
positivity and motivation. The five dimensions underlying Bar-On‟s (2006) model 
demonstrate a broadened scope of emotional intelligence, reflecting its social intelligence 
origins and combining a variety of personality traits into the construct: intrapersonal, 
interpersonal, adaptability, stress management and general mood (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 
2004). Models of emotional intelligence featuring broader applications and social contexts 
contributed to a theoretical divide in the literature.  
 
2.2.3 Defining Emotional Intelligence as an Ability or a Trait 
The expanding field of emotional intelligence informed by multiple perspectives 
resulted in fundamentally different approaches to defining and measuring the concept. The 
primary models defined emotional intelligence as a set of pure abilities (Ciarrochi, Chan & 
Caputi, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997), while other researchers approached it from a 
characteristic personality trait perspective (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995; Petrides & 
Furnham, 2000; Schutte & Malouff, 1999). Ability models attempted to define emotional 
intelligence using traditional criteria for establishing a legitimate form of intelligence that is 
conceptually related to other mental abilities and develops of over the lifespan (Mayer, 
Caruso, & Salovey, 1999). The literature generally supports emotional intelligence as a 
distinct intelligence domain (e.g., MacCann, 2010), viewing it as an information processing 
aptitude operating on an accumulated repository of emotional knowledge. Ability models 
represent a narrow specification of the construct concerned with emotional recognition and 
control, and the integration of these abilities with cognition. Accordingly, ability assessments 
are generally based on maximal performance across a series of tasks designed to objectively 
demonstrate emotional capabilities as a form of intelligence. 
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In contrast, conceptualisations often referred to as trait models of emotional 
intelligence (or mixed, where broadly specified) typically combine emotional abilities with 
personality features in the construct. Emotional intelligence is viewed as an innate 
characteristic incorporating an array of intellect, personality and affective components such 
as motivation, positivity, optimism and impulsivity (Petrides & Furnham, 2001; Petrides et 
al., 2016). Trait models concerned with typical functioning, or behavioural consistency across 
situations, are more appropriately assessed through validated self-report inventories, 
essentially capturing aggregate emotional self-efficacy. Figure 1.2 displays the intersection of 
emotion with intelligence and the broader features associated with some mixed models. 
 
Figure 2.2. The scope of emotional intelligence for integrated ability and mixed models.  
Adapted from “Human Abilities: Emotional Intelligence.” by J. D. Mayer, R. D. Roberts, and 
S. G. Barsade, 2008, Annual Review of Psychology, 59, C-1. 
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Reviews synthesising the various streams of emotional intelligence research view the 
construct as a tripartite model, consisting of crystallised emotional knowledge, the ability to 
use that knowledge, and typical behaviours that reflect how we generally implement 
emotional knowledge and abilities as a characteristic personality trait (Mikolajczak, Petrides, 
Coumans, & Luminet, 2009; Petrides et al., 2016). This reconciliation of divergent 
perspectives concords with the idea that research endeavours investigating ability, trait or 
mixed models provide a complementary understanding of the construct (Schutte et al., 1998, 
2009). Ability and trait literatures demonstrate similar empirical support for a wide range of 
beneficial outcomes.  
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2.3 The Benefits of Emotional Intelligence 
Various models of emotional intelligence converge on functional aspects, involving 
the intelligent deployment of emotional abilities to facilitate flexible and adaptive responding 
to situational demands. In particular, multiple frameworks stress the role of emotional 
intelligence for effective decision making (e.g. Bar-On, 2006). Explanation of Mayer and 
Salovey‟s (1997) model incorporated a decision-making example spanning all four branches 
of emotional abilities. In addition, emotional intelligence research generally investigates the 
construct from an individual difference approach, examining variations in emotional abilities 
or traits and how these differences impact outcomes across life domains (Peña-Sarrionandia, 
Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2014). Research efforts emphasise the role of emotional intelligence 
in health and workplace settings (Martins, Ramalho, & Morin, 2010; O‟Boyle, Humphrey, 
Pollack, Hawver, & Story, 2011). Furthermore, emotional intelligence is increasingly 
recognised as a platform for building additional individual strengths that contribute to 
positive outcomes in these areas (e.g., Schutte & Loi, 2014). 
 
2.3.1 Emotional Intelligence in Decision Making  
The role of emotional intelligence in decision making has potentially wide-ranging 
impacts, given the proliferation of choice and decision points permeating most realms of 
daily functioning. The majority of emotional intelligence models emphasise the use of 
emotions to guide thinking and behaviour necessary for effective decision making (Bar-On, 
2006; Mayer & Salovey, 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1997). For example, the second branch of 
Mayer and Salovey‟s (1997) model specifically relates to emotional facilitation of decision 
making. Emotionally-assisted decision-making incorporates somatic markers as informational 
stimuli to aid judgment when evaluating decision options (Bartol & Linquist, 2014; Damasio, 
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2008). Learning history builds a range of emotional associations that trigger a physiological 
response in anticipation of decision-making. Emotionally intelligent individuals can use these 
somatic markers to inform choice, avoiding or approaching certain options depending on 
whether the somatic response is positive or negative (Bartol & Linquist, 2014; Damasio, 
2008). Emotional information, conveyed partially through these physiological sensations, is 
integrated with cognitive evaluations pertinent to the available choices to facilitate decision 
making.  
Neuropsychological findings support the facilitative role of emotional intelligence in 
decision-making. Bar-On, Tranel, and Bechara (2003) tested individuals with neural damage 
to somatic marker circuitry. These patients exhibited significantly lower emotional 
intelligence and pervasive patterns of poor judgement in decision-making compared to 
patients with lesions in other brain regions, despite normal levels of cognitive intelligence 
and absence of DSM-IV psychopathology (Bar-On et al., 2003). These findings support the 
theory that emotions heuristically assist in the efficient analysis and accuracy of decision-
making. 
The benefits of emotional intelligence in decision-making may extend beyond the 
decision process itself. Suboptimal decision-making can instigate negative emotionality and 
cognitive evaluations such as rumination and regret, particularly for individuals with a 
tendency for decision maximisation (a personality disposition to seek the optimal choice in 
any situation, regardless of the search costs or personal resources involved; Schwartz et al., 
2002). A capacity to reflectively regulate emotions should assist in detaching from negative 
emotions and ruminative thought patterns, prompting transitions into more positive and 
adaptive states. Research indicates that emotionally intelligent individuals use emotions to 
mindfully deploy attention towards a non-judgmental awareness of the present moment 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Schutte & Malouff, 2011), demonstrating less ruminative focus on 
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suboptimal past decisions than individuals with lower levels of emotional intelligence 
(Petrides, Pérez-González, & Furnham, 2007; Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002). 
Through these mechanisms, emotional intelligence may contribute to improved outcomes in 
decision-making. 
 
2.3.2 Determinant of Health 
High emotional intelligence is associated with improved mental and physical health 
(e.g., Sánchez-Álvarez, Extremera, & Fernández-Berrocal, 2015).  Accurate perception, 
understanding, utilisation, and regulation of emotion theoretically protects against the 
manifestation of maladaptive emotional states (Schutte, Malouff, Thorsteinsson, Bhullar, & 
Rooke, 2007), which occur when inappropriate emotions arise with respect to content, timing, 
or intensity (Peña-Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2014). Many mental health disorders 
are characterised by maladaptive emotional states, implying that emotional intelligence may 
mitigate the risk of these conditions developing (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002; 
Zeidner & Matthews, 2016). The influence of emotional intelligence may extend into 
physical realms through psychosocial factors. For example, better interpersonal functioning 
generates greater social support, which can be used as a resource and buffer against physical 
illness (Brown & Schutte, 2006; Schutte et al., 2007; Zeidner & Matthews, 2016). 
Intrapersonal features associated with high emotional intelligence, such as optimism and 
motivation, may foster medical compliance and positive health behaviours, further 
attenuating physical illness (Brown & Schutte, 2006; Fernández-Abascal & Martín-Díaz, 
2015; Schutte et al., 2007). Consistent with these predictions, tobacco, alcohol and illicit drug 
use are inversely related to emotional intelligence, controlling for cognitive intelligence and 
  
22 
 
personality variables (Abdollahi, Talib, Yaacob, & Ismail, 2016; Bracket, Mayer, & Warner, 
2004; Trinidad & Johnson, 2002).  
Meta-analyses statistically combining comparable results potentially provide the most 
accurate estimation for the predictive validity of emotional intelligence towards beneficial 
outcomes (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004), particularly given that the research field 
encompasses multiple conceptualisations and measurement methods. Schutte et al. (2007) 
performed the first comprehensive meta-analysis examining the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and health. Emotional intelligence demonstrated a significant 
relationship with physical health, mental health, and psychosomatic health, following 
analysis of 44 weighted effect sizes from 7,898 participants. Martins, Ramalho, and Morin 
(2010) subsequently confirmed these findings in a meta-analysis including 105 effect sizes 
from 19,815 participants. Emotional intelligence demonstrated medium associations with 
physical health (r = .27), mental health (r = .36), and psychosomatic health (r = .33). 
Cumulative analysis indicated that these results are stable and sufficient; a significant positive 
relationship between emotional intelligence and health is well-established and additional 
research in the area should not materially alter the findings (Martins et al., 2010; Mullen, 
Muellerleile, & Bryant, 2001). This literature strongly supports the value of emotional 
intelligence as a predictor of various health domains. 
 
2.3.3 Workplace Functioning 
The benefits of emotional intelligence are not limited to health. Various theoretical 
reasons exist to support a positive relationship between emotional intelligence and workplace 
functioning. Emotion regulation abilities can be used to induce positive affective states that 
benefit individual and organisational outcomes (Martins et al., 2010). Individuals high in 
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emotional intelligence typically exhibit more positive mood states and efficient mood repair 
following negative inductions (Schutte, Malouff, Simunek, Hollander, & McKenley, 2002). 
Positive emotions broaden attentional scope, behavioural repertoires and flexibility 
(Fredrickson, 2001), potentially contributing to improved job performance. Some models 
show that positive affect predicts work performance through interpersonal and motivational 
processes, generating social support between co-workers, perceived efficacy in work tasks 
and task persistence (Tsai, Chen, & Liu, 2007). The importance of emotional intelligence in 
the workplace may be further heightened in roles with high emotional labour such as the 
service sector, where employees are required to regulate emotional expression in 
conformance with (usually positive) display codes (Grandey, 2000). This role requirement 
may be less strenuous for emotionally intelligent individuals to fulfil, leading to improved 
performance and perhaps fewer of the negative outcomes associated with excessive attempts 
to comply with emotional labour such as burnout (Joseph & Newman, 2010; Hochschild, 
1983; Grandey, 2000). 
A cascading model of emotional intelligence theorises a stepwise progression through 
the Mayer and Salovey (1997) four-branch emotional intelligence hierarchies towards 
improved job performance (Joseph & Newman, 2010). Attention, appraisal and response in 
relation to work situations correspond to perception, understanding and regulation of 
emotion, respectively (Joseph & Newman, 2010). In this model, perception of emotional cues 
in the work environment leads to a larger reservoir of emotional information available for 
accurate appraisal and consequently appropriate response formation, ultimately facilitating 
improved functional and adaptive performance (Joseph & Newman, 2010). Accordingly, 
emotional intelligence may promote job performance through multiple affective, emotion 
perception, comprehension, and regulation processes. 
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Van Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) conducted the first meta-analysis investigating the 
operational validity of emotional intelligence for predicting performance in employment, 
academic and life settings, respectively. The predictive validity of emotional intelligence was 
positive across all performance settings. Moreover, emotional intelligence demonstrated 
substantial incremental validity in predicting performance above the common big five 
personality traits, as well as some incremental validity over general mental ability, providing 
robust support for emotional intelligence as a distinct and valuable construct (Van Rooy & 
Viswesvaran, 2004). The authors concluded that emotional intelligence is an important 
predictor of work performance and shows more validity than traditional workforce selection 
methods (such as referee reports).  
O‟Boyle, Humphrey, Pollack, Hawver, and Story (2011) subsequently capitalised on 
continued research in the area to confirm the original findings in a meta-analysis with more 
than double the sample size of the Van Roy and Viswesvaran (2004) study. Various 
conceptual streams of emotional intelligence (e.g., performance, ability and self-reported 
trait) equally predicted job performance. The authors conducted rigorous epsilon rated 
dominance analysis to determine the relative importance of emotional intelligence in 
predicting job performance against traditional cognitive and personality factors. More than 
13% of the variance in job performance was attributable to emotional intelligence (O‟Boyle 
et al., 2011). This is a substantial finding given the conservative estimates applied to the 
relationship between cognitive intelligence and job performance (based on Schmidt, Schaffer, 
& Oh, 2008). As a construct, emotional intelligence demonstrated a significant incremental 
contribution to work performance, exceeding the high threshold of cognitive intelligence and 
the big five personality traits. These results are less susceptible to common method variance 
criticisms (i.e., where significant correlations stem from response biases) given the job 
performance criterion variable was rated by others (e.g., peers, supervisors, followers) rather 
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than self-reported. This meta-analysis provides compelling support for the benefits of 
emotional intelligence in the workplace, suggesting that the value of the construct extends 
beyond other factors already contributing a large portion of variance in work performance 
(O‟Boyle et al., 2011). 
The importance of emotional intelligence in the organisational context is further 
supported in a meta-analysis of leadership styles (Harms & Credé, 2010), which evaluated 
claims that emotional intelligence competencies determine up to 90% of the distinguishing 
features in outstanding leaders (Kemper, 1999). While the meta-analysis found that claims of 
emotional intelligence advocates were somewhat overstated, it did support the contribution of 
emotional intelligence to positive leadership styles and demonstrated negative correlations 
with poor leadership. For example, transformational leadership is widely considered to 
predict heightened managerial effectiveness and performance, contributing to team 
motivation and satisfaction (Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Miao, Humphrey, & Qian, 2016). 
Transformational leaders are characterised by confidence, commitment, values-driven action, 
collegial support, mentoring, and motivational and inspirational influences that promote team 
engagement (Harms & Credé, 2010). The Harms and Credé (2010) meta-analysis found a 
moderately strong validity estimate of .41 between overall emotional intelligence and 
transformational leadership across all samples. In contrast, emotional intelligence 
demonstrated a moderately strong inverse relationship with absent or laissez-faire leadership 
styles, where managers avoid decision making, action, responsibility, and accountability 
(Harms & Credé, 2010). The accumulating meta-analytic evidence shows that emotional 
intelligence may be a valuable facilitator of work performance and provide a compounding 
effect through increased leader effectiveness in organisational settings. 
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2.3.4 Emotional Intelligence as a Foundation for Individual Strengths 
The preceding discussion highlights the functional benefits of emotional intelligence 
in decision making, health and workplace domains. In addition to these direct outcomes, 
emotional intelligence may serve as a foundation for building further individual strengths. 
Schutte and Loi (2011) demonstrated that emotional intelligence is a platform for strengths-
building in relation to workplace social support and perception of power, which predicted 
improved work engagement as an indicator of workplace flourishing. Emotional intelligence 
may build further strengths through affective components. For example, emotion regulation 
abilities may aid the development and maintenance of positive emotional states. Emotional 
intelligence is associated with the characteristic experience of positive mood and transient 
state positive affect (Schutte, Malouff, Simunek, & Hollander, 2002). The adaptive value of 
positive emotion was highlighted in broaden-and-build theory as a mechanism for growth 
potential and the accumulation of personal resources (Fredrickson, 2001). Accordingly, the 
capacity for emotionally intelligent individuals to experience greater levels of positive 
emotion across situations may culminate in a variety of additional personal resources, 
including the acquisition of individual strengths. Psychological flexibility is one such strength 
that emotional intelligence may promote through positive affect and numerous other 
mechanisms inherent in emotional intelligence competencies. 
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Chapter 3 
The Potential Contribution of Emotional Intelligence to Psychological Flexibility 
3.1 Defining Psychological Flexibility 
Psychological flexibility is a broad construct, representing the culmination of multiple 
research fields including emotion regulation, mindfulness and acceptance, neuropsychology, 
social, personality and developmental psychology (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). A review 
synthesising prior research on the topic formulated an all-inclusive definition conceptualising 
psychological flexibility as: 
a range of human abilities to: recognize and adapt to various situational demands; 
shift mindsets or behavioural repertoires when these strategies compromise personal 
or social functioning; maintain balance among important life domains; and be aware, 
open, and committed to behaviours that are congruent with deeply held values.  
(Kashdan and Rottenberg, 2010, p. 865)  
Psychological flexibility is increasingly featured as a fundamental aspect of health, and the 
vast adaptive abilities encapsulated in the concept provide substantial benefits to individuals 
navigating the social environment (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). 
 
3.2 The Benefits of Psychological Flexibility in Decision-Making and  
Workplace Functioning 
Psychological flexibility offers a unique perspective on the dynamic interaction 
between people and their environment or social transactions (e.g., Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010). The modern world is a highly stimulating, constantly fluctuating environment, and the 
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ability to adapt when confronted with these circumstances is considered important for 
psychological health and well-being (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). The adaptive abilities 
inherent in psychological flexibility can be determinative of outcomes across a variety of 
situational contexts such as decision-making and workplace functioning. 
From the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) tradition in psychopathology, 
psychological flexibility denotes a capacity to accept internal subjective experiences (e.g., 
cognitions, emotions, and physiological sensations) in order to maintain attention and action 
towards valued goals afforded within the situational context (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, 
& Lillis, 2006). This process equips individuals with the ability to devote finite personal 
resources (e.g. attention and energy) towards meaningful pursuits as opposed to inwardly-
focusing on regulatory attempts to deal with internal phenomena (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010). ACT interventions use mindfulness-based exercises to promote awareness of the 
present moment and acceptance of internal cognitions, emotions, or sensations, without 
rumination (Seligman & Reichenberg, 2012). The absence of psychological flexibility is 
linked to pathological processes of rumination and behavioural perseveration (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyuubomirsky, 2008). In the previous discussion of emotional 
intelligence, rumination was identified as a potential feature in circumstances of suboptimal 
decision-making, particularly for individuals who may display personality traits with a desire 
to maximise decision outcomes (Schwartz et al., 2002). Accordingly, high levels of 
psychological flexibility may attenuate the effects of maximisation on rumination in decision 
situations, which are commonly encountered as an aspect of daily life. 
In the workplace domain, psychological flexibility is associated with behavioural 
effectiveness and positive outcomes such as increased organisational awareness and 
perceived job control (Bond, Flaxman, & Bunce, 2008; Hayes et al., 2006). Operationalised 
using ACT models, psychological flexibility is measured on the Acceptance and Action 
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Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011), which scores self-reported global flexibility 
levels averaged across contexts (Bond, Lloyd, & Guenole, 2013). High levels of 
psychological flexibility on this measure have positively predicted task performance, job 
motivation, and work engagement comprising vigour, dedication and absorption dimensions 
on the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale (UWES; Schaufeli, Bakker & Salanova, 2006; Bond 
et al., 2013). In addition, high psychological flexibility scores on AAQ-II were negatively 
related to job absenteeism and general measures of psychological distress (Bond et al., 2013). 
Longitudinal research shows that ACT interventions targeting psychological flexibility 
generate positive workplace outcomes, including improved mental health of employees 
(Flaxman & Bond, 2010), organisational innovation (Bond & Bunce, 2000), and reduced 
burnout (the conceptual opposite of work engagement; Lloyd, Bond, & Flaxman, 2013). 
A context-specific version of the AAQ-II demonstrates similar findings with 
additional sensitivity to workplace outcomes. In particular, the Work-related Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire (WAAQ; Bond et al., 2013) demonstrated correlations of greater 
magnitude between psychological flexibility and the UWES dimensions of work engagement 
than the AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2013). Measurement methods utilising context-specific 
instruments acknowledge the contextually-bound nature of psychological flexibility. 
Individual differences in psychological flexibility manifest both interpersonally and 
intrapersonally; variations in psychological flexibility can occur for the same individual 
across situations (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Bond et al., 2013). Therefore, contextual 
approaches represent a more accurate method for assessing the relationship between 
psychological flexibility and other variables like emotional intelligence.  
In Chapter 2, it was proposed that emotional intelligence may provide a solid 
foundation for building strengths such as psychological flexibility. Exploration of the 
conditions under which psychological flexibility may be enhanced seems warranted on the 
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basis of the associated positive outcomes in terms of health benefits, adaptive coping, and 
functional success in decision making and workplace flourishing. Theoretically, the 
individual difference of emotional intelligence may contribute to the development of 
psychological flexibility as a personal resource through a number of mechanisms. In 
particular, the set of emotional competencies underlying models of emotional intelligence, 
and the characteristic experience of positive affect, may facilitate psychological flexibility. 
 
3.3 Relating Psychological Flexibility to Emotional Intelligence Competencies 
Understanding the potential contribution of emotional intelligence towards 
psychological flexibility is aided through examination of its various conceptual incarnations 
across decades of research and theoretical perspectives. Psychological flexibility has been 
studied under closely synonymous names, including self-regulation, response modulation, 
executive control, and ego-resiliency, among others (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Each of 
these fields contributes a unique understanding to the range of processes that manifest as 
psychological flexibility.  
 
3.3.1 Self-regulation 
Self-regulation involves the ability to control emotions and behaviour as a situation 
warrants, and can be conceived either as a stable trait or state feature. A popular example of 
self-regulation involves delayed gratification research. In one study, children were presented 
with the opportunity to win additional treats if they could delay immediate gratification or 
consumption of the first treat (Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988). Children who successfully 
delayed gratification, a demonstration of self-regulatory behaviour, scored higher on 
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subsequent measures of academic success than their more impulsive peers. This longitudinal 
research implies that a minimal level of behavioural control is important for achieving 
optimal and adaptive outcomes. Goleman (1995) described emotional self-control or delayed 
gratification, as essential to accomplishment of all kinds, and included the ability to restrain 
impulsivity in a broad conceptualisation of trait emotional intelligence (Carver & Scheier, 
1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). This suggests that psychological flexibility, informed 
from self-regulation research, and emotional intelligence may be somewhat overlapping 
constructs. Emotional and behavioural control through self-regulation can be achieved via a 
number of strategies. 
An individual can employ a variety of self-regulation strategies such as acceptance, 
cognitive reappraisal or suppression. While certain strategies are generally considered 
superior to others (Gross & John, 2003), some researchers suggest that the benefits of 
particular strategies are contingent upon the situation and goals (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010; Peña-Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2014). Flexibly modifying a strategy to 
align with the context, rather than selecting a universal strategy, may impart greater benefits 
across a variety of situations, depending on what the individual aims to achieve. For example, 
in a hypothetical social scenario, participants role-played landlords questioning tenants over a 
missed rental payment (Tamir, 2009; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Researchers instructed 
participants to either achieve quick payment (confrontational goal) or maintain a constructive 
long-term relationship (collaborative goal). Participants in the confrontational condition who 
engaged in anger-inducing activities prior to the social interaction outperformed participants 
experiencing more pleasant hedonic tone. In contrast, participants in the collaborative 
condition engaged in strategies to enhance positive mood to encourage a more positive 
encounter.  
  
32 
 
The findings suggested that improved performance hinged upon the strategic 
facilitation of emotion (positive or negative) conducive to the applied situational goal. In this 
way, an awareness of the functional features of emotion and how to generate emotional states 
in the self was important to self-regulation and flexible responding, ultimately dictating 
performance within the social context (Barrett, Gross, Conner, & Benvenuto, 2001; Farb, 
Anderson, Irving, & Segal, 2014). Therefore, emotional intelligence competencies may be 
fundamental to the self-regulatory aspects of psychological flexibility. To this extent, 
Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) identified  that education on the functional value and 
advantages of various types of positive and negative emotions, including appropriate 
magnitude and expression, “explicitly addresses psychological flexibility” (p. 867). 
Accordingly, interventions to enhance emotional intelligence, particularly building 
repertoires of emotional knowledge and their associated utilities, may directly impact 
psychological flexibility.  
 
3.3.2 Response Modulation 
The flexible deployment of emotion through self-regulation is somewhat related to the 
concept of response modulation. The response modulation hypothesis (Patterson & Newman, 
1993) proposes that the self has a dominant response set to particular situations. In some 
circumstances, successful functioning may depend on an individual‟s ability to adapt or 
modulate their default emotional or behavioural responses. Deficits in the response 
modulation system result in behavioural perseveration in response to changing circumstances, 
denoting a decreased ability to inhibit innate patterns of responding.  
In a novel study investigating emotional response modulation, participants viewed a 
series of evocative images and were periodically instructed to express or suppress emotional 
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reactions (Bonanno et al., 2004). Trained observers rated the participants‟ ability to follow 
either strategy. Students with response modulation sets biased against the expression of 
positive emotion (i.e. low aptitude to express coupled with high aptitude to suppress positive 
emotions), experienced more distress in the three months following 9/11, partially suggesting 
that positive emotionality may be protective of healthy adjustment and well-being. However, 
combining observer ratings for performance in both expression and suppression strategies, 
showed that higher scores on this index of psychological flexibility predicted greater levels of 
adjustment for close to two years following the study (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal & 
Coifman, 2004). Consistent with this finding, daily diary studies examining stressors in 
naturally arising contexts found that variability in appraisals and coping strategy profiles 
(e.g., problem-focused or emotion-focused coping; active- or passive-focussed) was 
positively correlated with effective adjustment and negatively correlated with symptoms of 
psychopathology (Cheng, 2001; Cheng, 2003). In these cases, the ability to flexibly apply 
different types of emotional response modulation strategies facilitated health outcomes in 
laboratory and ecological settings.  
While emotional intelligence is generally associated with characteristic positive mood 
and accurate emotional expression (Schutte, Malouff, Simunek, McKenley, & Hollander, 
2002), the underlying emotional competencies incorporate the ability to monitor and 
reflectively engage or detach from emotion as needed (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997). This implies that high emotional intelligence may promote flexible response 
modulation, at least in relation to emotional content. The response modulation hypothesis 
theorised that individuals with deficits in this system are not sensitive to environmental cues 
that signal a need to adjust the dominant response (Patterson & Newman, 1993). The inability 
to shift attention towards environmental cues necessary to inform corrective action results in 
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a persisting maladaptive response. This process implicates attentional control, a feature of 
executive functioning, in psychological flexibility.  
 
3.3.3 Executive Function and Control 
Executive functioning is considered an essential element of psychological flexibility, 
comprising the ability to prioritize and integrate cognitive capacities such as shifting mindsets 
and attention in response to changing contexts and stimuli (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; 
Posner & Rothbart, 1998). The ability to adjust mental states is fundamental to cognitive and 
behavioural adaption to fluctuating situational demands which commonly occur in fluid, 
natural environments. Executive control specifically involves the cognitive capacity to 
rapidly shift attention toward a desired object or task as well as narrow or broaden focus from 
local to global elements. The attentional focus provided by executive control is critical to 
recognition of task requirements and self-regulatory behaviours towards desired goal-
pursuits, consistent with psychological flexibility (Goldberg, 2001). 
Emotions are also credited with broadening attention to global features (Fredrickson 
& Branigan, 2005) and facilitating attentional shifts by directing attention to the salient 
features of the environment (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). An initial global focus could assist 
emotionally intelligent individuals in detecting salient inputs, facilitating later attentional re-
direction towards appropriate, personally-relevant information (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; 
Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Utilisation of the emotional skill component of the Mayer-Salovey 
models of emotional intelligence relies on aspects of attentional control; using emotion 
adaptively to prioritise thinking and redistribute attentional resources in response to 
situational demands. Consequently, the adaptive emotional functioning inherent in emotional 
intelligence may facilitate executive control and thereby psychological flexibility.  
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Cortical structures for executive functioning are shared with somatic marker circuitry; 
the emotional-physiological inputs that are hypothesised to guide behaviour and decision 
making (Bar-On, Tranel, Denberg, & Bechara, 2003). To some degree, this suggests that 
emotional intelligence and the executive functioning aspects of psychological flexibility may 
be neurologically linked. Developmental studies examining emotional learning in schools 
provide some support for this theoretical connection. Administration of a specialised social 
and emotional learning curriculum showed development in neural circuitry specific to 
executive function in the prefrontal cortex (Goleman, 1995). The academic achievements 
associated with the program were attributed to improved attention and working memory 
(Greenberg, Kusché, Cook, Quamma, 1995). The emotional learning experience generated 
brain neuroplasticity towards flexibility and impulse control, key features of psychological 
flexibility.  
 
3.3.4 Ego Resilience 
Ego resiliency has been defined as the ability to respond adaptively to situational 
challenges confronted throughout the lifespan (Block & Block, 2006). It confers the ability to 
reduce or increase behavioural control, and expand or narrow attention as the situation 
warrants (Block & Block, 2006). Accordingly, it incorporates features of executive control, 
self-regulation and response modulation. People with low ego resilience demonstrate limited 
flexibility, anxiety and perseveration in response to novel or conflicting demands (Block & 
Block, 2006). For example, behaviours associated with low ego-resilience include rigid 
adherence to coping strategies, inappropriate emotional expressiveness and negative 
emotional reactions in response to environmental demands. In contrast, high ego-resiliency is 
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associated with high-levels of social functioning and emotional expressiveness, and positive 
emotional reactions and recovery following stressful events (Gjerde, Block, & Block, 1986).  
Features of ego resiliency represent emotional intelligence competences. Ego-resilient 
children actually demonstrate biological resilience in negative home environments, with 
attenuated physiological reactions along the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis 
compared to children with less ego-resilience (Smeekens, Risksen-Walraven, & Bakel, 2007). 
Given that emotions co-ordinate physiological responses to stress, it is possible that a 
requisite of level emotional intelligence assists adaptation to negative emotional experiences, 
enhancing healthy outcomes. Studies explicitly examining the role of emotional intelligence 
in ego-resiliency found that adaptive ego defence styles (e.g., sublimation) were correlated 
with overall emotional intelligence (Pelleteri, 2002; Mayer, Saolvey, Caruso, 2004), 
providing some support for the proposition that emotional intelligence facilitates ego-
resiliency and therefore psychological flexibility. 
 
3.3.5 Positive Affect as a Building Block of Psychological Flexibility 
Individuals with high emotional intelligence experience greater levels of transient 
state positive affect and display enduring characteristic positivity, theoretically due to 
heightened emotion regulation abilities or sensitivity to positive stimuli in the environment 
(Schutte et al., 2002). Positive emotional states have been shown to broaden the scope of 
attention and the size of thought-action repertoires (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Using 
emotions to direct attentional resources is a defined feature of emotional intelligence 
(Salovey & Mayer, 1990), and is critical to flexible executive control which underpins 
psychological flexibility. Appropriate attentional focus may facilitate identification of 
situational demands as a perquisite to effective behavioural adjustment. Further, broadened 
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thought-action urges stimulate a wider behavioural set, potentially prompting selection of a 
more adaptive response in the circumstances. Consequently, expansion of these cognitive and 
behavioural components may contribute to effective recognition and adaptation to situational 
demands, while helping shift repertoires appropriate to the situation. In this way, emotional 
intelligence may influence major branches of the human abilities underlying psychological 
flexibility primarily through positive emotion. These considerations informed the process 
variables identified in Figure 1.1., conceptualising the hypothesised relationship from 
emotional intelligence to psychological flexibility through positive affect.  
 
3.4 Arguments Implying an Inverse Relationship between Emotional Intelligence and 
Psychological Flexibility 
In the Acceptance and Commitment (ACT) model, psychological flexibility involves 
a mindful awareness of thoughts and feelings, and the ability to persist or change behaviour 
to achieve valued goals, depending on the situational affordances (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999). It involves open acceptance of emotional experiences and committed values-driven 
action even in the face of substantial challenges that may invoke negative emotion. From this 
perspective, it is important that an individual does not devote resources to emotional control 
in relation to negative thoughts or feelings; a process that interferes with active engagement 
towards meaningful goal-pursuits (Kashdan, Breen, & Julian, 2010). Self-control is a 
potentially depletable resource and tasks which require substantial levels of control disrupt 
executive functioning for subsequent activities (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). 
Consequently, excessive attempts to self-regulate emotion are considered counterproductive 
to mindful engagement with the environment and psychological flexibility (Kashdan et al., 
2010). Given that emotional self-regulation is a core component of emotional intelligence, it 
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could interfere with psychologically flexible responding. However, this viewpoint can be 
disputed on a number of grounds.  
Emotion regulation does not imply over-control or suppression and is related to the 
healthy expression or dilution of negative emotion in constructive ways (Van Rooy & 
Viswesvaran, 2004). In fact, emotionally intelligent individuals exert less effort as indicated 
in brain activity when regulating and solving emotional problems (Jausovec, Jausovec, & 
Gerlic, 2001; Jausovec & Jausovec 2005). Furthermore, suppression of emotional expression 
is not a regulation strategy commonly employed by emotionally intelligent individuals (Peña-
Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2014). Suppression alters the behavioural manifestation 
of emotion but not the emotional content itself. High emotional intelligence involves the 
ability to transform emotional states, making suppression somewhat unnecessary. Given that 
suppression has a tendency to increase the internal experience of the emotion being 
suppressed, impacting physiological arousal systems, it may be a nominally maladaptive 
strategy. The fact that emotionally intelligent individuals tend to employ regulation strategies 
other than suppression indicates higher levels of adaptive psychological flexibility. In 
addition, these individuals do not need to rely on emotion regulation strategies to the extent 
of individuals with lower levels of emotional intelligence.  
Emotional labour reflects emotional control consistent with organisational display 
codes (Hochschild, 1983). Employees can utilise a variety of strategies to regulate emotion, 
including surface acting (expressing an emotion inconsistent with feelings) or deep acting 
(transitioning emotional content into acceptable expressions; Hochschild, 1983). While 
emotional intelligence might theoretically be related to deep acting, given the strategy relies 
on emotional skill, research actually indicates that emotional intelligence facilitates an 
alternative strategy named positive consonance; synchrony between felt emotion and 
condoned expression (Mikolajczak, Menil, & Luminet, 2007). This means emotional 
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intelligence mitigates the need for active emotional control, freeing personal resources for 
meaningful engagement with goals.  
Individuals with high trait emotional intelligence also show more mindful awareness 
and greater non-judgmental attention to the present moment (Brown, George-Curran, & 
Smith, 2003). These individuals are open to positive and negative aspects of internal 
experience (Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), rather than demonstrating 
experiential avoidance characteristic of psychological inflexibility (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010, Bond et al., 2011). In this way, emotionally intelligent individuals confront difficult 
situations and experiences in order to realise long-term benefits congruent with their goals 
(Bastian et al., 2005), consequently using less avoidant coping strategies (Gerits, Derksen, & 
Verbruggan, 2004; Petrides et al., 2007; Mikolajczak et al., 2009) and demonstrating higher 
levels of psychological flexibility.  
In summary, criticisms around the influence of emotional intelligence on 
psychological flexibility may be unfounded. Further, the balance of facilitative emotional 
intelligence competencies potentially contributing to psychological flexibility may outweigh 
any negative inputs. However, it is important to note that a positive relationship between 
emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility may be context-dependent. For example, 
findings relating to emotional labour may not extend to organisational roles requiring 
negative emotional expression (e.g. funeral director, law enforcement officers or security 
guards). In these cases, positive consonance is unhelpful, and emotional intelligence may 
increase the depth of negative emotional experience to dysfunctional proportions. Some 
researchers (e.g., Mikolajczak et al., 2007) have noted that studies examining emotional 
intelligence as a personality trait must consider the specific circumstances in which it may be 
adaptive. In the preceding discussion, emotional intelligence was identified as adaptive in 
decision making and workplace settings, two areas which functionally benefit from 
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psychological flexibility. Consequently, examination in these contexts may present an ideal 
opportunity for understanding the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility. The following experimental chapters highlight investigation into the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility within decision 
making and workplace settings.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Input-context-output model of hypothesised relationships. 
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3.4.1 Operational Measurement for the Primary Variables in the Thesis 
The following section briefly highlights the rationale for operationalizing the primary 
variables across all four studies. The variety of available measurement approaches for 
emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility warrants considered selection. Emotional 
intelligence will be operationalised using the original Salovey and Mayer (1990) model 
which captures dimensions of emotional development encompassed in most frameworks and 
provides an accurate reflection of current emotional functioning (e.g., Schutte et al., 1998). 
The third emotion utilisation branch of this model closely reflects adaptive processes 
underlying psychological flexibility (i.e. attentional control, expanded or creative thinking, 
and flexible planning), providing a sensitive measure of emotional competencies that may 
facilitate a range of adaptive abilities. This model is primarily assessed through performance 
measures such as the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS; Mayer, Caruso, & 
Salovey, 1999), and the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; 
Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 2002), now in its second version (MSCEIT v2.0; Mayer, Salovey, 
Caruso, Sitarenios, 2003). Use of these tests is tightly controlled, requires specialised training 
and can be lengthy and costly to administer, particularly for large samples.  
Alternatively, the Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale (SEIS; Schutte et al., 1998) is 
a brief, reliable and validated measure based on the Salovey and Mayer (1990) emotional 
intelligence model. This self-report instrument comprises 33 items assessing each branch of 
the model. Psychometric validation of the SEIS demonstrated significant correlations with 
less alexithymia, greater attention to and clarity of feelings, and empathic perspective-taking 
(Schutte et al., 1998), features of Salovey and Mayer‟s (1990) framework. The SEIS 
correlates with other emotional intelligence measures, including the traditional MSCEIT test 
(Bracket & Mayer, 2003), and predicts theoretically-related outcomes such as fewer 
maladaptive emotional states (such as depressed affect; Schutte et al., 1998; Oginska-Bulik, 
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2005), and improved workplace performance (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004). 
Accordingly, the SEIS represents an appropriate, accessible, valid and reliable approach for 
measuring the selected conceptualisation of emotional intelligence and its relationship with 
psychological flexibility.   
Psychological flexibility is conceptualised using the Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) 
definition quoted in section 2.1, which is a coverall of current understanding in psychology 
for the construct. Comprehensive measures operationalizing the broad concept of 
psychological flexibility can be resource-intensive, involving prolonged behavioural 
observation and performance assessments across situations to capture temporal and 
contextual fluctuations in abilities. The commonly used AAQ-II measure (Bond et al., 2011), 
in conjunction with the more recent WAAQ work-related version for the workplace study 
(Bond et al., 2013), will be utilised throughout this thesis as the measurement tool for 
psychological flexibility. As discussed, these instruments are linked to outcomes in the 
primary areas of research interest and represent accessible self-report approaches to 
measurement that can be consistently maintained across the multiple studies, ensuring 
replicable and comparable findings.  
Psychometric analysis of the AAQ-II demonstrated concurrent, longitudinal and 
incremental validity applied to theoretically-related health and workplace outcomes (e.g., 
absenteeism; Bond et al., 2011). The WAAQ demonstrated similar features, correlating with 
workplace variables at higher magnitudes (e.g. work engagement; Bond et al., 2013). 
Consequently, these measures are considered sufficient for testing the hypothesised 
relationship with emotional intelligence and associated outcomes in restricted decision 
making processes and workplace contexts considered in the following sections.  
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Chapter 4 
Decision Maximization: How Psychological Flexibility and Emotional Intelligence 
Influence Ruminative Outcomes 
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Abstract 
Two studies explored how a maximizing personality trait interacts with psychological 
flexibility to predict ruminative outcomes in the context of decision making. The studies also 
investigated the influence of emotion in decision making and how emotional intelligence may 
promote psychological flexibility. Study 1 found preliminary correlational support for the 
hypothesised relationships between rumination, maximization, psychological flexibility, 
emotional intelligence and positive and negative affect. Study 2 extended Gilbert and Ebert‟s 
(2002) decision changeability paradigm to manipulate ruminative change as a function of 
maximizing tendency. Results suggest that interventions to increase emotional intelligence 
may foster positive affect leading to improved psychological flexibility which, in turn, could 
mitigate ruminative outcomes associated with maximizing personality styles. Future research 
is recommended investigating the causal relationship between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility using experimental intervention.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Rational choice theory suggests that people respond logically to choices afforded in 
the environment, evaluating options against set preferences, in order to optimise decision-
making (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). However, in the complexity of real-life 
decision-making, it is rare that an individual has the resources to exhaustively gather 
information relevant to a choice. Therefore, while decision maximization is appealing, it is a 
virtually unachievable goal. Instead, Simon (1955, 1956) suggested that individuals 
„satisfice‟; choose an option if it satisfies a set of criteria imposed on the decision. The search 
for better options terminates as soon as the threshold of acceptability is exceeded. Schwartz et 
al. (2002) proposed that response tendencies to decision making can be characterised as a 
personality trait measured on the spectrum between satisficing and maximizing. Further, the 
extent to which individuals maximize their decision goals has consequences for health 
(Schwartz et al. 2002; Schwartz, 2004).  
 
4.1.1 Decision Styles and Negative Outcomes 
A number of post-decisional processes are implicated in the negative outcomes 
associated with maximization, such as depression, unhappiness and lower optimism 
(Schwartz et al., 2002). Schwartz et al. (2002) proposed that high maximizers constantly 
evaluate choices, particularly through social comparison, and tend to experience regret when 
choices are deemed suboptimal. Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) defined regret as a 
“comparison-based emotion of self-blame, experienced when people realize or imagine that 
their present situation would have been better had they decided differently in the past” (p. 6). 
Embedded in this process of regret is the concept of counterfactual thinking, imagining 
alternate outcomes to past events. Schwartz et al. (2002) found that maximization predicts 
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regret and counterfactual thinking. Further, regret partially mediated the relationship between 
maximization and depression, explaining to some extent the pathway to negative outcomes. 
Regret and counterfactual thinking are outcome-focussed variables that emphasise a 
temporal orientation for past events; that is, thought processes that evaluate what has 
happened as opposed to what will happen. These post-decisional cognitive processes are an 
important feature in the relationship between maximization and negative outcomes given the 
mediating role of regret between maximization and depression (Schwartz et al., 2002). 
However, viewing decision styles through a process-focussed approach, independent of 
temporal orientation, may further contribute to understanding the relationship between 
maximization and negative outcomes by spanning the range of anticipated and experienced 
regret. 
Rumination offers a process-oriented analogue to regret and counterfactual thinking. 
While rumination is most commonly defined as a repetitive focus on the symptoms of 
depression, and possible causes, meanings and consequences (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), 
broader conceptualisations have emerged which define rumination as a past and future-
oriented thought style (Brinker & Dozois, 2009). This definition of rumination includes 
components of experienced regret and counterfactual thinking, as well as forward thinking 
anticipated regret. Viewing and measuring rumination as a stable disposition towards 
repetitive, recurrent, intrusive, and uncontrollable thinking without bias from temporal 
orientation, valence, or content, will enable broader investigation of the effects of 
maximization on negative outcomes. This operationalisation encompasses a greater range of 
cognitive processes while avoiding potential confounding, for example, with depressive 
symptomatology, which should assist in clarifying the causative pathways.  
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Similar to the link between maximization, counterfactual thinking and regret, it is 
anticipated that high maximizers will demonstrate high levels of rumination. Maximizers 
engage in a process of constant choice re-evaluation and outcome comparison. It seems 
difficult for maximisers to distract from intrusive and recurring thoughts in anticipation of, 
and in response to, decision making.  These thinking patterns at the core of a maximizing 
personality trait share the essential features of ruminative thought styles, suggesting that 
maximization may engender rumination in decision situations. Given the negative outcomes 
associated with ruminative thought styles, such as depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), 
investigating the role of maximization on ruminative thinking is warranted. 
 
4.1.2 Decision Styles and Adaptive Processes 
Importantly, maximization is not always associated with negative outcomes. Schwartz 
et al. (2002) discussed maximization as an adaptive strategy, noting that outcomes are 
contextually-dependent; maximization could equally lead to adverse consequences or 
improved outcomes depending on the circumstances. In fact, negative and positive outcomes 
may occur simultaneously, with high maximizers achieving better objective outcomes (such 
as better jobs) while subjectively experiencing more regret associated with post-decisional 
evaluative processes (Polman, 2010). This complicates identification of the point at which 
maximization may become pathological. 
The inability to switch from maximizing to satisficing strategies in response to 
situational demands may be relevant to explaining the negative outcomes associated with 
high levels of maximizing tendencies. For example, Wieczorkowska and Burnstein (1999) 
posited that either narrow or broad decision strategies are adaptive depending on the search 
costs and number of opportunities available in the environment. In this way, adjusting search 
  
48 
 
strategies consistent with environmental demands is key to adaptive decision functioning. 
Schwartz et al. (2002) noted that higher scores on the maximization scale may actually reflect 
the number of domains impacted by maximizing tendencies; that is, individuals scoring 
highly on the maximisation scale display choice maximization across a variety of decisions 
contexts, potentially spanning more important as well as mundane decision making 
situations. This suggests that high scores on the maximization scale reflect a less adaptive 
deployment of decision making strategies across situations. Therefore, it is proposed that the 
rigid application of maximizing strategies across multiple domains is likely related to the 
associated negative outcomes, such as regret and depression, rather than the potentially 
warranted use of a maximizing strategy in isolated situations. 
Given that high levels of maximization may indicate inflexible decision strategies 
applied in multiple domains, it follows that maximization may impede adaptive abilities (i.e., 
psychological flexibility) in decision situations. Psychological flexibility is “a number of 
dynamic processes…reflected by how a person: (1) adapts to fluctuating situational demands, 
(2) reconfigures mental resources, (3) shifts perspective, and (4) balances competing desires, 
needs, and life domains” (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010, p.866). The desire to maximize at 
extremely high levels could override the ability to be psychologically flexible in decision 
contexts. In this case, a maximizing decision strategy is employed without sensitivity to the 
situational demands, demonstrating an inability to shift mindset from maximizing to 
satisficing and balance the need for maximization with more functional outcomes.  
Importantly, these processes are likely bi-directional in nature; high psychological 
flexibility may facilitate a shifting of decision strategy in the face of conflicting situational 
pressures. This suggests that maximization and psychological flexibility may demonstrate 
interaction effects in decision contexts that influence ruminative and related outcomes. For 
example, low levels of psychological flexibility are associated with rumination and 
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depression (e.g., Cribb et al., 2006; Rawal, Park, & Williams, 2010; Moulds, Kandris, Starr & 
Wong, 2007), while maximization is proposed to impede flexibility and engender rumination. 
This warrants an exploration of the relationship of maximization and psychological flexibility 
on ruminative outcomes in decision contexts. 
 
4.1.3 The Role of Emotion in Decision Making and Psychological Flexibility 
Emotion represents another factor that can play an integral and sometimes 
subconscious role in decision making. Damasio (2008) described the interdependence 
between emotions, physiology and decision making through the Somatic marker hypothesis.  
Learned emotional associations trigger a positive or negative physiological response in 
anticipation of decision making which is interpreted as an informational stimulus to guide 
future decisions and behaviours. The cognitive interpretation of the somatic marker informs 
choice and improves decision making efficiency. For example, anticipated regret can elicit 
strong emotional components that influence decision making. In situations with inherent risk, 
intense anticipatory emotions may bypass cognitive assessments to directly dominate choice 
and behaviour (Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, & Welch, 2001).  
In addition to the input of emotional stimulus during decision making, emotions may 
also serve adaptive processes. Fredrickson (2001) observed that negative emotions are an 
adaptive evolutionary mechanism, narrowing specific action tendencies and priming the fight 
or flight responses necessary for survival in adverse or dangerous situations. Extrapolating 
from this premise, Fredrickson‟s Broaden-and-build theory (2005) proposed that it is 
evolutionarily adaptive in non-threatening situations for positive emotions to facilitate a 
broadening of thought-action repertoires that manifests in cognitive and behavioural 
expansion, promoting personal growth and resource acquisition. Consistent with this, it has 
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been demonstrated that positive affectivity has expanded the scope of attention and thought-
action repertoires in laboratory experiments; key aspects of psychological flexibility 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). A wide attentional field improves recognition of situational 
demands, while a broadened repertoire of cognitive and behavioural (thought-action) 
responses enable selection of the most appropriate and adaptive decision or action in the 
circumstances. These findings are consistent with Kashdan and Rottenberg‟s (2010) 
proposition that positive affect is a fundamental building block for psychological flexibility.  
Emotional intelligence can be critical to the experience of positive affectivity. 
Emotional intelligence is the ability to adaptively perceive, understand, regulate, and harness 
emotions in the self and others (e.g., Salovey & Mayer, 1990).  Schutte et al. (2002) found 
that higher emotional intelligence was associated with greater increases in positive affect 
during exposure to positive state inductions, controlling for prior emotional level. Further, 
higher emotional intelligence was associated with positive affect maintenance during 
negative state inductions. The ability of highly emotionally intelligent individuals to regulate 
and harness positive emotions may facilitate the broadening processes identified in 
Fredrickson‟s theory and, consequently, promote psychologically flexible behaviours. 
Exploring the role of emotional intelligence on psychological flexibility through 
mood regulation may assist in identifying valid treatment approaches to improved 
psychological flexibility and ultimately less rumination for maximizing individuals. 
Emotional intelligence can be increased through training (Schutte & Malouff, 2013) and may 
offer alternate, inexpensive methods for improving psychological flexibility. The importance 
of this relationship is further highlighted if the present study supports the role of 
psychological flexibility in reducing the negative outcomes associated with maximization, 
such as rumination. For example, high emotional intelligence could result in the experience 
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of greater levels of positive affectivity, promoting psychological flexibility, which in turn 
attenuates the effects of maximization on ruminative thinking. 
 
4.2 Preliminary Investigation of Maximizing, Psychological Flexibility, Mood and 
Rumination (Study 1) 
This study assessed the relationship of a maximizing personality trait and 
psychological flexibility with rumination. Further, the study examined the relationship of 
positive and negative affect and emotional intelligence with psychological flexibility. It is 
hypothesised that maximization and psychological flexibility will be negatively associated 
and together significantly predict rumination, with maximization and psychological flexibility 
demonstrating positive and negative relationships with rumination, respectively. Further, 
emotional intelligence will be positively associated with positive affect and negatively 
associated with negative affect. Psychological flexibility will be significantly positively 
predicted by emotional intelligence and positive affect and negatively predicted by negative 
affect.  
 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants and Procedure 
A total convenience sample of 217 participants self-selected for the study. The sample 
consisted of 189 psychology students participating for research credit and 28 community 
members participating without incentive (Females 164, 75.6%; Males 52, 24.0%; Other 1, 
0.5%). The mean (M) age of participants was 22.05 years (SD = 8.54 years, range 17-70 
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years). The ethnicity of the sample was 74.7% Caucasian and 12.0% Asian, with remaining 
participants (13.3%) representing a variety of ethnic groups.  
Participants completed general demographic information followed by a survey battery 
measuring all variables of interest. Respondents accessed the questionnaire through Qualtrics 
online with an average completion time of approximately 40 minutes.  
 
4.3.2 Materials 
4.3.2.1 Decision styles and rumination. 
The Brinker and Dozois (2009) Ruminative Thought Style Questionnaire (RTSQ; α = 
.93 in the present study) measured the criterion variable of rumination.  Participants rated 20 
items on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all like me, 7 = just like me) tapping 
repetitive, recurrent, intrusive and uncontrollable thinking (e.g., “I tend to replay past events 
as I would have liked them to happen”). 
The Schwartz et al. (2002) Maximization Scale (MS; α = .75 in the present study) 
assessed maximizing tendencies in decision making. The Maximization Scale is a 13-item 
self-report tool employing a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = completely disagree, 7 = 
completely agree). Responses reflect relative endorsement of maximizing behaviours (e.g., “I 
never settle for second best”), with higher scores indicating a disposition to maximize 
decisions and lower scores representing satisficing. 
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4.3.2.2 Psychological flexibility. 
 The second version of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Hayes et 
al., 2004, Bond et al., 2011) was reversed scored to derive a measure of psychological 
flexibility (α = .88 in the present study). The scale was designed to capture a sense of 
mindfulness and ability to modify behaviour for effective goal-pursuit, “depending upon what 
the situation affords” (Hayes et al., 2006). Participants rated items such as “Worries get in the 
way of my success” on a 7-point scale (1 = never true, 7= always true). 
 
4.3.2.3 Emotions.  
Emotional intelligence was assessed with the Schutte et al. (1998) 33-item Emotional 
Intelligence Scale (EIS; α = .90 in the present study). Participants rated their emotional 
abilities against behavioural descriptors such as “I use good moods to help myself keep trying 
in the face of obstacles” (from 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Mood itself was 
assessed with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and 
Tellegen, 1988), comprising 10 items each to measure the extent to which participants 
generally experienced positive affect (α = .88) and negative affect (α = .89 in the present 
study).  
 
4.4 Results 
Incomplete data were deleted from the data set and one outlier was removed 
following scatterplot analysis, resulting in a total sample size of 201 participants. The 
distributions for age and negative mood were significantly positively skewed; however, non-
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parametric equivalent analyses did not alter significance of tests involving these variables, 
therefore parametric results are reported.  
T-tests indicated gender differences with respect to measures of negative affect, 
rumination and psychological flexibility, t(198) = -2.41, p = .02, t(198) = -3.25, p = .001, 
t(198) = -2.80, p=.01, respectively. Compared to males, females showed higher means for 
rumination (M = 97.77, SD = 18.63 vs M = 87.86, SD = 19.21), and negative affect (M = 
21.77, SD = 7.47 vs M = 18.88, SD = 7.13) and lower psychological flexibility (M = 31.11, 
SD = 7.91, M = 34.49, SD = 5.89). Age differences were further noted for rumination, with 
younger participants demonstrating higher ruminative means than older participants, r(199) = 
-.20, p < .01. However, age and gender did not significantly predict rumination above 
maximization and psychological flexibility, and were excluded from analysis. 
Preliminary bivariate correlations demonstrated a significant negative relationship 
between maximization and psychological flexibility as hypothesised, r(199) = -.36, p < .001. 
Further, emotional intelligence was significantly positively correlated with positive affect, 
r(199) = .37, p < .001 and negatively correlated with negative affect, r(199) = -.16 p = .03. 
Table 4.1 shows zero-order correlations for all variables investigated. The significance of 
bivariate correlations supported follow up regression analysis testing the hypothesised 
relationships.  
A regression analysis showed that the linear combination of maximization and 
psychological flexibility significantly predicted rumination, F(2, 198) = 53.96, p < .001. 
Maximization and psychological flexibility accounted for approximately 35.3% of the 
variance in rumination (with a multiple correlation coefficient of .59).  A second multiple 
regression analysis showed that the linear combination of positive affect, negative affect and 
emotional intelligence significantly predicted psychological flexibility, F(3, 197) = 39.01, p 
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<.001, accounting for approximately 36.3% of the variance (multiple correlation coefficient 
.61). These results support all predictions. The relative magnitude of the predictors for 
rumination and psychological flexibility are presented in Table 4.2 as bivariate correlations 
between each predictor and criterion variable and partial correlations controlling for all other 
predictors. 
  
Table 4.1 
Pearson’s Zero-Order Correlations 
Variable MS RTSQ AAQ-II PA NA 
RTSQ .52***     
AAQ-II -.36*** -.45***    
PA .04 -.02 .22**   
NA .27*** .37*** -.54*** -.03  
EIS -.11 -.09 .34*** .37*** -.16* 
 
Note. AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2, 7-item single factor 
solution; EIS = Emotional Intelligence Scale; MS = Maximisation Scale; NA = Negative 
Affect subscale; PA = Positive Affect subscale; RTSQ = Ruminative Thought Style 
Questionnaire. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Notably, the partial correlation for negative affect was virtually unchanged in the 
regression predicting psychological flexibility, taking into account emotional intelligence and 
positive affect. This is explained in the literature; in addition to negative and positive affect 
being distinct dimensions, emotional intelligence purportedly does not play a significant role 
in regulating negative affect (Schutte et al., 2002; Watson et al., 1988; Diener & Emmons, 
1984).  
 
Table 4.2 
Bivariate and Partial Correlations of Predictors with Criterion variables 
Predictors Zero-order correlation Partial correlation  
Rumination (criterion)   
Maximization .52*** .43*** 
Psychological Flexibility -.45*** -.33*** 
Psychological Flexibility (criterion)   
Positive Affect .22** .14* 
Negative Affect -.54*** -.53*** 
Emotional Intelligence .34*** .24*** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
The bivariate correlations in Table 4.1 showed a corollary result that maximization 
and negative affect were significantly related, r(199) = .27, p < .001. While not a focus of the 
present study, this supports the Schwartz et al. (2002) findings that maximizers tend to be less 
happy. In fact, the significant association between rumination and negative affect (r(199) = 
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.37, p < .001) might further suggest that the lower levels of happiness maximizers experience 
are partially generated through ruminative processes leading to negative affective states. A 
supplementary analysis testing the meditational role of rumination between maximization and 
negative affect utilising the bias-corrected procedure with 5,000 bootstrap resamples supports 
this theory. The total effect of maximization on negative affect was significant, B = .19, SE = 
.048, t(199) = 3.00, 95% CI[0.10, 0.29], while the indirect effect of maximization on negative 
affect was no longer significant accounting for rumination as mediator, B = .08, SE = .055, 
t(199) = 1.44, 95% CI[-0.03, 0.19] (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 
2007). This pathway is similar to the meditational role of regret between maximizing and 
depression supported in the original Schwartz et al. (2002) study. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Maximization demonstrated a strong positive relationship with rumination. In their 
seminal article, Schwartz et al. (2002) found that maximization predicted social and product 
comparisons in relation to purchasing decisions, leading to experienced regret. The authors 
postulated that counterfactual thinking and ruminative thoughts were related to the regret 
experienced by high maximizers in their study. The present findings are consistent with this 
theory and unpublished data indicating that maximizers tend to ruminate more than satisficers 
(White, Lehman, & Schwartz, 2002). The findings also show that the effects of maximization 
extend into general rumination beyond the context of purchasing-related decisions. Schwartz 
et al. (2002) concluded that maximizing (always striving for the best) has paradoxical 
consequences, given its relationship with regret, and potentially counterfactual and 
ruminative thinking. In our study, the strength of the correlation between maximizing and 
rumination does suggest that a maximizing personality trait can have a profound effect on 
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negative thinking styles. These findings warrant further research investigating the links 
between maximization and rumination and how potential protective factors, such as 
psychological flexibility, influence the relationship in applied decision contexts. 
Psychological flexibility was negatively associated with maximization and rumination 
as previously postulated (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). This lends support to the proposition 
that psychological flexibility may facilitate the application of more adaptive decision 
strategies across multiple domains, potentially promoting a shift from maximizing to 
satisficing depending upon the situational demands. However, the causal direction of the 
relationship is unclear due to the limitations of the correlational research method. While high 
levels of flexibility could assist in down-regulating maximizing tendencies, and therefore 
ruminative outcomes, rumination could correspondingly impair psychological flexibility 
resulting in a bi-directional compounding effect. The perseverative thinking styles 
characteristic of rumination represent the antithesis of cognitive flexibility. For example, the 
passive inward focus inherent in ruminative tendencies, interferes with environmental 
engagement, essentially preventing the modification of thoughts or behaviours that allow 
strategic adaption to a situation (Baumeister, 2002). Rumination has been found to impair 
attention at low and high levels of cognitive load (Brinker, Campisi, Gibbs & Izzard, 2013), 
as well as response inhibition, reaction time and set shifting (Brinker, Campisi, Gibbs & 
Izzard, 2013). More research is needed to assess the direction and nature of the relationship 
between maximization, psychological flexibility and rumination. 
If psychological flexibility is determined to be a useful mechanism in combating the 
negative outcomes associated with maximization (such as rumination), further examination of 
factors promoting flexibility is warranted. While it was noted that emotions can serve as 
potent decision stimuli, the present study explored the role of emotional intelligence in 
positive affect regulation as a means of fostering psychological flexibility. Consistent with 
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previous research (Schutte et al., 2002), emotional intelligence was positively associated with 
positive affect, which itself demonstrated a positive (albeit weak) relationship with 
psychological flexibility. This supports the idea that emotional intelligence may regulate the 
experience of positive affect and hence contribute to improved psychological flexibility. The 
causal directions need to be teased out in future research, but these findings offer promising 
approaches to enhancing psychological flexibility. Emotional intelligence is sensitive to 
training effects and low cost, therapist-free interventions could be employed if proven 
effective for this purpose. Given the limitations of study 1, a second study was designed 
utilizing a decision situation to manipulate ruminative responding in high maximizers and 
differentiate the causal roles of the variables investigated in study 1. 
 
4.6 How Maximizing, Psychological Flexibility, Affect and Emotional Intelligence 
Influence Ruminative Outcomes in Decision Making (Study 2) 
In study 1, the focus was on the post-decisional process of rumination as a dependent 
variable implicated in the negative outcomes associated with maximization. In a novel study, 
Gilbert and Ebert (2002) showed how post-decisional processes can be manipulated by the 
changeability features of a decision. When a decision is made, people have a tendency to 
restructure their perceptions of the decision outcome towards more positive interpretations as 
a means of promoting satisfaction. Gilbert and Ebert (2002) labelled this strategy as a 
psychological immune system, which has the primary function of protecting “people from the 
emotional consequences of suboptimal outcomes” (p. 504). This form of emotion-based 
coping may be particularly important for protecting high maximizing individuals from 
experiencing regret or rumination, as these individuals frequently assess outcomes as 
suboptimal due to constant choice re-evaluation and social comparison. Gilbert and Ebert 
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(2002) noted that the psychological immune system, while fully operative in unchangeable 
decision circumstances, is impaired when the decision is changeable. 
Choice changeability prevents activation of the so-called psychological immune 
system, or decision acceptance, and ultimately the satisfaction that generates. This system 
helps people find ways to accept and be satisfied with decisions that cannot be changed 
through a change in attitude similar to dissonance reduction (Gilbert & Evert, 2002). 
However, decisions that can be changed tend to bypass this process as individuals shift focus 
to re-considering or attempting to change the decision rather than generating satisfaction with 
a final decision (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). If a decision is changeable, high maximizers in 
particular may be more likely to continue searching for better options and critically evaluate 
the current choice, focussing on negative features while attempting to decide if it really is the 
best choice. In this way, the ability to change decisions could potentially activate and prolong 
ruminative thought styles while preventing the ability to draw upon emotion-based coping 
strategies such as the psychological immune system. Satisficers may be less affected by this 
process than maximizers; post-decisional exposure to better options in the environment is less 
salient for satisficers where the decision goal is a choice that meets the threshold of 
acceptability as opposed to some amorphous best choice. The positive correlation between 
maximization and rumination in study 1 lends some support to this proposition, but the 
direction of causation could not be inferred.  
It is anticipated that manipulating choice changeability in decision making may assist 
in extricating the causal components of the variables investigated in study 1. High 
maximizers are likely to be more susceptible to changeability features than satisficers and 
therefore demonstrate greater levels of ruminative change in response to the manipulation. 
Psychological flexibility may assist maximizers in functionally responding to changeable 
decision conditions and therefore be associated with lower ruminative change. However, as 
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explored in study 1, extremely high levels of maximization, as a tendency to deploy inflexible 
decision strategies across multiple domains, is likely to impede adaptability to the 
manipulation. It is therefore anticipated that maximization level will moderate the effects of 
psychological flexibility on ruminative change. 
Finally, emotional intelligence may regulate positive affect in changeable decision 
conditions, by either boosting positive affect change or facilitating positive affect 
maintenance if the manipulation tends to lower affective states. In turn, positive affect change 
will, as a fundamental building block, enhance psychological flexibility, extending the 
findings from study 1 to determine causative pathways. In this way, positive affect change is 
expected to partially mediate the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility. 
This study applied Gilbert and Ebert‟s changeable decision manipulation to extend the 
findings from study 1 and assess the causative relationships between a maximizing 
personality trait, psychological flexibility, positive and negative affect and emotional 
intelligence on rumination. It is predicted that high maximizers will be more sensitive to 
changeable decision situations than low maximizers, expressed through higher ruminative 
change. Psychological flexibility will negatively influence rumination, moderated by 
maximization. Finally, emotional intelligence will predict positive affect change, which will 
mediate its relationship with psychological flexibility.  
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4.7 Method 
4.7.1 Participants  
The sample consisted of 181 psychology students (Females 126, 69.6%; Males 55, 
30.4%) opting to participate in the project through the online university research portal for 
receipt of course credit. The mean age of participants was 19.94 years (SD = 3.69, range 17-
51 years). The majority of participants were Caucasian (77.9%), followed by Asian (14.4%) 
and a variety of ethnic groups (7.7%). 
 
4.7.2 Procedure 
The study was advertised as a project examining individual differences in art 
appreciation and choice. Prior to manipulation, all participants completed general 
demographic information and measures for maximization, psychological flexibility and 
emotional intelligence as described in study 1. The internal consistency for each measure in 
the present study was: AAQ-II, α = .93; EIS, α = .89; MS, α = .70; RTSQ, α = .92; PA, α = 
.90; NA, α = .89. Participants were randomly assigned to the changeable or unchangeable 
manipulation and contributed to either pre- or post-data on measures of rumination and 
positive and negative affect for between groups analysis.  
All participants were presented a set of eight similar artworks and informed only one 
artwork could be submitted to a competition being held in one month‟s time. The artworks 
used in this study were sourced, unaltered, from Wikimedia commons, as published under a 
Creative Commons license (ShareAlike 3.0 Unported) by the artists Tjaša Iris and Franz 
Marc, who in no way endorsed their use in this research. All artworks, and links to their 
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licenses, can be found at the following sites: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tja%C5%A1a_Iris 
and https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Franz_Marc.  
Participants were instructed to “choose the artwork you decide has the best chance of 
performing well in terms of aesthetic appeal and technical quality”. In the changeable 
condition, participants were informed to “Please be aware that you can change your mind 
about which of these artworks is submitted to the competition. Submissions are only finalised 
just prior to the competition, so it's absolutely no problem if you change your mind at any 
time in the next month. Just let the experimenter know and they'll change the selection for 
you. Contact details are provided on the debrief page at the end of the survey.” In the 
unchangeable condition, participants were advised to “Please be sure about your choice 
because it is a final choice. Your selection is automatically submitted to the competition on 
completion of this survey.” 
 
4.8 Results 
The means, standard deviations and sample size for rumination scores as a function of 
decision manipulation and maximization level (median split into high and low) are presented 
in Table 4.3. Gender was excluded from analysis as no differences were observed for 
ruminative change, t(85) = -1.14, p = .26. This suggests that baseline gender differences in 
ruminative disposition (t(92) = -.83, p < .01; mean for males = 101.92, mean for females = 
105.16) did not impact change measurements as a result of the manipulation, which may 
improve the utility of the results given the sample bias (69.6% female), potentially allowing 
generalisations that would ordinarily be limited to young females extend more broadly across 
the population. 
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Table 4.3 
Mean Ruminative Scores for Unchangeable and Changeable Manipulations by Low and High 
Maximization Level 
  
Mean rumination 
scores 
 Standard 
deviation 
 
Sample size 
Manipulation Maximization  Pre Post   Pre Post  Pre Post 
Unchangeable Low 95.87 87.58  16.13 16.51  23 19 
 High 114.52 105.96  14.86 13.45  25 23 
 Total 105.58 97.64  17.98 17.39  48 42 
Changeable Low 99.67 94.56  12.63 16.36  18 25 
 High 104.96 113.85  17.23 11.96  28 20 
 Total 102.89 103.13  15.65 17.37  46 45 
 
A 2 X 2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effects of the decision manipulation 
(changeable and unchangeable) and maximization level (median split into high and low) on 
ruminative change. As shown in Figure 1, the ANOVA indicated a significant interaction 
between decision manipulation and maximization level, F(1, 83) = 5.03, p = .03, partial ƞ2= 
.06 as well as significant main effects for decision manipulation, F(1, 83) = 10.53, p < .01, 
partial ƞ2 = .11, and maximization, F(1, 83) = 4.66, p =.03, partial ƞ2 = .05. 
Given the significant interaction between decision condition and maximization level, 
follow up analyses for pairwise comparisons were conducted, with alpha set at .0125 to 
control for Type 1 error. Differences in ruminative change between changeable and 
unchangeable decision conditions were only significant for high maximizers (F(1, 83) = 
14.99, p < .001, partial ƞ2 = .15) , as opposed to low maximisers (F(1,83) = .50, p = .48). 
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There were no differences in ruminative change for the unchangeable condition between high 
and low maximizers, F(1, 83) = .00, p = .95. However, high maximizers showed significantly 
greater ruminative change in the changeable decision manipulation compared with low 
maximisers, F(1, 83) = 10.01, p < .01, partial ƞ2 = .11.  
  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean ruminative change score for unchangeable and changeable manipulations 
by maximization level. 
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A moderation analysis using Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro was conducted to test 
the hypothesis that maximization would moderate the relationship between psychological 
flexibility and rumination. The continuous variables for maximization and psychological 
flexibility were mean centered to avoid multicollinearity issues (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Results of the PROCESS analysis are presented in Table 4.4.  The conditional effects of 
maximization, psychological flexibility and their interaction were significant. The overall 
model predicted a significant proportion of variance in ruminative change, R
2
 = .65, F(3, 41) 
= 26.78, p < .0001.  
 
Table 4.4  
Conditional and Interaction Effects on Ruminative Change 
 B SE T p 
Intercept 2.84 1.75 1.62 .11 
Maximization .75 .20 3.68 <.001 
Psychological flexibility -1.10 .23 -4.89 <.001 
Maximization x Psychological flexibility .05 .02 2.48 .018 
 
A Johnson-Neyman analysis of the interaction indicated that psychological flexibility 
significantly negatively predicted ruminative change when maximization scores were less 
than 12.60 (mean centred). This equates to a total maximization score of 71.14 (or 5.47 
composite score), showing that psychological flexibility predicted ruminative change for 
86.7% of maximization scores in the sample. The simple slopes pick-a-point analysis 
(Rogosa, 1980) demonstrated a significant conditional relationship between psychological 
flexibility and ruminative change when maximization scores were held one standard 
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deviation below the mean (49.62), at the mean (58.84), and one standard deviation above the 
mean (68.07), B = -1.54, SE = .34, p < .001; B = -1.10, SE = .23, p < .001 and B = -.67, SE = 
.22, p = .004, respectively.  Figure 2 shows predicted ruminative change scores as a function 
of the pick-a-point analysis.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean ruminative change by psychological flexibility and maximization level for 
changeable decision condition.  
Note: Total scores for ruminative change and psychological flexibility are mean centred. 
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The meditational role of positive affect between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility was tested utilising the bias-corrected procedure with 5,000 
bootstrap resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). As shown 
in Figure 3, positive affect change significantly mediated the association between emotional 
intelligence and psychological flexibility, F(2, 42) = 5.72, p < .01, R
2
 = .21. The total effect 
of emotional intelligence on psychological flexibility was significant (B =.21, SE = .092, 
t(42) = 2.31, p = .03), but its direct effect was non-significant (B = .06, SE = .109, t(42) = 
0.55, p = .59), supporting full mediation by positive affect change in the model instead of 
partial mediation as hypothesised. Interestingly, the magnitude of the relationship between 
positive affect change and psychological flexibility is higher than shown in study 1. In fact, 
regulated positive affect change shows a stronger relationship with psychological flexibility 
in this decision making paradigm than baseline positive affect, r(92) = .32, p < .01). This 
highlights the inherent challenges in measuring context-dependent variables such as 
psychological flexibility; context can impact the relationships between variables compared 
with simple trait-based correlational studies. 
 
Figure 4.3. Model showing path from emotional intelligence to psychological flexibility 
through positive affect change as a mediator. Numbers represent standardised regression 
coefficients. N = 45. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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4.9 Discussion 
Study 2 showed that a maximizing personality trait predicted high levels of 
ruminative change, particularly for changeable decision conditions. Psychological flexibility 
attenuated the effects of maximization on ruminative change, despite being progressively less 
effective at extremely high levels of maximization. The study further found that emotional 
intelligence predicted psychological flexibility, fully mediated by positive affect. These 
results are consistent with study 1 and support all predictions. 
 
4.10 General Discussion 
These studies extend Schwartz (2002) and Gilbert and Ebert‟s (2002) findings, 
demonstrating that a maximizing personality trait entirely delineates the effects of choice 
changeability on rumination. That is, low maximizers maintain a fully functioning 
psychological immune system when exposed to changeable decision conditions, while high 
maximizers show impairments. This suggests that high maximizers are less capable than 
satisficers at restructuring their perceptions of decision outcomes towards more positive 
interpretations as a means of promoting satisfaction under conditions of choice changeability. 
Schwartz et al. (2002) postulated that high maximizers may prefer changeable decision 
options as a means of upgrading decisions when exposed to better options in the 
environment. Therefore maximizers may paradoxically seek out the conditions of choice 
changeability that impair the psychological immune system, or dissonance reduction 
processes, and engender rumination. This process could potentially lead to other negative 
consequences, given the associations between ruminative tendencies and depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
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4.10.1 Implications for Intervention 
High psychological flexibility offers a saving grace for maximizers. Higher levels of 
psychological flexibility were associated with lower ruminative change in the changeable 
decision manipulation. Despite a desire to maximize, if an individual possesses sufficient 
psychological flexibility, alternative responses and decision styles, like satisficing, can be 
employed to achieve more functional outcomes. However, high psychological flexibility may 
not be effective for individuals scoring in the top 13.3% of maximizing tendencies. A 
maximizing disposition may need to be directly targeted in this subset of the population to 
mitigate negative outcomes. Some of the strategies Schwartz (2004) recommended for high 
maximizing individuals include: curtail social comparison, cultivate satisficing, seek out 
unchangeable decisions, and reflect on what decisions are really important before allocating 
substantial personal resources to the decision making process. Practically, these strategies 
could, for example, involve avoiding social media, a forum which inundates individuals with 
opportunities for social comparison. For the remaining majority of individuals on the 
maximizing spectrum, the studies show that interventions to improve psychological 
flexibility, which attenuates the effects of maximization on rumination, could offer 
substantial benefits for long-term health. 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is a traditional clinical intervention for 
enhancing psychological flexibility and thereby promoting health (e.g., Bond et al, 2013; 
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Randomized controlled trials support the efficacy of ACT 
for enhancing psychological flexibility and health outcomes (Bond & Bunce, 2000; Flaxman 
& Bond, 2010). In relation to maximizing tendencies, ACT could assist maximizing 
individuals to engage more in the present moment rather than inwardly focus on post-
decisional ruminative thoughts. ACT also attempts to clarify what is inherently important and 
meaningful (i.e., values) to guide an individual‟s actions toward these goals (Harris, 2006). 
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This is similar to Schwartz‟ (2004) recommendation to reflect on the value of the decision 
before focusing unneeded time and energy towards maximization. In this way, individuals 
approach decision situations more consistently with their values and goals, discerning 
important from trivial decisions and deploying maximizing or satisficing strategies 
appropriately. While ACT seems viable as an intervention for maximizers and can be 
effective over brief time-spans (Bach & Hayes, 2002), the majority of delivery methods are 
therapist-led. For a variety of reasons this could deter potential consumers from seeking help; 
high maximizers may present with sub-clinical symptoms and prefer the anonymity and 
accessibility of self-administered interventions. The present studies identified alternative 
mechanisms for promoting psychological flexibility and lowering ruminative outcomes that 
may prove efficacious through suitable self-administered treatments. 
Emotional intelligence demonstrated a promising avenue for indirectly facilitating 
psychological flexibility. High emotional intelligence predicted psychological flexibility, 
mediated by positive affect change. These findings suggest that interventions to increase 
emotional intelligence may promote positive affect and hence psychological flexibility. A 
number of emotional intelligence training interventions have supported efficacy (Schutte et 
al., 2013) and should be explored to determine whether experimental treatments improve 
functional outcomes and to test the causation relationship between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility. For example, a journal writing intervention provided to workplace 
employees was effective at increasing emotional intelligence after only 3, 20 minute writing 
sessions (Kirk, Schutte, & Hine, 2011). Journal instructions offer a flexible delivery format 
and could be adapted for self-help interventions external to workplaces if proven efficacious. 
Given the finding that the effects of emotional intelligence on flexibility were fully mediated 
by positive affect, interventions solely focussed on directly increasing positive affect should 
demonstrate similar outcomes to emotional intelligence treatments.      
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Positive affect is widely considered to be a building block for psychological flexibility 
(Kashdan et al., 2010). A large body of positive psychology research supports the efficacy for 
numerous interventions to increase positive affect that are low-cost and self-administered 
(Bolier, Haverman, Westerhof, et al., 2013; Sin & Lyubomirsky, 2009). For example, just 
one week of keeping a daily gratitude journal, listing three good things each day and their 
subjective causes, has been shown to increase happiness and decrease depressive symptoms 
for 6 months (Seligman, 2005). While the present study suggests that engaging with self-help 
exercises to increase positive affect could enhance flexibility and decrease ruminative 
outcomes, emotional intelligence potentially improves an individual‟s ability to derive 
positive affect from a variety of situations through emotion regulation (Schutte et al., 2002). 
Emotional intelligence may therefore offer a more enduring pathway to psychological 
flexibility, which could ultimately address some of the negative outcomes associated with 
maximization such as rumination.  
 
4.10.2 Limitations and Future Research 
The maximization scale used in the present study has been criticized for poor 
psychometric properties (e.g., Turner, Rim, Betz & Nygren, 2012; Diab, Gillespie & 
Highhouse, 2008), despite demonstrating acceptable alpha coefficients standards in the 
present study (Nunally, 1978). The newer Maximization Inventory (Turner et al., 2012) and 
Maximization Tendency Scales (Diab et al., 2008) were designed to address construct 
validity and reliability concerns. Notably, in the Maximization Inventory, satisficing is 
conceived as a separate dimension to maximization rather than spectrally opposed. The 
findings from the present studies should be replicated using these alternative measurement 
methods and conceptual frameworks to confirm the supported relationships.  
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Some results barely reached significance in the decision manipulation and may be 
anomalies influenced by small sample size. Ideally, the decision manipulation study should 
be replicated with a larger sample. Alternatively, more power could be achieved using a 
repeated measures design rather than between groups comparison employing briefer, state-
based rumination measures. This methodology change could further clarify the unexpected 
ruminative mean decrease in the unchangeable condition, which may have been an artefact of 
the between groups design. Alternatively, it is possible that the decision process and topic 
(choosing and writing about art) actually facilitated a real decrease in rumination - the 
observed corresponding deceases in negative affect might support this proposition. Therefore, 
in addition to utilising a repeated measures design, future studies might consider varying the 
decision paradigm and further manipulate the number of decision options to examine how 
rumination varies as a function of choice expansion. 
The present studies found that a maximizing personality trait is associated with 
greater ruminative tendencies. Further, the negative consequences of changeable decision-
making, in terms of rumination, are generally attributable to high levels of maximization. 
Fortunately, individuals who possess sufficient psychological flexibility appear to be capable 
of attenuating the effects of maximizing on ruminative outcomes. Methods for increasing 
psychological flexibility were explored, with emotional intelligence presenting a promising 
avenue for future clinical applications and research. Emotional intelligence predicted 
psychological flexibility mediated by positive affect. These findings suggest that 
interventions to increase emotional intelligence may foster positive affect leading to 
improved psychological flexibility and ultimately mitigating ruminative outcomes. Further 
research is warranted in examining the causative role of emotional intelligence on 
psychological flexibility using established interventions and measurement techniques.  
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Chapter 5 
The Effect of an Expressive-Writing Intervention on Emotional Intelligence, 
Psychological Flexibility and Workplace Flourishing  
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 Abstract 
Emotional intelligence as a means for facilitating psychological flexibility and work 
engagement is explored through administration of the Kirk, Schutte and Hine (2011) writing 
paradigm. The sample comprised 44 Australian public servants (33 females, 11 males) aged 
44.57 years, on average. Compared to controls, intervention participants showed significant 
increases in emotional intelligence, positive affect and work engagement, but not 
psychological flexibility as traditionally measured through the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011). However, when noncompliant participants are 
excluded, psychological flexibility increased for the work-specific derivative of the AAQ-II 
(WAAQ; Bond, Lloyd & Guenole, 2013). Positive affect and work-specific psychological 
flexibility mediated the effects of emotional intelligence on work engagement at pre-test. 
Emotional intelligence interventions may promote individual strengths and workplace 
flourishing. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Emotional intelligence refers to adaptive emotional functioning and the majority of 
operationalisations feature emotional perception, understanding and management in the self 
and others as key attributes (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004; Nebauer & Freudenthaler, 
2005). Measurement approaches for emotional intelligence vary between ability (e.g., Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2008) and trait models (e.g., Petrides & Furnham, 2000), both of which 
are associated with positive outcomes. Meta-analytic studies have shown that high emotional 
intelligence is related to better mental and physical health in general (Schutte, Malouff, 
Thorsteinsson, Bhullar, & Rooke, 2007), as well as increased performance and productivity 
in the workplace (O‟Boyle, Humphrey, Pollock, Hawver & Story, 2011; Van Rooy & 
Viswesvaran, 2004).  
 
5.1.1 Emotional Intelligence and Workplace Functioning 
Schutte and Loi (2014) examined how emotional intelligence supports workplace 
functioning from a positive psychology perspective. The positive psychology movement aims 
to promote „flourishing‟; a scientific study of optimal functioning for individuals, 
communities and organisations (Gable & Haidt, 2005; Seligman, 2012). Positive psychology 
applied to the workplace emphasises the reciprocal nature of employee strengths and 
organisational culture for fostering employee engagement and productivity (Bakker & 
Schaufeli, 2008). Emotional intelligence is emerging as a core individual strength within the 
workplace environment (Joseph & Newman, 2010; O‟Boyle et al., 2011; Schlaerth, Ensari, & 
Christian, 2013) and many organisations are beginning to endorse program delivery 
purporting to enhance it, particularly in the Australian public sector where emotional 
intelligence has been identified as a strategic priority for leadership development (Australian 
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Public Service Commission, 2014). A range of empirical research supports the value of 
emotional intelligence as an individual and collective organisational strength facilitating 
flourishing workplaces. 
Emotional intelligence supports positive workplace functioning in various ways. 
Emotionally intelligent individuals demonstrate more co-operative behaviour (Schutte et al., 
2001) and better interpersonal relations (Lopes et al., 2004); a transferable skillset to the 
situational demands of the workplace. Employees with high emotional intelligence 
demonstrate more effective leadership (Harms & Credé, 2010) and conflict resolution 
(Schlaerth et al., 2013), while emotional interventions have resulted in more courteous 
interactions between employees (Kirk et al., 2011). Interpersonal interactions in the 
workplace can be governed by emotional display codes, introducing the need to manage 
emotional expression through emotional labour, which is associated with burnout, often 
viewed as the diametric opposite of work engagement (Grandey, 2003; Mikolajczak, Menil, 
& Luminet, 2007).  
For many professions, workplace display rules condone positive emotional 
expression. The characteristic experience of positive emotion and sensitivity to positive 
stimuli observed in individuals with high emotional intelligence promotes positive 
consonance, synchrony between felt, expressed and required emotion (Mikolajczak et al., 
2007). This reduces the need for emotional labour and improves workplace outcomes such as 
less burnout and increased work engagement, which involves “a positive, fulfilling work-
related state of mind that is characterized by vigor, dedication and absorption” (Schaufeli, 
Bakker, & Salanova, 2006, p. 702; Mikolajczak et al., 2007). Emotional intelligence further 
influences the selection of healthier long-term strategies to cope with emotional labour 
(Mokolajczak et al., 2007). Consequently, the characteristics of emotionally intelligent 
employees are associated with improved well-being, engagement with workplace 
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responsibilities and satisfaction with co-workers and supervisors (Martin & Hine, 2005), 
suggesting that emotional intelligence fosters positive workplace relations and constructive 
outcomes.  
While emotional intelligence may directly influence positive work outcomes, Schutte 
and Loi (2014) theorised that it also provides a foundation for the development of further 
workplace characteristics or strengths that support flourishing employees and organisations. 
For example, emotional competencies improve interpersonal work relationships and thereby 
promote workplace social support, which bolsters overall work engagement and mitigates 
against stressors (Shirey, 2004; Duran, Extremera, & Ray, 2004). Likewise, the skillset of 
emotionally intelligent individuals fosters a sense of social power; the ability to influence 
colleagues and work outcomes, which may lead to further work engagement and improved 
performance (Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004). Schutte and Loi (2014) showed that satisfaction 
with workplace social support and perception of power in the workplace significantly 
mediated the connection between emotional intelligence and work engagement as an 
indicator of workplace flourishing.  
These findings build upon a growing literature demonstrating the importance of trait 
emotional intelligence for work engagement. For example, one study assessing over 1,000 
adult workers found that trait emotional intelligence was the strongest predictor of work 
engagement and demonstrated incremental validity in the prediction of engagement beyond 
demographic and general and occupational personality variables (Akhtar, Boustani, 
Tsivrikos, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014). This literature provides strong support for the 
conclusion that emotional intelligence is a platform for the emergence of positive workplace 
characteristics, both in the individual and work culture, that support thriving organisations 
and employees (Schutte & Loi, 2014). One positive characteristic that emotional intelligence 
may potentially foster in this way is psychological flexibility.  
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5.1.2 Emotional Intelligence as a Foundation for Adaptive Abilities and Flourishing 
Workplaces 
Psychological flexibility is the ability to mindfully attend to the present moment and 
respond appropriately within the situation to achieve valued goals, despite challenging 
internal processes that may interfere with effective functioning (Bond et al., 2013; Hayes, 
Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis, 2006). For example, an employee seeking promotion may 
need to overcome public speaking anxieties to demonstrate work-related capabilities. The 
essence of psychological flexibility is a commitment to act and achieve that goal, overcoming 
negative internal processes such as anticipatory rumination, negative emotion or anxiety-
driven physiological sensations that may otherwise foster avoidance (Bond et al., 2013; 
Hayes et al., 2006). Instead, internal experiences are accepted and focus is diverted to the 
outward affordances enabling an individual the attentional and cognitive resources to act 
consistently with their goals. This adaptive ability, to reconfigure mental resources and 
activate approach behaviours towards growth opportunities, is an individual strength that may 
be related to emotional intelligence.  
Emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility have demonstrated positive 
correlations in research collecting concurrent data, particularly when flexibility is 
operationalised using the revised Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II; e.g., Foster, 
Pammer, Schutte, & Brinker, 2016; Donaldson-Feilder, & Bond, 2004). A number of theories 
explain these findings. For example, the mindful awareness of internal experiences that 
underpins traditional definitions of psychological flexibility, also referred to as psychological 
acceptance (e.g., Bond et al., 2013), is synonymous with awareness of emotional states and 
physiological sensations associated with their experience. This perception and understanding 
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of emotions underlying psychological flexibility are emotional intelligence competencies. 
Further, the strategies individuals with high emotional intelligence employ to cope with 
emotional labour in the workplace involve redeployment of attention and cognitive shifting or 
reappraisal (Mikolajczak, 2007), which reflect features of psychological flexibility such as 
attentional control and the ability to shift mindsets (Kashdan and Rottenberg, 2010). 
Another mechanism by which emotional intelligence could foster psychological 
flexibility and work engagement involves positive affect. Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) 
identified positive affect as a fundamental building block for psychological flexibility. 
Studies have shown that individuals with high emotional intelligence are more adept at 
regulating positive affect than individuals with low emotional intelligence. Highly 
emotionally intelligent individuals may be more capable of deriving greater levels of positive 
affect from a variety of situations as well as being able to maintain positive affective states in 
the face of negative stimuli (Schutte, Malouff, Simunek, & Hollander, 2002). The broadening 
effect of positive affect engendered through emotional intelligence could enhance 
psychological flexibility as well as work engagement, either in combination with flexibility 
or independently through more general broadening effects (broaden-and-build theory; 
Fredrickson, 2001). Positive affect inductions have increased attentional span and thought-
action repertoires (Fredrickson, 2005), indicators of enhanced psychological flexibility. 
Supporting this idea, the study undertaken in Chapter 4, examining psychological flexibility 
and emotional intelligence in a decision context, showed that positive affect mediated the 
effects of emotional intelligence on psychological flexibility. Therefore, enhancing emotional 
intelligence could provide a foundation for the development of psychological flexibility 
through positive affect, which may further enhance work engagement or workplace 
flourishing. 
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A range of findings support the proposition that psychological flexibility promotes 
effective workplace functioning. General measures of characteristic psychological flexibility, 
such as the AAQ-II, have predicted numerous work-related outcomes, including mental 
health, performance, job satisfaction, absenteeism and work engagement (e.g., Bond & 
Bunce, 2003; Bond et al., 2013). The Work-related Acceptance and Action Questionnaire 
(WAAQ; Bond et al., 2013), developed for increased context sensitivity, predicts work-
related variables more strongly than the AAQ-II, including the three dimensions of work 
engagement operationalized in the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale: vigour, dedication and 
absorption (Schaufeli, Bakker & Salanova, 2006). As noted previously, emotional 
intelligence also predicts work engagement through mediating variables, such as satisfaction 
with workplace social support and perception of power in the workplace (Schutte & Loi, 
2014). Given these findings, it is possible that psychological flexibility represents another 
mediator between emotional intelligence and work engagement, especially considering the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility supported in the 
literature. It is therefore proposed that emotional intelligence, as a growth platform for 
positive workplace characteristics, may promote the development of psychological flexibility 
and thereby contribute to flourishing individuals and organisations. 
The positive psychology framework, which focuses on the individual in context, 
provides a strong theoretical approach for examining the relationships between context-
dependent variables like emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility. Given work 
engagement is an indicator of workplace flourishing that has demonstrated associations with 
both psychological flexibility and emotional intelligence, it offers a valuable criterion 
measure for evaluating the hypothesised causation relationship; that emotional intelligence 
builds psychological flexibility and thereby fosters positive work outcomes, as indicated by 
increased work engagement. Administering an experimental intervention to test the causation 
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relationships will address the methodological reliance on concurrent data collection evident 
in the previous research assessing the effects of emotional intelligence on workplace 
flourishing. Schutte and Loi (2011) suggested a number of empirically-tested emotional 
intelligence interventions as future research directions, including the application of an 
expressive writing paradigm within the workplace. 
 
5.1.3 Trait Emotional Intelligence Expressive-Writing Intervention 
Kirk et al., (2011) extended Pennebaker‟s writing paradigm (Pennebaker & Beall, 
1986) to a workplace training intervention in emotional self-efficacy and intelligence. The 
training was designed to enhance emotional self-efficacy beliefs based on Bandura‟s social-
cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1997) and demonstrated increases in total mean scores for 
self-reported trait emotional intelligence relative to a control group (Kirk et al., 2011). Meta-
analyses show that this expressive writing paradigm, which involves journaling thoughts or 
feelings stemming from life experiences for three or more consecutive days, is effective in 
promoting a range of positive outcomes (Frattaroli, 2006). The task itself can generate 
positive affect while exploration of emotional events and meanings may assist in cognitive 
restructuring, emotional and physiological desensitisation to negative internal experiences 
and help develop emotional mastery through training prompts (King, 2001; Kirk et al., 2011). 
The focus of this particular applied intervention may therefore address emotional 
competencies as well as promote psychologically flexible mindsets. In the original efficacy 
study, participants in the training condition showed increased emotional intelligence 
alongside increased positive affect and decreased workplace incivility perpetration (Kirk et 
al., 2011). Accordingly, this paradigm offers a useful method to test the causation 
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relationship between emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility in relation to 
workplace flourishing.  
 
5.1.4 Aims of the Research 
The aim of the present study was to provide more concrete support for the argument 
that emotional intelligence leads to positive workplace outcomes through experimental 
intervention. Further, the study aimed to clarify whether emotional intelligence is a 
foundation for strengths building, particularly psychological flexibility and positive affect, 
which in turn leads to workplace flourishing indicated by increased work engagement. It was 
hypothesised that emotional intelligence, positive affect, work engagement and psychological 
flexibility would increase for intervention participants compared with controls. In addition, 
psychological flexibility (and positive affect) would partially mediate the connection between 
emotional intelligence and work engagement. 
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Of 62 employed adults who participated in the study, 51 completed the final survey, 
indicating a dropout of 17.7%. Cases for seven respondents were removed from the final 
dataset due to mismatching linkage codes, missing journal codes (which identified condition 
assignment), and substantial missing data or outliers, resulting in a total sample size of 44 
participants. The 44 completed responses comprised 11 males and 33 females employed at 3 
public sector agencies across Australia. Ages ranged from 22 to 64 years (M = 44.57, SD = 
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11.66) and participants were employed in their current workplace from a minimum of 3 
months to a maximum of 25 years and 6 months (M = 9.39, SD = 6.57).  
The sample demonstrated strong educational attainment, with the majority of 
participants holding bachelor or higher degrees; 6.8% school certificate, 15.9% technical 
college diploma, 52.3% bachelor degree, 22.7% graduate degree, 2.3% doctorate. Further, 
40.9% of participants identified as being in a supervisory or management role. Following 
assignment, 21 and 23 participants were allocated to the control and training conditions, 
respectively, with gender equally represented across both groups (i.e., 5 males in the control 
and 6 males in training condition). 
 
5.2.2 Procedure 
Participants were recruited through direct organisational contact at Canberra and 
Adelaide sites. Workplace permission was obtained through multiple managerial levels at 
each site, sometimes requiring hierarchical approvals from unit, group and CEO-level 
delegates. The process was also impacted by high-level staffing changes and altered 
clearance protocols, extending the approvals and collection timeframe for the study up to 2 
years. Data collection was staggered; participants commenced the initial survey battery at 
five separate time points over a six month period. All participants completed pre-measures 
for emotional intelligence, positive and negative affect, work engagement, psychological 
flexibility and work-specific psychological flexibility. Online survey links were emailed 
through a distribution list using blind carbon copy to maintain participant anonymity.  
Journals were available for collection at all worksites following completion of the 
initial pre-measure survey. Participants were assigned to the emotional intelligence 
intervention or control condition at the time of journal collection. The journals were arranged 
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in alternating order for intervention and control conditions; participants were assigned to 
either condition depending on the order in which they collected a journal from the pile. Each 
journal was identifiable through a unique 3-digit alphanumeric code on the inside sleeve with 
odd numbers attached to the control condition and even numbers representing the 
intervention condition. Participants were instructed to input this condition code on 
completion of the final survey for double blind assignment.  
All journals instructed participants to write for at least 20 minutes a day over the next 
three days consistent with the original paradigm (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Kirk et al., 
2011). In most instances, this time period fell during a working week from Tuesday to 
Thursday, depending on when the initial survey was completed. Intervention participants 
were instructed to write about and explore emotional experiences and outcomes related to a 
recent or important workday in the past. Examples of writing content for common workplace 
scenarios were provided to assist emotional learning, including:  
(i) evaluating how personal experiences demonstrate effective perception, use, 
understanding or regulation of emotions;  
(ii) vicarious learning through observation of emotional mastery;  
(iii) verbal persuasion encouraging effortful engagement in mastering emotional 
competencies; and, 
(iv) understanding the contribution of physiological states in managing emotion. 
 
Control participants were instructed to write on any topic related to their non-workday 
and provided with purely descriptive examples devoid of emotional content and exploration. 
The privacy of the journal was emphasised during the recruitment phase and reiterated in the 
journal instructions to address potential social desirability or self-presentation concerns that 
might influence expressive writing.  As such, journals were not collected or reviewed by the 
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researcher. However, compliance with the writing task was assessed using generic post-
writing queries included in the final survey, asking how many days participants wrote in the 
journal for the full 20 minutes.  
The post-measure survey was accessible 2 weeks following the final journal writing 
session to allow training processing to occur and to ensure measurement before substantial 
dilution of intervention effects, consistent with the original paradigm supporting training 
efficacy (Kirk et al., 2011). Delays in responding were followed up with email reminders. 
The majority of participants responded between 2-3 weeks following the writing sessions; 
however, 2 respondents (both in the control condition) completed the survey 3-4 weeks later. 
A linkage code was used to merge pre- and post-measures in the dataset. Participants were 
prompted to create this unique personal identifier using standard construction principles at 
both collections points. 
 
5.2.3 Measures 
5.2.3.1 Emotional Intelligence. 
The 33-item Assessing Emotions Scale (Schutte et al., 1998; Schutte, Malouff, & 
Bhullar, 2009) measured characteristic emotional intelligence. Respondents rated their 
capacity to identify, understand, regulate and harness emotions in the self and others on a 5-
point scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) against statements such as “I am 
aware of my emotions as I experience them”. At each measurement time, participants were 
instructed to rate typical emotional abilities referencing the past 2 weeks. Associations with 
self-reported emotional attention, clarity and repair on the Trait Meta Mood Scale support 
convergent validity of the measure (Bastian, Burns & Nettelbeck, 2005). The present study 
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demonstrated strong internal consistency for the general trait emotional intelligence factor 
with Cronbach‟s alpha of .92 (pre-test) and .93 (post-test).   
 
5.2.3.2 Positive and Negative Affect. 
Mood was assessed using the 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Subscales for positive and negative affect 
consist of 10 items each; sample items include „enthusiastic‟ and „distressed‟ for positive and 
negative affect, respectively. Participants rated the extent to which they felt each state over 
the past 2 weeks from 1 (Slightly) to 5 (Extremely). The present sample demonstrated stable 
internal consistency, with Cronbach‟s alpha of .91 for the positive mood subscale and .85 for 
the negative mood subscale at both collection points, respectively. 
 
5.2.3.3 Work Engagement. 
The shortened 9-item version of the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale (UWES; 
Schaufeli et al., 2006) assessed the 3 dimensions of work engagement: vigour, dedication, 
and absorption. The UWES is a commonly used, peer-reviewed work engagement measure 
(Bakker, Albrecht, Leiter, 2011; Schaufeli & Bakker, 2010). Studies support both a one-
factor total work engagement score and 3 factor structures. For the one factor solution in the 
present study, Cronbach‟s alpha was .94 at pre-test and .93 at post-test. Validity of the scale 
is supported across several international populations, including Australia, North America, 
Asia, and Africa (Bakker, 2009). Respondents endorsed statements (e.g., “I am immersed in 
my work.”) using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (Never true) to 7 (Always true), relating to 
the past 2 weeks. 
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5.2.3.4 Psychological Flexibility. 
The AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011) measured general psychological flexibility. 
Participants rated the accuracy of 7 items such as “worries get in the way of my success” 
from 1 (Never true) to 7 (Always true). Given the negatively keyed nature of this tool, all 
items were reverse scored so that higher scores indicate greater psychological flexibility. The 
AAQ-II demonstrated strong psychometric reliability, with Cronbach‟s alpha of .92 at pre-
test and .94 at post-test in the present study. A workplace-specific derivative of the AAQ-II 
was also administered; the Work-related Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (WAAQ; 
Bond et al., 2013). Compared with the AAQ-II, the WAAQ tends to correlate with work-
specific variables at higher magnitudes (Bond et al., 2013) and may be more capable of 
detecting any treatment effects in the workplace context. Items are rated on the same likert-
type scale as the AAQ-II and include statements such as “I am able to work effectively in 
spite of any personal worries that I have”. For the present study, the internal consistency of 
the WAAQ as measured by Cronbach‟s alpha was .89 and .93 at pre- and post-test, 
respectively. Criterion-related validity is indicated by improved workplace functioning, for 
example, increased observer-rated task performance and work engagement (Bond et al., 
2013). In the present study, both psychological flexibility scales asked participants to respond 
referencing the past two weeks. 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Preliminary Analyses 
Gender differences were noted for emotional intelligence, F(1, 42) = 8.77, p < .01, 
partial ƞ2 = .17. Females (M = 128.12, SD = 13.81) scored higher than males (M = 112.91, SD 
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= 17.46) on emotional intelligence at pre-test; however, these differences were not significant 
at post-test, F(1, 42) = 4.06, p > .05, partial ƞ2 = .09. Likewise, older participants reported 
significantly greater levels of global psychological flexibility, r(44) = .30, p = .05; but the 
relationship was not significant following the training intervention, r(44) = .26, p = .09. No 
significant differences were observed between control and training participants on any 
demographic variables, including sex age, education, English-speaking background, number 
of years employed and whether the participant was in a supervisory or management role. 
Of the 44 participants who responded to post-writing compliance queries, 27 (61.4%) 
indicated writing in the journal for the full 20 minutes over a minimum of three days. 
Another 10 (22.7%) participants managed to write for 20 minutes over two days, while 7 
(15.9%) wrote for only one day. Crosstabs revealed that compliance with journal writing 
sessions did not significantly differ between groups, χ2 = 5.27, p = .26. Analysis proceeded 
with an intention to treat approach, including all 44 participants irrespective of compliance 
with the training instructions. 
 
5.3.2 Main Analyses 
Group means showing pre- and post-test scores (and standard deviations) for all 
analysis variables are presented in Table 1. Zero-order correlations between all main 
variables at both time points are shown in Table 2.  
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Table 5.1  
Means and Standard Deviations for Control and Intervention Groups on Pre and Post-Test 
Measures 
 Pre-test  Post-test 
Condition M SD  M SD 
Control group (n = 21)      
Emotional intelligence 123.76 17.12  122.38 17.15 
Positive affect 31.86 7.13  30.67 7.72 
Negative affect 19.38 6.97  19.67 6.51 
Work engagement 41.00 9.85  39.57 8.15 
Vigour 11.76 3.67  11.57 2.91 
Dedication 14.24 3.48  13.48 3.11 
Absorption 15.00 3.46  14.52 3.09 
Psychological flexibility 34.38 9.93  35.19 9.92 
Work-specific psychological flexibility 35.00 6.98  33.71 6.78 
Experimental group (n = 23)      
Emotional intelligence 124.83 15.35  129.13 13.92 
Positive affect 32.04 6.51  34.83 6.00 
Negative affect 16.65 4.73  16.74 5.50 
Work engagement 42.39 6.82  43.39 7.12 
Vigour 12.83 2.25  12.83 2.64 
Dedication 14.87 2.78  15.30 2.85 
Absorption 14.70 2.67  15.26 2.58 
Psychological flexibility 36.39 5.91  38.26 5.99 
Work-specific psychological flexibility 36.30 5.31  36.83 6.13 
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Table 5.2 
Zero-order correlations between main variables (n = 44) 
Pre-test          EIS PA NA UWES U-Vig U-Ded U-Abs AAQ-II 
PA .56***        
NA -.16 -.42**       
UWES .42** .71*** -.30*      
U-Vig .46** .71*** -.36* .89***     
U-Ded .44** .73*** -.26 .95*** .82***    
U-Abs .25 .51*** -.21 .88*** .62*** .77***   
AAQ-II .39** .61*** -.62*** .54*** .55*** .56*** .36*  
WAAQ .31* .60*** -.49** .66*** .60*** .57*** .63*** .59*** 
Post-test         
PA .40**        
NA -.43** -.50***       
UWES .53*** .62*** -.35*      
U-Vig .55*** .66*** -.34* .91***     
U-Ded .44** .60*** -.37* .92*** .82***    
U-Abs .44** .39** -.22 .84*** .62*** .63***   
AAQ-II .44** .60*** -.58*** .50*** .51*** .49*** .34*  
WAAQ .38* .48*** -.41** .61*** .53*** .56*** .55*** .70*** 
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Note. EIS = Emotional Intelligence Scale; PA = Positive Affect subscale; NA = Negative 
Affect subscale; UWES = Utrecht Work Engagement Scale; U-Vig = UWES Vigour 
subscale; U-Ded = UWES Dedication subscale; U-Abs = UWES Absorption Subscale; AAQ-
II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2, 7-item single factor solution; WAAQ = 
Work-related Acceptance and Action Questionnaire. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
Individual ANCOVA‟s assessed the efficacy of the intervention for increasing 
emotional intelligence, positive affect, work engagement, psychological flexibility, and work-
specific psychological flexibility, with pre-test scores on each measure entered as covariate. 
ANCOVA was chosen over ANOVA of change analysis to increase power given the small 
sample size. Quasi-random allocation combined with the absence of baseline differences 
between groups implied a lack of bias, supporting the use of ANCOVA (Van Breukelen, 
2006). The homogeneity of regression slopes was met for all analyses. Table 5.3 summarises 
the results of covariance analyses with associated effect sizes and adjusted post-test means, 
controlling for pre-test scores.  
Participants undertaking the intervention scored significantly higher than controls on 
emotional intelligence, positive affect, and work engagement when controlling for pre-test 
scores. While the higher order factor for work engagement was significant, a subscale 
analysis revealed that dimensions of absorption (F(1, 41) = 4.99, p = .03, partial ƞ2 = .11) and 
dedication (F(1, 41) =  5.44, p = .03, partial ƞ2 = .12) contributed to the significant group 
differences, with the vigour subscale showing no significant treatment effect (F(1, 41) = .85, 
p = .36, partial ƞ2 = .02). Likewise, no group differences were observed on measures of 
negative affect, psychological flexibility or work-specific psychological flexibility.  
Removing the 7 (15.9%) participants who wrote in the journal for only 1 day (one 
third compliance with training protocols) from the dataset revealed largely the same findings 
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with greater mean differences between groups. However, the work-specific psychological 
flexibility measure (WAAQ) showed significantly higher scores in the intervention group 
compared with controls, F(1,34) = 5.80, p = .02, ƞ2 = .15 (control adjusted M = 34.58, SE = 
.85; intervention adjusted M = 37.61, SE = .92). Despite this finding, the general 
psychological flexibility measure (AAQ-II) remained non-significant. 
 
Table 5.3 
ANCOVAs of Training Effect on Post-test Variables, Controlling for Pre-test scores, with 
Post-test Adjusted Means and Standard Errors for Control and Intervention Groups 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 Control group 
(n = 21) 
 Experimental 
group 
(n = 23) 
 F-value Partial  ƞ2 
Measure M SE  M SE    
Emotional intelligence 122.83 1.82  128.72 1.74  5.47* .12 
Positive affect 30.73 1.12  34.77 1.07  6.75** .14 
Negative affect 18.74 1.03  17.60 0.98  0.63 .02 
Work engagement 40.12 0.95  42.89 0.91  4.44* .10 
Vigour 11.94 0.43  12.49 0.41  0.85 .02 
Dedication 13.71 0.42  15.09 0.40  5.44* .12 
Absorption 14.40 0.32  15.38 0.30  4.99* .11 
Psychological flexibility 36.04 1.07  37.49 1.02  .96 .02 
Work-specific 
psychological flexibility 
34.24 0.96  36.34 0.92  2.50 .06 
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Pre-score mediation analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) for all participants showed 
that work-specific psychological flexibility partially mediated the effects of emotional 
intelligence on work engagement, while positive affect fully mediated the effects of 
emotional intelligence on work engagement. The total effect of emotional intelligence on 
work engagement was significant, B = .22, SE = .073, t(42) = 3.00, 95% CI[0.07, 0.37], and 
the indirect effect of emotional intelligence on work engagement remained significant 
accounting for work-specific psychological flexibility as mediator (Figure 1), B = .12, SE = 
.061, t(41) = 2.03, 95% CI[0.00, 0.25]. The indirect effect of emotional intelligence on work 
engagement became non-significant accounting for positive affect as mediator (Figure 2), B = 
.01, SE = .069, t(41) = 0.21, 95% CI[-0.12, 0.15]. This provides concurrent data support 
suggesting that emotional intelligence potentially builds the individual strengths of 
psychological flexibility and positive affect, and ultimately promotes work engagement. 
  
 
Figure 5.1. Model showing path from emotional intelligence to work engagement through 
psychological flexibility as a mediator. N = 44. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
The causation effect between variables was assessed using a sequential mediation 
analysis and change scores for all participants who were generally compliant with the training 
instructions (i.e., completed a minimum of 2 journal writing sessions). Experimental 
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condition was entered as the independent variable, emotional intelligence change as the first 
mediator followed by work-specific psychological flexibility change as the second mediator 
and work engagement as the dependent variable. The sequential mediation model did not 
reach significance, B = 2.58, SE = 1.704, t(35) = 1.51, 95% CI[-0.88, 6.03], R
2
 = .25. 
Accordingly, the indirect effects of experimental condition on work engagement through 
emotional intelligence change and work-specific psychological flexibility change were not 
significant, B = .03, SE = .100, t(33) = .29, 95% CI[-0.18, 0.23] and B = .24, SE = .233, t(33) 
= 1.04, 95% CI[-0.23, 0.72], respectively. The sequential mediation analysis was repeated for 
the full sample with positive affect change replacing work-specific psychological flexibility 
as the second mediator. The analysis returned similar results with non-significant findings for 
the total model, B = 2.43, SE = 1.445, t(42) = 1.68, 95% CI[-0.49, 5.35], R
2
 = .25, and 
indirect effect of experimental condition on work engagement though emotional intelligence 
and positive affect change, B = .03, SE = .100, t(33) = .29, 95% CI[-0.18, 0.23] and B = .24, 
SE = .233, t(33) = 1.04, 95% CI[-0.23, 0.72], respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Model showing path from emotional intelligence to work engagement through 
positive affect as a mediator. N = 44. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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5.4 Discussion 
The present study examined the proposal that emotional intelligence supports 
workplace flourishing, partly through the development of further strengths that contribute to 
positive workplace outcomes. Psychological flexibility was assessed as a potential individual 
strength developed through emotional intelligence competencies that might facilitate 
workplace flourishing as indicated by increased work engagement. This study extends on the 
Schutte and Loi (2014) investigation of emotional intelligence as a foundation for workplace 
flourishing through administration of the Kirk et al. (2011) emotional intelligence 
intervention. The present study design extended the original investigation by addressing 
causation relationships, operationalising work engagement using an alternative measure to 
capture dimensions of vigour, dedication and absorption (UWES), and explored the influence 
of emotional intelligence training on the previously unassessed individual strength of 
psychological flexibility, as a potential mediating variable between emotional intelligence 
and work engagement. 
The findings from the original Kirk et al. (2011) emotional intelligence training study 
and Schutte and Loi (2014) investigation of emotional intelligence as a source for workplace 
flourishing were largely confirmed. The emotional intelligence training intervention 
promoted increased emotional intelligence, positive affect, and work engagement, relative to 
controls. Increases to work engagement were demonstrated across dedication and absorption 
dimensions, extending previous research examining the influence of trait emotional 
intelligence on engagement as a one-dimensional construct (Akhtar et al., 2014). In addition, 
the intervention facilitated increased work-specific psychological flexibility for participants 
generally compliant with the training instructions. Results from the present study show that a 
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low-cost, self-administered, journal writing training program can be effective in promoting 
positive workplace characteristics.  
Consistent with Kirk et al.‟s (2011) finding, building confidence in emotional self-
efficacy through expressive writing resulted in better emotional functioning; however, the 
intervention demonstrated a lower effect size in the present study (training accounted for 12% 
of the variance in post-test emotional intelligence scores versus 31% in the original efficacy 
study). This difference could reflect lower levels of compliance with the training instructions 
observed in the present study as well as individual difference features in the participant pool. 
Pre-training emotional intelligence means were higher in the present Australian public sector 
sample than the Kirk et al. (2011) study, and likely resulted in a ceiling effect preventing the 
training from stimulating as much change and ultimately limiting effect sizes and statistical 
significance. Future research should consider extending recruitment beyond Australian public 
sector agencies in order to access a greater participant pool for increased power as well as 
participants with more varied individual difference characteristics, which might improve 
training responsiveness and generalizability of findings. 
The hypothesis that psychological flexibility would mediate the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and work engagement was partially supported. Higher employee 
emotional intelligence prior to intervention was significantly related to greater work-specific 
psychological flexibility and work engagement. Testing of the mediation model found that 
work-specific psychological flexibility partially mediated the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and work engagement as hypothesised at pre-test. Similarly, positive affect fully 
mediated the effects of emotional intelligence on work engagement, consistent with the 
broaden-and-build hypothesis (Fredrickson, 2001). However, both mediation models failed to 
reach significance when tested after the emotional intelligence training intervention using 
change scores for these variables. It is likely statistical power impacted the ability of the 
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change score mediation model to detect a significant result due to dropout and non-
compliance with training instructions limiting the number of cases available for analysis. 
Further, the magnitude of the relationships between variables assessed through change scores 
appeared to be slightly lower than the magnitude suggested in the pre-intervention mediation 
model. This may imply that the relationship between emotional intelligence, work-specific 
psychological flexibility (and positive affect) and work engagement is strengthened when 
developing naturally over longer time frames as demonstrated in the pre-score mediation 
analyses. In contrast, a time-limited intervention may have a smaller effect size and therefore 
less chance of detecting significance in a similar size sample.  
It is somewhat anomalous that the emotional intelligence training fostered work-
specific psychological flexibility but not global psychological flexibility, particularly given 
previous findings that both the AAQ-II and WAAQ predict work engagement as 
operationalised by the UWES (Bond et al., 2013), which did increase. The additional context-
sensitivity of the WAAQ may explain this finding coupled with limited power to detect 
changes in global AAQ-II. Further, the necessity to reverse-key the AAQ-II to derive a 
measure of psychological flexibility may be inherently flawed; the presence of inflexibility 
may not necessarily imply the presence of flexibility (e.g. Grossman, 2011). Given the 
WAAQ includes positively-worded items, this conceptual variation may explain the positive 
findings for the WAAQ and limited sensitivity of the AAQ-II for detecting increases in 
psychological flexibility. Alternatively, given the emotional training focus on work scenarios, 
it is possible that global psychological flexibility was not improved and broader emotional 
intelligence training interventions are required to facilitate this strength more generally. In 
fact, given the different focus of the training instructions (work in experimental and non-work 
in controls), the positive intervention effects on work-specific flexibility and workplace 
engagement may be attributable to writing about work rather than emotional processing. 
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Further, instructions to emotionally „process‟ events in the experimental condition are 
inherently different from instructions to „describe‟ events in the control condition. This 
semantic inconsistency could artificially inflate training effects considering that describing 
emotional content may not have the same benefits as emotional processing. Therefore, while 
this study partially supports a causative relationship from emotional intelligence as the 
foundation for building work-related psychological flexibility and engagement, more research 
is required to address these potential confounds and assess causation for the general 
psychological flexibility construct.  
Changes in this instance are limited to the workplace and future research should 
extend these findings to clarify the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
characteristic psychological flexibility. Replicating this research in other applied settings will 
assist in establishing more causative links between these constructs, especially considering 
the context-dependent nature of psychological flexibility (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). 
These findings highlight implications for measurement methods in research and practice. The 
improved sensitivity to treatment effects using a work-specific measure of psychological 
flexibility supports recent efforts to develop context-specific versions of the widely-used 
AAQ-II (e.g., Bond et al., 2013) and directs future research towards the development of more 
contextual measures. A static, global self-report measure such as the AAQ-II may not 
adequately capture nuanced changes in adaptive abilities and a range of measures appropriate 
to the setting may prove effective for future research approaches and assessment of clinical 
outcomes.  
Future research might also consider varying the conceptualisations and measurement 
methods for the main variables to provide more support for the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility. The present study conceptualised 
emotional intelligence using the trait approach and global scores. A greater sample size 
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enabling subscale analysis for specific domains of emotional intelligence competencies (e.g., 
optimism/mood regulation, emotional appraisal, social skills and utilisation of emotions; 
Petrides and Furnham, 2000) may be highly informative. Further research could approach 
study design from an ability perspective of emotional intelligence to assess the mediation 
relationships and intervention efficacy. Ability emotional intelligence has also been 
associated with positive work outcomes, such as job performance (O‟Boyle et al., 2011), and 
research using ability models would complement trait findings from the present study to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena leading to workplace 
flourishing (Schutte et al., 2009).  
Performance assessments more prevalent in the measurement of ability models may 
also address the common method variance limitation due to the present study‟s reliance on 
self-report measures for all variables assessed. In particular, item content for the emotional 
intelligence and WAAQ self-report measures demonstrated some overlap; for example, 
“when I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail” and “I can work 
effectively, even when I doubt myself”, respectively (Schutte et al., 1998; Bond et al., 2013).  
Overlapping item content combined with self-report collection methods may have artificially 
inflated correlations. Constructs for emotional intelligence, psychological flexibility, and 
work outcomes are capable of assessment through performance proxies and observer ratings. 
Future research in this area might benefit from application of these varied approaches. In 
addition, lengthier follow up should be considered in future studies. Observed treatment 
effects for emotional intelligence, positive affect and work engagement in the present study 
were tested between 2-4 weeks following the training. Further research could test the 
sustainability and perseverance of observed training effects and ideal intervals for brief 
refresher training. However, designs involving protracted study timeframes need to be 
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balanced against the likelihood that control participants may become aware of condition 
assignment over lengthier periods.  
The present study provides additional support that emotional intelligence is a 
foundation for workplace flourishing through the development of positive characteristics such 
as work-specific psychological flexibility. The practical implications of the study show that 
relatively brief, self-administered, training programs, that encourage reflection on the 
emotional content of work experiences through expressive writing, can effectively increase 
workplace strengths such as emotional intelligence and work-specific psychological 
flexibility, ultimately facilitating increased work engagement. From a positive psychology 
perspective, this finding describes an avenue for facilitating optimal employee functioning as 
well as fostering positive organisations that could benefit from greater employee engagement.  
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Chapter 6 
Characteristic Emotional Intelligence Helps Maintain Positive Emotional States Which 
Broaden Flexible Thinking 
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Abstract 
 
Positive affect is theorised to broaden thought-action repertoires resulting in the accumulation 
of personal resources such as psychological flexibility. Emotional intelligence has been 
linked to positive affect regulation and may therefore promote broadening processes and 
associated skills acquirement. This study reports results from 107 participants, randomly 
allocated to positive, neutral and negative mood inductions using a combination of Velten 
statements and brief film clips. Participants in the positive condition demonstrated broadened 
cognitive repertoires as a performance proxy for psychological flexibility relative to a neutral 
state. Emotional intelligence was partially associated with positive affect maintenance and 
increased psychological flexibility. The authors discuss measurement implications for 
psychological flexibility and promising future research directions to further test the 
relationship between emotional intelligence, positive affect, and psychological flexibility.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Emotions are momentary feelings that describe our subjective experiences and 
influence the way we think, act and respond physiologically to various situations (Reeve, 
2009). Emotion theorists propose that emotional phenomena have an inherent adaptive value 
developed as an evolutionary mechanism for survival (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; 
Fredrickson, 1998). For example, exposure to aversive situations culminates in the experience 
of negative emotions, such as anger and fear. These emotions stimulate changes in thoughts, 
actions and physiology, priming the individual to access a narrowed repertoire of action 
tendencies (Fredrickson, 2001). In these circumstances, specific action tendencies primarily 
consist of flight or flight responses which were crucial to survival. Negative emotion, 
therefore, coordinates the necessary psychological and physical (e.g., increased adrenaline) 
changes, promoting behavioural efficiency and effectiveness.  
The evolutionary value of negative emotions is relatively explicit compared to the 
amorphous adaptive value of positive emotions, which are not generally associated with 
specific action tendencies (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). However, Fredrickson‟s (1998; 
2001) broaden-and-build theory proposes that positive emotions have an adaptive value that 
is complementary to negative emotion, and tangibly different in form. Positive emotions, 
such as amusement and contentment, experienced in non-threatening situations, broaden 
instead of narrow thought-action repertoires. These nonspecific action tendencies result in the 
accumulation of enduring physical, social, intellectual and psychological resources 
(Fredrickson, 1998). For example, the momentary positive emotion of joy may lead to play, 
building physical skills and strengths as a resource against future threats. In a more 
contemporary example, play or engaging and enjoying the company of others, develops 
social networks, ensuring greater levels of social support are available when required (Lee, 
1983). One personal resource potentially fostered in this way is psychological flexibility. 
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6.1.1 Expanding Psychological Flexibility through Positive Affect 
Psychological flexibility involves the ability to “recognize and adapt to various 
situational demands [and] shift mindsets or behavioural repertoires” (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010, p.865). High levels of psychological flexibility are considered a fundamental aspect of 
health and contribute to numerous positive outcomes such as improved coping skills and less 
depression and anxiety (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Two studies testing the broaden-and-
build hypothesis examined the influence of emotions on the scope of attention and cognitive 
and behavioural (thought-action) repertoires, indicators of psychological flexibility 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). These studies demonstrate how positive affect could 
contribute to psychological flexibility as a personal resource. 
Emotions influence the scope of attention; biases in attentional focus are introduced 
depending on the valence of emotional content (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). Fredrickson 
and Branigan (2005) experimentally tested the influence of positive and negative emotions on 
attentional biases using a global-local visual processing task (Kimichi & Palmer, 1982). 
Following positive, neutral or negative mood induction using brief film clips, participants 
were presented with a series of standard figures and asked to select their impression of the 
most similar comparison figure from two options reflecting either local shape elements or 
global configurations. Global bias scores were significantly greater in the positive condition 
compared with neutral, indicating broadened attentional focus associated with positive 
emotional states.  
In the same experiment, Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) examined whether positive 
emotions broaden the scope of thought-action repertoires relative to typical or neutral 
emotional states. The researchers administered a Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954) instructing participants to focus on the strongest emotion elicited during 
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the mood induction film and visualise a situation in which they experience that emotion to its 
full extent. Participants were provided with 20 blank lines and asked to construct a list 
describing all the present action urges flowing from that emotional experience (Fredrickson 
& Branigan, 2005). Positive affect significantly broadened thought-action repertoire size 
compared to neutral emotionality.  
Combined, the broadened scope of attention and thought-action repertoires 
engendered through the experience of positive emotion may benefit momentary adaptive 
functioning and could build psychological flexibility as a personal resource. Fredrickson and 
Branigan‟s (2005) studies show that a global bias due to the experience of positive affectivity 
may allow individuals to direct attentional resources where required, seeing past the finite 
details of a situation to gain a broader assessment of the circumstances. After facilitating 
recognition of situational demands, positive affect promotes a broader repertoire of 
behavioural affordances from which to select the most appropriate and adaptive response 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). In this way, positive affect may contribute to key features of 
psychological flexibility.  
Studies examining the broadening effects of positive affect support the theory that it 
underlies psychologically flexible behaviours and cognitions, impacting adaptive functioning 
and situational outcomes. Positive affect expands cognitive organisation, facilitating 
consideration of creative options that may prove more adaptive and functional in the 
circumstances (Isen, Johnson, Mertz & Robinson, 1985). For example, medical practitioners 
consider wider arrays of diagnostic possibilities when experiencing positive emotion, 
contributing to decision-making efficiency and quality (Estrada, Isen & Young, 1997). 
Further, people in positive moods are more likely to openly consider arguments and arrive at 
mutually beneficial bargaining solutions in business negotiations compared with people in 
neutral states (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). The culmination of this research suggests that 
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positive affect supports broadened and flexible use of both cognitive and behavioural 
(thought-action) repertoires, manifesting as increased psychological flexibility. This is 
consistent with a comprehensive review of psychological flexibility, which concluded that 
positive emotional states facilitate flexible thinking and behaviour (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010). Consequently, the frequent or characteristic experience of positive affect may build 
psychological flexibility as an enduring personal resource. 
 
6.1.2 Emotional Intelligence as a Foundation for Positive Affect and Psychological 
Flexibility 
Considering that positive affect may build personal resources such as psychological 
flexibility, emotion regulation abilities enabling individuals to derive greater levels of 
positive emotion from a variety of situations may facilitate exponential growth. Emotional 
intelligence is adaptive emotional functioning associated with the characteristic experience 
and regulation of positive mood (Schutte, Malouff, Simunek, McKenly & Hollander, 2002). 
In this way, emotionally intelligent individuals may possess an evolutionary advantage in 
terms of the resources acquired through broaden and build processes. Schutte et al. (2002) 
posited that emotional intelligence facilitates recognition, understanding and regulation of 
emotions to the extent that individuals with high emotional intelligence can resist negative 
environmental influences and maximise the effects of positive situational influences. Studies 
examining both ability and trait models of emotional intelligence in relation to emotion 
regulation support this proposition. 
Ciarrochi, Chan and Caputi (2000) administered an ability test of emotional 
intelligence prior to positive, neutral, and negative mood induction using film clips. 
Individuals with high emotional intelligence reported higher mood levels following the 
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positive (humorous) film than individuals with low emotional intelligence. Schutte et al. 
(2002) replicated these findings using a trait conceptualisation of emotional intelligence. 
High trait emotional intelligence was associated with greater characteristic positive affect as 
well as transient state positive affect. Further, trait emotional intelligence predicted positive 
affect after mood manipulation using Velten statements (Velten, 1968). Participants with high 
emotional intelligence maintained levels of positive affect following a negative induction and 
gained greater levels of positive affect when subsequently exposed to a positive induction 
compared to individuals with low emotional intelligence (Schutte et al., 2002).  
These studies support the notion that individuals with high emotional intelligence are 
sensitive to positive environmental stimuli and can capitalise on the mood-enhancing benefits 
of positive experiences. Further, these individuals appear to be less vulnerable to negative 
stimuli, maintaining positive affect when exposed to aversive influences. Accordingly, 
emotionally intelligent individuals may experience more positive affect and thereby develop 
greater psychological flexibility as a personal resource to draw upon as needed in a variety of 
situations.  
 
6.1.3 Evidence of the Relationship between Emotional Intelligence, Positive Affect and 
Psychological Flexibility 
Emotional intelligence, positive affect and psychological flexibility may be intricately 
interrelated. Emotional intelligence potentially provides a foundation for the development of 
psychological flexibility through the ability to regulate positive affect. This is an important 
relationship given the relevance of psychological flexibility to health (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010). Previous research has examined the relationships between these variables in different 
applied contexts in an attempt to assess the causative roles. For example, in a decision study 
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manipulating choice changeability, positive affect mediated the effects of emotional 
intelligence on psychological flexibility, which in turn mitigated ruminative outcomes 
(Foster, Pammer, Schutte, & Brinker, 2016a). While this offers compelling support, 
emotional intelligence interventions and mood manipulations provide the most direct means 
of testing the potential causal relationships between emotional intelligence, positive affect 
and psychological flexibility. 
A study investigating the effects of an emotional intelligence intervention on 
workplace outcomes provided partial support for the connection between emotional 
intelligence, positive affect and psychological flexibility (Foster, Schutte, & Pammer, 2016b). 
Concurrent data collected prior to the intervention showed that emotional intelligence 
significantly predicted work-specific psychological flexibility mediated by positive affect. 
Furthermore, individuals in the emotional training condition reported significantly more 
work-specific psychological flexibility following the intervention than control participants. 
However, the meditational role of positive affect between emotional intelligence and work-
specific psychological flexibility was not confirmed in a sequential mediation analysis 
building in the intervention effects. The authors of the study concluded that the magnitude of 
the relationship between emotional intelligence, positive affect and work-specific 
psychological flexibility may be strengthened when developing naturally over longer time 
frames in comparison to a time-limited intervention. Consequently, the study offered 
equivocal support for meditational role of positive affect between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility and additional research examining the influence of positive affect is 
warranted.  
The workplace emotional intelligence study , comprising Chapter 5, raised further 
implications regarding the measurement of psychological flexibility. While the training 
intervention was effective at increasing work-specific psychological flexibility, no changes 
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were noted for general psychological flexibility operationalized as the widely-used 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II). The discussion suggested that this 
traditional measure of characteristic psychological flexibility may not be sensitive to 
treatment effects and highlighted the need for future research comparing the self-report AAQ-
II measure against performance proxies of psychological flexibility. Mood induction offers a 
valuable method for comparing the efficacy of psychological flexibility measures given wide 
support for the effects of positive affect on flexible thinking and behaviour (e.g., Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010). Valid measures of psychological flexibility should be sensitive to 
significant changes in positive affect. 
Research in the area of cognitive broadening and flexible categorisation offers 
performance analogues for psychological flexibility. Greene and Noice (1988) induced 
positive affect in adolescents prior to a word generation task. The mean number of words and 
unusualness of word associations generated in the positive induction condition was 
significantly greater than in the neutral induction condition. This task offers a convenient test 
of the broadening hypothesis as well as a performance proxy for psychological flexibility as 
an indicator of expanded cognitive repertoires and flexible categorisation. Including a trait 
measure of emotional intelligence in conjunction with a mood manipulation procedure and 
assessment of psychological flexibility may further assist in clarifying the purported 
relationship between emotional intelligence, positive affect and psychological flexibility.  
The present study will combine mood induction and measurement methods from the 
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) and Schutte et al. (2002) studies, utilising film clips and 
Velten statements to induce mood in three randomly assigned groups: positive, neutral and 
negative. This addresses a limitation in the original Schutte et al. (2002) study which did not 
counterbalance mood manipulations (negative was always applied before positive) or provide 
a neutral condition aside from baseline measurements. Accordingly, the positive induction 
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could have operated as a mood repair rather than mood enhancer and may be confounded by 
passage of time effects resulting in a return to baseline. This creates ambiguous results for the 
purposes of testing the broadening hypothesis. The inclusion of a trait emotional intelligence 
measure and performance proxy for psychological flexibility (word generation) alongside the 
traditional measure (AAQ-II) in the present study should assist in more rigorous examination 
of the relationship between emotional intelligence, positive affect and psychological 
flexibility. The hypotheses are: 
1. Word generation will be greater following a positive mood induction relative to a neutral 
condition, reflecting broadened psychological flexibility. 
2. Word generation will be lower in the negative induction condition relative to neutral, 
reflecting narrowed psychological flexibility. 
3. High emotional intelligence will be related to greater state positive affect prior to 
induction across all conditions. 
4. Higher emotional intelligence will be associated with a greater increase in positive affect 
after a positive mood induction, controlling for prior levels.  
5. High emotional intelligence will be associated with less of a decrease in positive affect 
after a negative mood induction, controlling for pre-existing positive affect. 
6. Higher emotional intelligence will be associated with increased word generation. 
7. Psychological flexibility as measured by the AAQ-II will not differ between positive, 
neutral and negative mood induction conditions. 
8. Rumination will be inversely related to psychological flexibility and emotional 
intelligence in the positive condition. 
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6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
First and second year psychology students self-selected to participate in the study for 
receipt of course credit incentive through the university online research gateway. Close 
examination of the dataset as collection progressed revealed data quality concerns, instigating 
a second recruitment round seeking community participants. Community members were 
recruited through social media advertising and snowball sampling. Of 195 students and 
community participants who started the survey, complete responses were recorded for 178 
cases, suggesting 8.7% dropout. The 17 incomplete cases and 1 self-identified dummy 
response were deleted, leaving 177 cases in the dataset. An additional 70 cases were removed 
following the application of stringent data validation procedures outlined further in the results 
section. Participant attributes described in this section relate to the final data set with all 
suspect cases deleted. 
The final study sample consisted of 107 participants. The sample comprised 91 
students and 16 community members, representing 81 women and 26 men. The age of these 
individuals ranged from 18 to 78 years, with an average of 23.04 years (SD = 10.37). 
Reflecting the young demographic, the majority of participants held secondary school 
certificates as the highest qualification; 57.0% school certificate, 1.9% technical college 
diploma, 30.8% bachelor degree, 6.5% graduate certificate, and 3.7% graduate or doctorate 
degree. Ten participants (9.3%) identified with having a non-English speaking background 
(NESB). 
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6.2.2 Materials 
6.2.2.1 Emotion Measures. 
Emotional Intelligence Scale. Schutte et al. (1998) developed this 33-item self-report 
scale to measure characteristic emotional intelligence, operationalised as the trait ability to 
identify, understand, regulate and harness emotions in the self and others. Participants rate 
their abilities against a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly 
agree), with total scores ranging from 33 to 165. Sample statements include “When I 
experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last” and “When I am in a positive 
mood, I am able to come up with new ideas”. The scale demonstrated strong internal 
reliability in the present study with Cronbach‟s alpha of .87, consistent with the mean alpha 
reported across diverse samples (Schutte, Malouff, & Bhullar, 2009). The Emotional 
intelligence scale has demonstrated convergent validity with alternative self-report and 
performance measures of emotional intelligence (Brackett & Mayer, 2003), as well as 
theoretically related constructs such as mood repair and emotional clarity (Bastian, Burns & 
Nettelbeck, 2005). 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS comprises two 10-item 
mood scales, depicting positive and negative emotional states (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1988). Negative affect scale items reflect a variety of aversive mood states such as “hostile” 
and “afraid”, while positive affect items denote pleasurable engagement, including feeling 
“enthusiastic” and “interested”. Respondents report the extent of each emotional experience 
from 1 (Very slightly or not at all) to 5 (Extremely), in reference to relational time frame 
instructions. Validated time frame instructions range from the present moment (state) to more 
general characteristic (trait) affect. The present study instructed participants to indicate how 
  
114 
 
they are feeling “right now, that is, at the present moment” to capture momentary state 
affective changes as a function of the mood manipulation. In the original psychometric 
analysis, the internal reliability for administration of the present moment time instructions 
ranged from Cronbach‟s alpha of .85 for the negative affect subscale to .89 for positive affect 
(Watson et al., 1988). For the present study, both scales demonstrated strong reliability; 
positive affect α = .93 (pre-test) and .94 (post-test), negative affect α = .88 (pre-test) and .92 
(post-test). As an indicator of external validity, measures of anxiety, depression and 
psychological distress have been significantly positively correlated with the negative affect 
subscale and negatively correlated, at lower magnitudes, with positive affect (Watson et al., 
1988; Crawford & Henry, 2004). 
 
6.2.2.2 Mood Manipulation. 
Velten statements. Modified sets of Velten‟s (1968) original mood induction 
statements were used to evoke positive, neutral and negative emotions. Participants assigned 
to each condition were asked to experience the mood associated with the relevant list of 
statements. The list of 52 statements (comprising 17, 16 and 19 statements for the positive, 
neutral and negative conditions, respectively) was sourced from work evaluating the efficacy 
of Velten‟s original statements against valence and arousal ratings (Jennings, McGinnis, 
Lovejoy & Stirling, 2000) using a Self Assessment Manikin rating scale (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1999). Statements demonstrating strong reliability and validity features consistent 
with Velten‟s original valence designations were retained in the modified lists.  
Film Clips. In addition to the Velten statements, brief excerpts from movie segments 
freely available on youtube were used to create three mood induction clips. One clip 
“Singing” (1 min 30 sec), intended to evoke positive emotion, shows part of a singing and 
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dancing comedy routine from the feature film „Singing in the Rain‟. A travel documentary for 
an Alaskan nature park describing the Denali mountain range and surrounding area, “Nature” 
(1 min 11 sec), served as the neutral manipulation. The final clip “Network” (1 min 18 sec) 
shows an anchorman expressing intense negative emotion, primarily anger, in response to 
prevailing social conditions. The Singing and Network clips demonstrated efficacy in 
eliciting the desired emotional state during pilot testing, while the Nature clip had been used 
in prior dissertation research as a neutral induction (e.g., Desnoyers, 2013). 
 
6.2.2.3 Dependent Measures. 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-Revised (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011). The 
AAQ-II is a widely used 7-item self-report scale measuring characteristic psychological 
flexibility. Sample items include “emotions cause problems in my life” and “worries get in 
the way of my success”. Respondents rate the self-descriptive accuracy of statements from 1 
(Never true) to 7 (Always true). Items are reverse scored so that higher scores indicate general 
psychological flexibility. In the present study, Cronbach‟s alpha was .87 following the mood 
induction procedure across all participants. Validation demonstrated that lower flexibility 
correlated with higher levels of emotional distress and poorer life functioning (Bond et al., 
2011). 
Word-generation task (Greene & Noice, 1988). A word generation task measured 
cognitive flexibility, or broadened and creative thinking, as a performance indicator for 
psychological flexibility (Greene & Noice, 1988; Rosent, 1980). Participants were asked to 
generate words relating to two categories: fruits and birds (Greene & Noice, 1988). The 
online form presented 20 text-entry boxes underneath each category, allowing a maximum of 
40 words to be generated. Participants were allowed three minutes to complete the task 
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before the page automatically submitted. Pilot testing showed that three minutes was 
sufficient time for slow typists to exhaust word generation options and the maximum range of 
40 word options did not create a ceiling effect. Instructions for the task were presented prior 
to the categories and timed responses to ensure differential reading times did not confound 
results. This task provides a crude estimate of expanded cognitive repertoires and flexible 
thinking that requires less intensive administration and scoring procedures than remote 
associates testing (Mednick & Mednick, 1967), frequency scoring of category norms (e.g., 
Battig & Montague, 1969), or content analysis of thought-action repertoires (e.g., TST; Kuhn 
& McPartland, 1954). Mean differences for word generation in previous samples 
administering this task were significant between positive and neutral induction conditions 
(Greene & Noice, 1988). 
Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire (RTSQ; Brinker & Dozois, 2009). The 20-
item RTSQ assessed ruminative tendencies defined as repetitive, recurrent, intrusive and 
uncontrollable thinking regardless of content, valence, temporal orientation, or reason for 
engaging in the behaviour. Participants rate how well items describe their thinking from 1 
(Not at all like me) to 7 (Just like me). Sample items include “If there is an important event 
coming up, I think about it so much that I work myself up” and “I find myself daydreaming 
about things I wish I had done”. Convergent validity is supported by the Beck Depression 
Inventory and Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (Brinker & Dozois, 2009). Scale reliability 
in the present study was α = .92.  
 
6.2.2.4 Controlling for Potential Confounds. 
Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Shipley, 1940). The Shipley scale is a measure of 
cognitive function and verbal ability; a probable contributor to success on word generation 
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tasks. Participants are presented with a list of 40 words and requested to select the most 
appropriate synonym from four possibilities grouped against each word. For example, four 
possible answers for the word talk include draw, eat, speak and sleep; speak represents the 
most appropriate synonym. This scale provides an additional check to ensure individual 
differences in verbal ability are not confounding findings between conditions. 
Verbal working memory. Individual differences in semantic capacity could influence 
the number of words generated on the performance task. A measure of verbal recall was 
included to confirm that random group differences in working memory are not confounding 
mood induction results. Participants had 1 minute to read a list of 12 words and were 
prompted to recall those words later in the survey.  
 
6.2.3 Procedure 
Participants completed the emotional intelligence measure and a state version of the 
PANAS, indicating the extent to which they felt each positive and negative emotion at the 
present moment. The Qualtrics software then applied a randomizer assigning participants to 
positive, neutral and negative mood induction conditions. For each condition, participants 
were presented with the set of Velten statements prior to the brief film clip. Immediately 
following the mood induction procedure, participants completed a second state PANAS 
measure before undertaking the word generation task and psychological flexibility self-report 
survey. The presentation for these two measures of psychological flexibility was randomized 
to counterbalance any order effects. Participants were also requested to select their general 
typing speed (split by slow, medium and fast categories) and identify if from a non-English 
speaking background (NESB). Typing speed and English proficiency could potentially 
influence success on the word generation task and confound results. Finally, participants 
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completed the verbal memory task, Shipley cognitive function test and responded to the 
ruminative thought tendencies scale. Participants assigned to the negative mood induction 
were presented with the positive induction for mood repair on completion of the study. A 
second collection round followed the same procedure, targeting community participants and 
excluding the film clips from the mood induction protocols due to observed participant non-
compliance with the film component of the induction procedure.  
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Data Validation 
An embedded data element indicated whether participants clicked play when 
presented with the mood induction clip. Of 177 individuals who completed the study, only 63 
clicked one or more times on the video presentation screen, suggesting that 114 participants 
did not view the brief film clip or encountered technical access difficulties with the youtube 
links. Participants were instructed to attempt the survey on a desktop computer with youtube-
enabled settings and speaker hardware. Testing the clips during survey design supported 
compatibility with these peripherals on various systems. However, given the psychology 
student demographic, it is possible that many participants attempted access on unsupported 
smart devices or were noncompliant with induction protocols to ensure quick completion of 
research credit requirements without meaningful engagement with the study. As this became 
apparent, the second data collection round was organised recruiting community members and 
relying solely on the Velten instructions to improve comparability of data and quality. 
However, community recruitment had limited success. Accordingly, extensive data validation 
was undertaken using established objective indices of suspect responding.  
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Descriptive statistics for mean scores and standard deviations on the main measures 
were run separately for each condition. Outliers, identified as three times the standard 
deviation from the mean, were removed from the dataset. Scatterplot analysis assisted in 
further identification and removal of outliers. Shipley scores of less than 20 out of 40 (i.e., 
lower than 50% comprehension of assessed English word definitions) were removed; some 
individuals performed worse than chance on this multiple choice measure of crystallised 
English proficiency, indicating random responding. Maximum string lengths for matching 
responses were applied to the main measures; cases with identical responses entered across 
all test items for a single measure were removed. Likewise, consistent endorsement of 
extreme responses were identified and deleted.  
The verbal working memory task provided another data check, with cases 
demonstrating recalls of less than four words, or false recollection of more than three words, 
deleted from the dataset. In addition, responses were deleted where unrelated words were 
input for the word generation task (e.g., “dinosaur” as a response for the bird category), or 
less than four words were entered for either category (fruits or birds). Many of the deleted 
cases simultaneously failed multiple indices of suspect reporting. The presentdoctoral thesis 
outlines data validation treatment in more detail at Appendix E, with deleted cases identified 
alongside reasons for removal. In total, 70 complete cases were deleted from the original 177 
responses (comprising 24, 19 and 27 cases from the positive, neutral and negative state 
inductions, respectively); the final dataset consisted of 107 responses.  
 
6.3.2 Manipulation Check 
Manipulation checks were undertaken to confirm that the three induction conditions 
influenced state affect. Repeated measures ANOVAs, using within-subject pre- and post- 
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variables for positive and negative affect, assessed the induction efficacy within each 
condition. For the positive induction, there was a significant increase in positive affect and 
decrease in negative affect, F(1, 38) = 10.63, p < .01, partial ƞ2 = .22 and F(1, 38) = 19.52, p 
< .001, partial ƞ2 = .34, respectively. The negative induction showed significant increases in 
negative affect with no significant changes in positive affect, F(1, 34) = 7.28, p = .01, partial 
ƞ2 = .18 and F(1, 34) = 1.08, p = .31, respectively. Both positive and negative affect 
significantly regressed in the neutral condition, F(1, 32) = 6.98, p = .01, partial ƞ2 = .18 and 
F(1,32) = 13.25, p < .001. partial ƞ2 = .29, respectively. Table 5.1 shows the mean scores for 
positive and negative affect before and after the induction procedure for each condition.  
Table 6.1 
Mean Scores on Positive Affect and Negative Affect Before and After Positive, Neutral and 
Negative State Inductions 
  Before Induction  After Induction 
Condition n Mean SD  Mean SD 
Positive Affect       
Positive induction 39 24.28 9.14  26.44 9.04 
Neutral induction 33 24.00 7.48  20.70 6.07 
Negative induction 35 30.63 8.82  29.43 8.82 
Negative Affect       
Positive induction 39 14.46 4.27  12.92 3.91 
Neutral induction 33 15.21 6.38  12.42 3.82 
Negative induction 35 16.57 6.70  19.46 7.42 
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A 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (Induction Condition x Gender x NESB) evaluated group 
differences on positive and negative affect change. State affective changes were significant 
between induction conditions for positive and negative affect; F(2, 98) = 3.97, p = .02, ƞ2 = 
.08 and F(2, 98) = 21.74, p < .001, ƞ2 = .31, respectively. Pairwise comparisons among the 
three induction conditions using the Tukey HSD procedure to control for Type 1 error, 
showed that positive affect change in the positive condition was significantly greater than the 
neutral condition (mean difference = 5.46, SD = 1.47, p < .01, 95% CI [1.95, 8.96]), but not 
significantly different from the negative condition (mean difference = 3.35, SE = 1.45, p = 
.06, 95% CI [-.10, 6.80]). Negative affect change in the negative induction condition was 
significantly greater than both neutral and positive induction conditions (mean difference = 
5.67, SE = 1.03, p < .001, 95% CI [3.23, 8.12] and mean difference = 4.44, SE = 0.98, p < 
.001, 95% CI [2.08, 6.77], respectively). The ANOVA indicated no significant main effects 
for gender or NESB on either positive or negative affect change and there were no significant 
interactions between factors. 
 
6.3.3 Main Analyses 
The mean number of words generated overall was 28.83 (SD = 7.14). Group 
differences in word generation were tested using a 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (Induction Condition x 
Gender x NESB). The induction condition was the only significant main effect, F(2, 98) = 
11.73, p < .001, ƞ2 = .19. Figure 5.1 shows the mean number of words generated for each 
mood induction condition. The largest mean number of words generated followed the 
positive mood induction condition. Post hoc analyses using Tukey HSD confirmed that word 
generation in the positive condition was significantly larger than the neutral condition (mean 
difference = 4.11, SE = 1.51, p = .02, 95% CI [0.54, 7.68]), supporting the hypothesis that 
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positive affect broadens cognitive repertoires and flexible categorisation. In addition, the 
mean number of words generated in the negative condition was significantly lower than both 
positive and neutral conditions (mean difference = -8.00, SE = 1.48, p <.001, 95% CI [-11.52, 
-4.49] and mean difference = -3.89, SE = 1.55, p = .04, 95% CI [-7.55, -0.23], respectively), 
supporting the narrowing effect of negative affect on cognitive repertoires. 
 
Figure 6.1. Word generation means by mood induction condition. 
 
Results do not appear to be confounded by typing speed, English comprehension or 
semantic capacity. Across all participants, 9 individuals identified as slow typists, 71 as 
medium and 27 as fast. Word generation means did not differ by slow, medium and fast 
typing speeds, F(2, 104) = .06, p = .94 (M = 28.78, SD = 8.61, M = 28.68, SD = 6.82, M = 
29.26, SD = 7.73, respectively). Although Shipley total scores were significantly positively 
associated with word generation across all participants, r(107) = .32, p <.01, Shipley mean 
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scores did not differ significantly between groups, F(2, 104) = 2.97, p = .06, providing further 
support for emotion as the mechanism of broadening effects rather than any group differences 
on knowledge of English word definitions. Likewise, although verbal working memory was 
significantly correlated with word generation totals overall, r(107) = .30, p < .01, mean scores 
for semantic capacity did not differ between groups, F(2, 104) = 1.93, p = .15. In addition, 
crosstabs showed that participant educational attainment did not significantly differ across 
conditions, χ2 = 8.86, p = .35. 
The average emotional intelligence score across all participants was 125.45, SD = 
12.08, and ranged from a minimum of 92 to a maximum of 153. Emotional intelligence did 
not differ significantly between groups: F(2, 104) = 1.11, p = .33. As anticipated, higher 
emotional intelligence was associated with significantly more positive affect prior to 
induction across positive, neutral and negative conditions, although the magnitude of the 
correlations varied slightly, r(39) = .58, p < .001, r(33) = .48, p < .01, r(35) = .35, p = .04, 
respectively.  
Partial correlations were used to test the association between emotional intelligence 
and changes in positive affect with prior levels (i.e. before induction) of state positive affect 
held constant. Higher emotional intelligence measured before the positive mood induction 
was not associated with greater increases in positive affect as hypothesised, r(36) = .05, p = 
.76. Likewise, higher emotional intelligence measured before the negative mood induction 
was not associated with less decrease in positive affect as hypothesised, r(32) = -.06, p = .74. 
The induction efficacy for these two conditions is of much lower magnitude than found in the 
original study (Schutte et al., 2002) and may not provide enough scope for the influence of 
emotional intelligence on positive affect maintenance to be detected. Given greater decreases 
in positive affect observed for the neutral condition, presumably due to regression towards 
the mean, this data may provide greater sensitivity in detecting the influence of emotional 
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intelligence on positive affect maintenance than the other conditions. Therefore, further 
supplementary analyses were conducted using neutral data. Higher emotional intelligence 
measured before the neutral induction was significantly associated with less decrease in 
positive affect, r(30) = .39, p = .02. The strength of this association almost perfectly 
replicates the original findings relating to the negative induction, in which positive affect was 
similarly decreased (Schutte et al., 2002). 
Emotional intelligence is theorised to be associated with psychological flexibility 
through the primary mechanism of positive affect. Given the influence of emotional 
intelligence on changes in positive affect was not detected in the positive and negative 
conditions, it is unsurprising that higher emotional intelligence was not associated with 
greater word generation in these conditions as hypothesised, r(39) = .09, p = .59 and r(35) = -
.31, p = .07, respectively. However, higher emotional intelligence was associated with 
significantly greater word generation in the neutral condition, r(33) = .43, p = .01, where its 
influence on positive affect was supported. This partially supports the hypothesis that high 
emotional intelligence fosters positive affect maintenance and contributes to greater 
psychological flexibility as indicated by word generation.  
The average overall score for psychological flexibility, as measured by the AAQ-II, 
was 31.25 (SD = 7.07) and ranged from a minimum of 11 to a maximum of 46. Group 
differences in psychological flexibility were tested using the same procedure as word 
generation; a 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (Induction Condition x Gender x NESB). The ANOVA 
indicated no significant main effects or interaction for any group differences, F(2, 98) = 1.20, 
p = .31. Figure 5.2 shows the mean psychological flexibility score measured after each mood 
induction condition. These findings support the hypothesis that characteristic psychological 
flexibility as measured by the AAQ-II would not be sensitive to changes as a result of the 
mood induction, even though positive affect is widely theorised to be a building block for 
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psychological flexibility. Further, psychological flexibility was not associated with word 
generation in any of the mood induction conditions.  
 
Figure 6.2. Psychological flexibility means by mood induction condition. 
 
Emotional intelligence demonstrated a significant inverse relationship with 
rumination in the positive induction condition, r(39) = -.42, p < .01. This would be 
anticipated if emotional intelligence influenced positive affect gains to enhance psychological 
flexibility, in turn minimising ruminative tendencies as extrapolated from previous studies 
(Foster et al., 2016). However, this result is somewhat unusual given the finding that 
emotional intelligence did not predict positive affect change in this particular condition. 
Regardless, emotional intelligence was strongly correlated with characteristic psychological 
flexibility, r(39) = .45, p < .01, which was inversely associated with rumination, r(39) = -.54, 
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p < .001, providing partial support for the theory that emotional intelligence may enhance 
positive outcomes through the frequent experience of positive affect over longer timeframes. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
This study showed that positive affect broadens semantic access and creative thinking 
on a word generation task, expanding cognitive flexibility and categorisation as indicators of 
enhanced psychological flexibility. The corollary hypothesis, that word generation would be 
lower in the negative induction condition, was also supported. These effects were 
demonstrated relative to neutral states, providing robust support for both broadening and 
narrowing in cognitive processes as a consequence of positive and negative emotional 
experience. Partial support was also provided for the influence of emotional intelligence on 
positive affect maintenance and enhanced performance on the psychological flexibility task. 
The study further revealed some limitations in the traditional measure of characteristic 
psychological flexibility depending on the research purposes. 
 
6.4.1 The Contribution of Affective States to Psychological Flexibility 
These findings confirm Fredrickson‟s (2005) broaden-and-build hypothesis and are 
consistent with previous research examining the effects of positive affect on cognition. In the 
Green and Noice (1987) word generation study, positive affect increased activation of 
semantic networks, resulting in the generation of more exemplars to the presented categories. 
The magnitude of the mean difference between the number of words generated in the positive 
and neutral conditions was larger in the original study compared to the present study (13.4 
and 4.1 words, respectively). It is possible the induction procedure was less effective in the 
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present study, contributing to smaller effect sizes on the dependent word generation measure; 
however, no data were reported for mood manipulation checks in the original study to 
confirm this assumption. Despite the small effect size in the present study, the finding was 
significant and underscores the pervasiveness of broadening processes even at low levels of 
positive affect. 
The present study extends the original Greene and Noice (1987) findings through 
inclusion of a negative induction condition. This enabled testing of Fredrickson‟s (2005) 
corollary narrowing hypothesis. Individuals in the negative induction condition demonstrated 
lower word generation means relative to the neutral condition on the psychological flexibility 
performance task, confirming a narrowed semantic repertoire. The narrowing hypothesis 
tends to yield less consistent and marginal findings compared with the broadening hypothesis 
(e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Narrowing processes may be specific, affecting limited 
cognitive or behevaioural domains, with the particular negative emotion experienced 
dictating the effects. This interpretation acknowledges that negative emotion mobilises 
specific action tendencies and explains why some studies do not detect narrowing processes 
following negative inductions targeting particular emotions or measurement methods. It 
further highlights that the Greene & Noice (1987) word generation task offers a simple and 
sensitive test for use in future studies examining narrowing processes. 
 
6.4.2 The Influence of Trait Emotional Intelligence on Positive Affect 
High emotional intelligence was associated with greater state positive affect prior to 
induction across all conditions (supporting Hypothesis 3). However, it was not associated 
with enhanced positive affect following the positive mood induction, controlling for prior 
emotional levels (Hypothesis 4 not supported). This finding can be interpreted in two ways. 
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In the original Schutte et al. (2002) study, the positive induction always followed a negative 
manipulation. Accordingly, trait emotional intelligence may have facilitated mood returning 
to baseline levels as opposed to genuine mood increases as a result of the positive 
manipulation. This explanation is particularly persuasive considering that positive affect 
scores following the positive induction were similar to baseline levels in that study. 
Combined with the findings from the present study, this implies that emotional intelligence 
may be critical to mood repair but does not improve sensitivity to positive environmental 
stimuli.  
The alternative explanation is that the positive induction efficacy did not reach the 
threshold required to detect an existing relationship between trait emotional intelligence and 
positive affect gains. In the present study, the positive induction condition demonstrated 
smaller increases on the equivalent measure of positive affect than observed in the original 
Schutte et al. (2002) study following a Velten-only mood manipulation. This means that 
emotional intelligence possibly facilitates mood gains in broadening conditions and future 
studies should examine this relationship through administration of more efficacious mood 
protocols. Considering student participant noncompliance with viewing instructions for the 
film clips, administration of Velten-only manipulations in a non-student sample may improve 
the induction efficacy. However, any replications restricting mood manipulations should 
balance the limitations of Velten statements against other methods. The intent of mood 
induction statements is relatively self-evident and may be susceptible to social desirability 
factors or hypothesis guessing (Jennings et al., 2000). Further, Velten statements have been 
more effective at inducing negative states as opposed to positive states (Gerrards-Hesse et al., 
1994) and may therefore demonstrate limited utility in testing broadening effects associated 
with positive affect. Alternatively, positive psychology literature presents a valuable resource 
for empirically tested interventions to increase positive affect. For example, gratitude journals 
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(Seligman, 2005) may provide an opportunity to further test the influence of emotional 
intelligence on positive affect gains and changes in psychological flexibility across longer 
intervention timeframes. Considering that the broaden-and-build hypothesis operates as an 
upward spiral towards enduring personal resources, manipulations spanning prolonged 
periods may be more informative and effective at detecting hypothesised relationships. 
While high emotional intelligence was not associated with positive affect maintenance 
in the negative condition, it did predict positive affect maintenance in the neutral condition. 
This result is explicable; there was no decrease in positive affect during the negative 
induction to delineate the differential effects of emotional intelligence on affect maintenance. 
Positive affect unexpectedly decreased at substantially greater levels in the neutral condition, 
presumably due to regression, providing individuals with high emotional intelligence the 
opportunity to demonstrate positive emotion regulation abilities in this condition. This 
finding provides partial support for Hypothesis 5; emotional intelligence did facilitate 
positive affect maintenance in a condition where positive affect significantly decreased. 
While this effect was anticipated in the negative condition, it is worth noting that negative 
inductions target negative emotion and that positive and negative emotions are theoretically 
quasi-independent (Watson et al., 1988). Although the original Schutte et al. (2002) study 
found a significant decrease in positive affect following the negative induction, negative 
mood manipulations may not necessarily impact positive emotion. More work examining 
inductions targeting specific positive and negative emotions could be useful in extricating the 
underlying factors responsible for these mixed findings.  
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6.4.3 Emotional Intelligence, Positive Affect and Psychological Flexibility 
The magnitude of the relationship between high emotional intelligence and positive 
affect maintenance in the neutral condition paralleled findings from the Schutte et al. (2002) 
study. In this condition alone, emotional intelligence was also significantly related to word 
generation, the performance proxy for psychological flexibility, partially supporting 
Hypothesis 6. The findings in this condition suggest that high emotional intelligence may 
foster positive affect maintenance and thereby contribute to greater psychological flexibility 
as indicated by word generation. Further, emotional intelligence may support broader 
outcomes through enhanced characteristic psychological flexibility given the inverse 
relationship it demonstrated with rumination. 
Findings interpreting the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility should consider alternative theories proposed in the literature. The 
Acceptance and Commitment model origins for the AAQ-II measure of psychological 
flexibility suggest that emotional intelligence may inversely impact flexibility (Donaldson-
Feilder & Bond, 2004). For example, active attempts to suppress aversive emotional states 
could interfere with mindful environmental engagement and consequently flexible 
responding due to an inward rather than outward attentional focus. However, research 
suggests that emotional intelligence does not contribute to negative affect regulation and 
therefore any attempts to control negative emotion may be unrelated to trait levels of 
emotional intelligence (Schutte et al., 2002). In fact, individuals high in emotional regulation 
abilities are considered to engage in less emotional suppression, instead employing strategies 
such as cognitive re-appraisal which deplete fewer mental resources (Joseph & Newman, 
2010).  In addition, sensitivity to positive stimuli may be responsible for the characteristic 
positive affect in emotionally intelligent individuals rather than active attempts at emotion 
regulation that potentially interfere with flexibility. 
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6.4.4 Measurement Implications 
Characteristic psychological flexibility operationalised as the AAQ-II showed no 
differences across induction conditions (supporting Hypothesis 7). This outcome was 
anticipated following the absence of treatment effects for characteristic psychological 
flexibility despite increases in work-specific psychological flexibility following an emotional 
intelligence intervention (Foster et al., 2016). The authors theorised that this particular 
measure is not sensitive to treatment effects. An alternative explanation was that the 
treatment did not enhance global flexibility, as the targeted emotional intelligence 
competencies were work-specific. However, the present findings extend support for the 
proposition that the measure lacks treatment sensitivity given that positive affect, a widely-
accepted determinant of psychological flexibility (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010), did not 
enhance scores on the AAQ-II. Potentially, this could mean that positive affect contributes to 
state psychological flexibility and the effects are negligible when summed across ability 
contexts in global assessments. Accordingly, future research might benefit from an eclectic 
approach combing context-specific measures of psychological flexibility (like the work-
specific derivation of the AAQ-II) alongside performance proxies for state and trait 
psychological flexibility, using indicators such as expanded cognitive or behavioural 
repertoires.  
 
6.4.5 Future Directions 
This study supports a growing body of literature showing that positively-valanced 
emotions broaden thought-action repertoires. Broaden-and-build theory extends further than 
emotional valence, suggesting that the content of emotion dictates the type of thought-action 
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urges experienced in positive conditions (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). For example, 
individuals viewing an amusing film clip experienced frequent urges to socialise, while 
individuals viewing a contenting nature clip expressed more urges to exercise. Further 
research could focus on manipulating specific emotions and examining the differential 
broadening effects and associated outcomes. This highlights another useful research 
endeavour; developing an extensive and freely accessible repository of mood induction film 
clips with accompanying data on validated induction effects using Emotion Report Forms, 
PANAS or equivalent. Such a repository of clips targeting specific emotions may be useful 
for the purpose of testing content effects related to the broaden hypothesis.   
The study was premised on broadened attentional scope and thought-action 
repertoires as indicators for enhanced psychological flexibility (Fredrickson & Branigan, 
2005) but did not explore the role of global attention biases. Importantly, attentional control 
rather than a global bias per se is fundamental to psychological flexibility (Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010). While a global bias may be useful in determining situational needs, the 
ability to rapidly shift processing focus if warranted represents flexible executive control and 
adaptive functioning (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Future experiments may test this 
capacity for psychological flexibility in relation to positive affect and emotional intelligence, 
especially considering ACT propositions that emotional intelligence may inhibit outward 
attention. An adaptation of the Garner Interference Task presents an interesting application of 
this research which could also inform alternative performance measures for psychological 
flexibility. This test requires participants to attend to two distinct stimuli that vary along 
features of colour and orientation. Participants are directed to attend to one aspect and change 
focus part-way through the exercise. This task provides a measure for cognitive set-shifting 
(attention) and behavioural set-shifting (key press) in relation to a situational demand (task 
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objective). Consequently, studies incorporating this task could address attentional control in 
psychological flexibility and how this relates to positive affect and emotional intelligence.  
While some data limitations and anomalies preclude the formation of concrete 
conclusions, the present study offers useful insights into the broadening mechanisms of 
positive emotion and measurement methods in psychological flexibility. The study confirmed 
the broadening hypothesis and provided partial support for the proposition that trait emotional 
intelligence facilitates psychological flexibility through enhanced positive affect, extending 
on previous findings for these variables. It further notes treatment sensitivity limitations for 
the commonly-used self-report measure of psychological flexibility, suggesting an eclectic 
deployment of tools tailored to the research or clinical aims. Discussion explored potential 
research directions in identifying valid measurement methods for psychological flexibility 
and further testing the relationship between emotional intelligence, positive affect and 
psychological flexibility.  
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and General Conclusions  
7.1 Summary of Findings 
The studies within this thesis examined the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and psychological flexibility from a contextual perspective, evaluating how these 
constructs interrelate to promote positive outcomes in decision making and workplace 
flourishing. Three experimental chapters outlined results from four separate studies. These 
studies, described below, demonstrate the power of emotional intelligence for facilitating 
psychologically flexible thinking and how this process impacts positive outcomes in these 
contexts. 
The first two studies described in Chapter 4 investigated how maximising personality 
styles in decision making influence rumination, and whether emotional intelligence facilitates 
psychological flexibility to protect against this potentially adverse health outcome. In the first 
correlational study, emotional intelligence and positive affective experience significantly 
predicted psychological flexibility scores on the AAQ-II, providing preliminary correlational 
support for the hypothesised relationship between emotional intelligence and psychological 
flexibility. Moreover, psychological flexibility inversely predicted rumination, which was 
associated with high levels of maximisation on the Maximisation Scale (Schwartz et al., 
2002). It was hypothesised that psychological flexibility may down-regulate maximising 
tendencies in appropriate situations, attenuating the post-decisional evaluative processes (e.g., 
social comparison) that contribute to ruminative thought styles.  
The second study outlined in Chapter 4 clarified these processes through the 
application of Gilbert and Ebert‟s (2002) decision changeability manipulation. Results 
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showed that only high maximisers increased ruminative responding when confronted with 
changeable decision conditions. These findings suggest that high maximisers may be less 
capable of accepting and moving on from a decision identified as changeable, making them 
particularly susceptible to post-decisional ruminative thinking. However, high levels of 
psychological flexibility, or the ability to shift mindsets when dominant strategies (such as 
maximisation) compromise functioning, moderated the effects of maximisation on 
rumination. In addition, emotional intelligence significantly predicted psychological 
flexibility, mediated by positive affect change. This study provided more compelling 
experimental support for the proposition that emotional intelligence facilitates psychological 
flexibility, identifying positive affect change as a primary mechanism in the relationship. 
Consequently, the characteristic experience of positive affect inherent in high levels of 
emotional intelligence, and the ability to regulate positive emotion, may generate greater 
levels of psychological flexibility as a resource to draw upon when needed. Contextual 
examination of this relationship was extended to the workplace environment to assess causal 
components. 
The study in Chapter 5 explored the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility from a positive psychology perspective applied to workplace 
flourishing. This study was an extension of Schutte and Loi‟s (2014) correlational research 
demonstrating that emotional intelligence competencies generate workplace social support 
and perception of power, ultimately predicting improved work engagement. In the present 
thesis, emotional intelligence was viewed as a foundation for building positive affect and 
psychological flexibility as employee strengths, contributing to positive organisational 
outcomes operationalized as increased work engagement on the Utrecht Work Engagement 
Scale (UWES; Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 2006). An adaptation of Pennebaker‟s 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1986) writing paradigm, targeting emotional self-efficacy in the 
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workplace (Kirk et al., 2011), was experimentally administered to Australian Public Sector 
employees across three nationally distributed organisations. Trait emotional intelligence, 
positive affect, work-specific psychological flexibility, and work engagement (dedication and 
absorption dimensions) were increased in the experimental group relative to controls. Further, 
positive affect and work-specific psychological flexibility mediated the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and work engagement in separate analyses. 
Findings from the third study (Chapter 5) were the first step towards addressing the 
causal role of emotional intelligence for facilitating psychological flexibility and associated 
outcomes in workplace flourishing. Training in emotional competencies directly increased 
work-specific psychological flexibility and engagement. In addition, positive affect increased 
for the experimental group relative to controls and may partially explain corresponding 
increases for work-specific psychological flexibility and engagement. These findings indicate 
that emotional intelligence competencies may help employees mindfully approach and persist 
in work tasks despite internal subjective experiences that may otherwise interfere with 
effective functioning; a behavioural pattern that reflects adaptive responding to workplace 
challenges consistent with psychological flexibility. However, significant increases in work-
specific psychological flexibility WAAQ (Bond et al., 2013) contrasted with the absence of 
changes in global psychological flexibility scores measured by the AAQ-II, warranting 
follow-up in laboratory conditions. 
The fourth study in Chapter 6 applied a mood induction procedure to directly assess 
the effects of positive affect on psychological flexibility and more explicitly determine the 
role of emotional intelligence in positive emotion regulation. This study confirmed 
Fredrickson‟s (2001) broaden-and-build hypothesis and the corollary narrowing hypothesis. 
Positive affect increased activation of semantic networks and broadened creative 
categorisation on a word generation task, as a performance proxy for psychological 
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flexibility. Despite these effects, characteristic psychological flexibility measured through the 
AAQ-II was unchanged. Findings relating emotional intelligence to positive affect as an 
extension of Schutte et al.‟s study (2002) were mixed. Emotional intelligence was associated 
with greater levels of positive affect across all conditions prior to induction. However, the 
fourth study could not confirm the mood-enhancing benefits of emotional intelligence 
following positive induction. The influence of emotional intelligence on positive affect was 
limited to mood repair (or maintenance) subsequent to conditions of mood regression. Former 
studies supporting the mood-enhancing benefits of emotional intelligence tested the 
relationship after negative induction, confounding interpretation of the findings which could 
be attributed to either mood enhancement or repair (Schutte et al., 2002). While the fourth 
study in the present thesis did not detect a benefit, the induction efficacy may not have 
reached the necessary threshold and further mood manipulation experiments examining the 
effects of emotional intelligence on positive affect gains are needed. Regardless of this 
limitation, emotional intelligence was related to positive affect maintenance and improved 
performance on the proxy psychological flexibility measure in the neutral condition. These 
results provide laboratory confirmation supporting the causal role of emotional intelligence 
for facilitating psychologically flexible thinking, particularly through positive affect 
mechanisms.  
Findings from the final study (Chapter 6) are linked to positive outcomes initially 
explored in the first two decision studies (Chapter 4). Emotional intelligence demonstrated 
strong correlations with characteristic psychological flexibility, which was inversely 
associated with rumination. In addition, emotional intelligence itself demonstrated a strong 
negative correlation with rumination in the positive induction condition. This suggests that 
emotional intelligence plays a role in supporting reduced pathological thinking, perhaps as a 
consequence of positive affect and through the facilitation of psychological flexibility. These 
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findings may potentially extend beyond decision making scenarios given indications of this 
relationship in laboratory conditions divorced from context. Overall, the thesis supports a 
causal connection between emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility, and 
beneficial outcomes in decision making and workplace settings. It also highlights some 
limitations in measurement methods for psychological flexibility. 
 
 7.2 Broad Implications of the Thesis Findings  
The thesis findings summarised in section 7.1 have broad, practical implications in 
decision making and workplace contexts. Chapter 4 results regarding decision processes have 
specific applications for medium-to-high maximising individuals navigating choice 
proliferation in the contemporary environment. Commercial competition is increasing not 
only the number of choices available to consumers but also the incentives for consumer 
patronage, such as free trial periods and exchange options. Consequently, choice 
changeability is becoming a common feature of the social world confronting decision makers 
across a diverse range of contexts. Moreover, individuals with high maximising tendencies 
intentionally seek opportunities with changeability features in order to maximise outcomes 
(Schwartz et al., 2002). The Chapter 4 study results showed that high level maximisers are 
particularly susceptible to post-decisional evaluative processes (such as rumination) in 
changeable decision situations, making them vulnerable to negative health outcomes. 
Ruminative thought styles are linked to depressive symptomology (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008), implying that mechanisms to reduce rumination in decision making may result in 
better overall mental health.  
While Schwartz (2004) recommends a number of strategies for high maximising 
individuals, such as avoiding social comparison (e.g., facebook) and approaching 
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unchangeable decision opportunities, the studies in Chapter 4 support the utility of 
psychological flexibility as an additional mechanism for positive health outcomes in the 
decision context. Psychological flexibility demonstrated a strong moderating effect on 
maximising tendencies and ruminative outcomes, theoretically facilitating a shift in decision 
strategy towards more functional processes (such as satisficing) or promoting acceptance of 
internal cognitions and affective experiences generated in the decision task without needless 
rumination. Psychologically flexible individuals may be capable of restructuring perceived 
decision outcomes consistent with positive interpretations, leading to choice satisfaction and 
lower levels of ruminative responding. Given that emotional intelligence predicted 
psychological flexibility (mediated by positive affect), it may serve as a protective trait in 
these circumstances, helping decision makers maintain positive affect in the face of 
changeable decision conditions and thereby generating better health outcomes. Subsequent 
analysis of the causal contribution of emotional intelligence towards psychological flexibility 
strengthens this interpretation. 
Chapter 5 examined the effects of an emotional intelligence training program in the 
workplace. Exemplar-guided exploration of emotional content in real-life work scenarios 
facilitated emotional intelligence, and was associated with corresponding increases in work-
related psychological flexibility and positive affect. From a positive psychology perspective, 
these variables are regarded as individual strengths, contributing to workplace flourishing. 
Training targeting trait emotional intelligence provided a foundation for building these 
employee strengths, ultimately promoting dedication and absorption in work tasks that 
manifested as global improvements in work engagement. These outcomes may be inherently 
satisfying for the employee, but also contribute to improved organisational productivity. 
Work life is a fundamental social role and represents a realm of functioning that many 
individuals devote substantial personal resources towards fulfilling over the lifespan. Any 
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improvements in the subjective experience of work life and contextual outcomes are a 
clinically significant finding with widespread application. These outcomes highlight the value 
and functionality of emotional intelligence in the work environment, consistent with previous 
research (O‟Boyle et al., 2011). In addition, the results show that relatively brief and 
inexpensive journal-writing tasks can be efficacious in this context and therefore represent a 
promising training technique that can be exploited by individuals and workplaces to improve 
organisational outcomes.  
Finally, the series of studies described in this thesis provide strong support for 
emotional intelligence as a clinically significant facilitator of psychological flexibility. These 
findings are consistent with a recent meta-analysis linking emotional intelligence to the use of 
emotion regulation strategies important to psychologically flexible thinking (Peña-
Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, & Gross, 2014). Individuals high in emotional intelligence have a 
larger repertoire of adaptive coping and emotion regulation strategies available, which they 
apply flexibly and successfully when navigating the social world to achieve better outcomes. 
These adaptive emotional competencies underlie flexible responding, highlighting the power 
of emotional intelligence for influencing psychological flexibility as a fundamental aspect of 
health. Broadly, these findings suggest that emotional intelligence training and more general 
interventions to increase enduring positive affect as a significant mediator, may be effective 
in promoting psychological flexibility and a host of associated positive outcomes. Emotional 
intelligence and positive affect interventions represent a low cost, therapist-free alternative to 
traditional clinical interventions for psychological flexibility such as Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT). The equivocal findings in relation to the causal effect of 
emotional intelligence on global flexibility as measured by the AAQ-II raised important 
considerations for future research endeavours. 
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7.2.1 Measurement Implications for Psychological Flexibility 
As the studies progressed, limitations in traditional measurement methods for 
psychological flexibility became apparent. Study three (Chapter 5) simultaneously 
demonstrated post-intervention increases for work-specific psychological flexibility, 
alongside unchanged global flexibility as measured in the AAQ-II. A follow up on this 
anomaly in the final Chapter 6 study revealed that a selected performance proxy for 
psychological flexibility was sensitive to changes in positive affect, while characteristic 
flexibility on the AAQ-II remained unchanged. Given that positive affect is considered a 
precursor to psychological flexibility (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010), an assessment method 
incapable of detecting these types of changes may have limited utility as a clinical and 
research tool.  
The limited intervention-sensitivity of the AAQ-II in the present thesis may stem from 
the negatively keyed nature of the item questions. Specifying an absence of inflexibility does 
not necessarily impute the presence of flexibility (Grossman, 2011). Therefore, attempts to 
build psychological flexibility, through mechanisms such as emotional intelligence and 
positive affect, may not be captured on a tool that primarily measures increases for 
inflexibility as opposed to increases for flexibility. Alternatively, a measure of averaged 
flexibility across situations may not sufficiently detect context-specific changes in behaviour 
(e.g. work-specific psychological flexibility). This implies that there may be merit in research 
activities focused on the construction of additional psychological flexibility measures. In 
particular, the field may benefit from global psychological flexibility instruments that 
combine positively-keyed content with reversed items, a wider range of context-specific 
versions (extending beyond work-specific areas), and an eclectic mix of performance tests 
potentially combined with more traditional self-report assessments.  
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In their extensive review, Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) noted that the dynamic 
nature of psychological flexibility necessitates measurement methods incorporating 
temporality and person-situation interactions. This point informed the context-directed nature 
of the present thesis and the use of a performance proxy when examining the variable in 
laboratory conditions. However, it also highlights the challenges in measuring psychological 
flexibility through global self-report. Psychological flexibility is not a single, static concept 
that can be applied to an individual in isolation of their environment; it is a resource that 
fluctuates over time and across situations. Research efforts aimed at developing more robust 
measures should refer to the Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) review for an informative 
framework. A varied set of measurement approaches depending on the research purposes 
includes daily diary studies, behavioural observation, Q-sort procedures evaluated again 
prototypical flexibility profiles, and aggregate 360 observer ratings. Research in this area 
could subsequently be applied to further investigation of the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and psychological flexibility. 
 
7.3 Future Directions 
7.3.1 Extending the Thesis Findings and Research Opportunities Addressing Limitations 
The research in this thesis informs a number of opportunities for future research 
pathways. Investigation of the causal impact of emotional intelligence on psychological 
flexibility was intentionally restricted to decision making and workplace environments to 
provide a contextual perspective. The nature of the relationship described between these 
variables may not persist in the same form in other contexts. In particular, studies examining 
how emotional intelligence relates to psychological flexibility in health contexts may be a 
promising research avenue, given the fundamental importance attributed to health outcomes 
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for both these variables (Martins, Ramalho, & Morin, 2010; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). In 
addition, the research in this thesis tested the causal role of emotional intelligence on 
psychological flexibility through application of a journal writing intervention targeting 
emotional self-efficacy. The literature supports a wide variety of efficacious emotional 
intelligence programs applied across numerous settings, including broader organisational 
contexts, sports studies, mental health, and education (Schutte, Malouff, & Thorsteinsson, 
2013). Researchers in any of these areas could explore the effects of various emotional 
intelligence training programs on psychological flexibility and their associated outcomes. 
Extending investigation to alternative intervention techniques and contexts will enhance 
understanding of how emotional intelligence facilitates psychological flexibility, what 
outcomes can be achieved, and the essential pre-conditions for effectuating the relationship.  
In addition to broadening the range of contexts exploring the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility, more in-depth studies could be 
conducted in workplace settings. Future research could combine examination of workplace 
and decision contexts given that aspects of decision making are incorporated in various 
realms of workplace functioning. This expanded study scope could include consideration of 
maximising personality factors in relation to emotional intelligence and psychological 
flexibility in the workplace. The current thesis also focused primarily on Australian Public 
Service (APS) employees. The APS operates on an Integrated Leadership System (ILS), 
outlining stages of progression modelled on specified leadership qualities, including: “shapes 
strategic thinking”, “achieves results”, “cultivates productive working relationships”, 
“exemplifies personal drive and integrity”, and “communicates with influence” (Australian 
Public Service Commission, 2007). Many of these elements are associated with 
transformational leadership styles related to high functioning emotional intelligence (Harms 
& Credé, 2010). Rosete and Ciarrochi (2005) found that the majority of these APS qualities 
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were significantly correlated with various sub-dimensions of the revised Mayer and Salovey 
(1997) integrated ability model of emotional intelligence, measured through performance on 
the MSCEIT. Journal writing instructions could be adapted to include more scenarios 
modelling these particular qualities and thereby improve emotional intelligence outcomes and 
workplace performance specific to the APS. This approach could be applied more broadly 
across a variety of work environments. Workplace settings may vary substantially, and the 
impact of the emotional intelligence journal writing intervention could be strengthened 
through tailored sets of examples applied to specific work roles. For example, care industries 
(e.g., nursing) could emphasise examples related to an awareness of patient emotions and 
building understanding and efficacy towards regulating those emotions for motivating 
recovery-oriented behaviours. The context-specific nature of emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility suggest that these tailored approaches may prove more efficacious 
when matched to the appropriate setting.  
The fact that ability measures such as the MSCEIT are demonstrating similar findings 
to the trait measure used in the APS workplace study suggests that the thesis results may 
generalise to other conceptualisations of emotional intelligence. However, it is acknowledged 
that the present research findings are limited to a characteristic trait approach. Future research 
using ability models would complement trait findings outlined in this thesis to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
psychological flexibility. Such research may further assist identification of emotional sub-
dimensions or specific emotional competencies that contribute to beneficial outcomes 
(Schutte et al., 2009). In particular, situational tests of emotional understanding (e.g., 
Freudenthaler & Neubauer, 2007; MacCann & Roberts, 2008) may reveal contextually-bound 
competencies relevant to psychological flexibility. Ability approaches complementing the 
research in this thesis could further address an intrinsic limitation of self-report measures. A 
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minimal level of intrapersonal self-awareness in relation to typical emotional functioning is 
required in order access the knowledge that informs valid responding on self-report 
assessments. This emotional competency is one of the basic dimensions of emotional 
intelligence. Therefore, self-report measures may be increasingly less reliable at lower levels 
of emotional intelligence. Resource-intensive research methods testing maximal performance 
through administration of ability tests may represent a suitable approach capable of 
addressing this limitation.  
The project within this thesis examined a discrete selection of psychological 
flexibility features. In particular, it assessed global flexibility as measured in the AAQ-II, 
work-related psychological flexibility (WAAQ), and expanded thinking (broadened 
categorisation), operationalised as semantic repertoires. As discussed in the measurement 
implications of the thesis findings, these methods capture a small component of the overall 
psychological flexibility construct, which is reflected in a wide range of abilities (Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010). Future research could evaluate the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and other aspects of psychological flexibility. For example, the final study 
(Chapter 6) noted a research avenue assessing attentional control (i.e. redirecting attention as 
dictated by task demands).  
While exploration of attention processes was not pursued as part of the thesis scope, 
the theoretical development was partially predicated on the idea that positive emotion, a 
feature of emotional intelligence, facilitates global biases in attention and therefore a greater 
situational awareness necessary for psychological flexibility (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). 
It is noted, however, that flexible deployment of attentional resources through executive 
control represents a more adaptive competency than global biases per se. In some situations, a 
goal-directed focus on specific local, as opposed to global, elements may be necessary for 
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task success. While positive affect may be related to global attention biases, the competencies 
underlying emotional intelligence extend to flexible attentional control.  
One ability described in the formulation of Salovey and Mayer‟s (1990; 1997) 
emotional intelligence model is the use of emotion to redirect attention towards the salient 
features of the environment. Emotional intelligence may therefore promote flexible 
attentional control necessary for adaptive responding. An understanding of the situational 
demands enables top-down processing of environmental stimuli, and emotionally intelligent 
individuals may use emotions in a goal-directed manner to focus attention on the essential 
elements for behavioural effectiveness. Self-reported attention deployment abilities have been 
correlated with trait emotional intelligence (Schutte, Manes, & Malouff, 2009). The final 
(Chapter 6) study in the thesis described a potential application for extending this research 
using the Garner Interference Task. Participants are presented with various stimuli and task 
demands require a shifting attentional focus for effective performance. In addition, adaptation 
of this task could test behavioural set shifting (response inhibition versus perseveration) by 
adjusting the required key press on identification of the target stimuli. Such research could 
expand on the relationship between emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility 
described in this thesis. 
The majority of the studies in this thesis emphasised positive affect as a mechanism in 
the relationship between emotional intelligence and psychological flexibility. How emotional 
intelligence relates to positive affect, and the unique contribution of positive affect to 
psychological flexibility, could be further explored. For example, emotional intelligence was 
related to positive mood maintenance (or repair), but further research employing induction 
protocols could clarify whether it enhances sensitivity to positive stimuli. Given that positive 
affect consistently demonstrated its utility as a mediating variable between emotional 
intelligence and psychological flexibility across multiple studies in this thesis, it could be 
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expected to independently build psychological flexibility. The field of positive psychology 
provides a rich source of empirically-derived interventions to increase positive affect. Many 
interventions from the positive psychology literature are closely related to the Kirk‟s et al. 
(2011) journal writing paradigm employed in this research, using expressive writing as a 
means of self-exploration and emotional facilitation. For example, one positive psychology 
exercise involves the daily journaling of three positive events and their perceived causes over 
the course of a week (Seligman, Steen, Park & Peterson, 2005). Other tasks include writing 
gratitude letters, and describing best possible versions of the self, that is, if all outcomes 
valued by the individual could be achieved, alongside an outline of the trajectory involved in 
attaining these goals (King, 2001; Peters, Flink, Boersma, & Linton, 2010). Writing tasks of 
this nature may enhance focus on personal values and motivate effortful engagement with 
congruent activities and behaviours, thus fulfilling one dimension of the range of human 
behaviours encompassed in Kashdan and Rottenberg‟s (2010) comprehensive definition of 
psychological flexibility. Although positive affect in general was identified as an important 
element of psychological flexibility it is important to note that affect and specific emotions 
are theoretically distinct constructs. 
Emotions are somewhat distinguishable from affective experience; they have been 
described as more transient subsets of affect, and may contain subconscious processes 
(Fredrickson, 2001). While the two concepts are closely related, emotions are more 
contextual, manifesting from surrounding circumstances and reflecting more specific types of 
emotional state (e.g. joy, contentment versus general positivity; Fredrickson, 2001). In this 
way, a separate examination of various kinds of emotion may present an ideal opportunity for 
examining the relationship with context-dependent variables like psychological flexibility 
and emotional intelligence. The relationship between these variables and associated outcomes 
may differ as a function of particular emotional content. This research could proceed in 
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tandem with construction of a freely accessible emotion induction repository containing brief 
validated film clips of sufficient quality and induction efficacy for research purposes. 
Retrieving available clips with these objective features was challenging when designing the 
final mood induction study and a repository, if not already in development, may benefit 
ongoing research in the field.  
 
7.4 General Conclusion 
In general, the findings in this thesis support the power of emotional intelligence for 
facilitating psychologically flexible thinking in relation to decision making and workplace 
contexts as hypothesised in Figure 1.1. Relatively brief, self-directed interventions to increase 
emotional intelligence have the potential to contribute to significant clinical outcomes. While 
this thesis demonstrated positive outcomes relating to the attenuation of pathological thinking 
styles in decision making and improved workplace flourishing, the contribution of emotional 
intelligence to psychological flexibility may generalise to other contexts. In particular, the 
influence of emotional intelligence on positive affect maintenance in laboratory conditions, 
which was associated with heightened performance on a psychological flexibility proxy 
measure, suggests that the relationship may persist more globally. These findings have 
significant practical and theoretical implications. Emotional intelligence is a promising 
individual difference for the facilitation of a large repertoire of adaptive coping competencies 
that contribute to important realms of functioning (mental health outcomes in decision 
making and workplace flourishing) and successful navigation of the social world. 
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for the Control Condition 
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Emotional Intelligence 
Training 
Writing Journal  
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Please spend the next 3 days (Tuesday – Thursday) writing in this journal for 20 minutes at 
the end of each workday, following the Journal Writing instructions (enclosed).  
 
NOTE: This journal is a completely private self-training tool and will not be collected or 
reviewed. Please do not show or compare your journal to other participants. 
 
AFTER THE JOURNAL WRITING:  
1. You will receive an email link to complete the final online survey on 5 November.   
2. On completion of the survey, a debrief page is presented with further information 
about the study and expected outcomes. 
 
Your Journal Code: 
 
Please input this code when prompted in your final online survey on  
5 November. 
 
Thank you for participating!
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Contact details if in distress: 
We understand that writing about experiences in the journal may elicit distress. If you 
experience any symptoms of distress, we strongly encourage you to seek support. You can 
contact Lifeline at 13 11 14 or visit www.beyondblue.com. 
 
Contact details for more information: 
If you have any questions about this project or your participation, please do not hesitate to 
contact the researchers at:  
·         Roxanne Foster – roxanne.foster@anu.edu.au 
·         Kristen Pammer – Kristen.Pammer@anu.edu.au 
If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been conducted, please 
contact: 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Writing about emotional events can improve physical health and overall well-being.  This 
study is expanding on these previous findings to discover the benefits such writing has on 
overall workplace functioning.  In order to do this, a particular process is required. 
1. Keep a journal for 3 days.  What you write in the journal need be seen by no one but 
you.  The researchers will not ask you for the journal. 
2. It is requested however that you keep a log of how much time you spend writing per 
day. 
 
In this journal you will need to: 
3. Write for at least 20 minutes a day for 3 days about what you did in the past 24 hours 
that was not related to work (please see following examples). 
Two weeks after completing the journaling 
4. You will be emailed a survey link to complete. 
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JOURNAL WRITING 
 
The purpose of writing is to provide you with an opportunity to reflect on your 
thoughts related to your non-work day.  
The following examples are just some of the types of events you may choose to 
write about. 
 
  Example 1: 
Took the family to McDonalds so no-one had to cook the dinner (elaborate on the 
occasion). 
 Example 2: 
I managed to watch my favourite show on TV tonight (Discuss what the show was 
about). 
        Example 3 
Helped the kids with their homework (Describe what you actually did). 
Example 4 
Decided to have friends over for a party at the weekend (note down who will be 
coming and what type of food and/or drinks you will be serving). 
 
NB:  Please write for at least 20 minutes a day for 3 days 
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Please spend the next 3 days (Tuesday – Thursday) writing in this journal for 20 minutes at 
the end of each workday, following the Journal Writing instructions (enclosed).  
 
NOTE: This journal is a completely private self-training tool and will not be collected or 
reviewed. Please do not show or compare your journal to other participants. 
 
AFTER THE JOURNAL WRITING:  
1. You will receive an email link to complete the final online survey on 5 November.   
2. On completion of the survey, a debrief page is presented with further information 
about the study and expected outcomes. 
 
Your Journal Code: 
 
Please input this code when prompted in your final online survey on  
5 November. 
 
Thank you for participating!
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Contact details if in distress: 
We understand that writing about experiences in the journal may elicit distress. If you 
experience any symptoms of distress, we strongly encourage you to seek support. You can 
contact Lifeline at 13 11 14 or visit www.beyondblue.com. 
 
Contact details for more information: 
If you have any questions about this project or your participation, please do not hesitate to 
contact the researchers at:  
·         Roxanne Foster – roxanne.foster@anu.edu.au 
·         Kristen Pammer – Kristen.Pammer@anu.edu.au 
If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been conducted, please 
contact: 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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JOURNAL WRITING 
 
The purpose of this writing is to provide you with an opportunity to reflect on your 
deepest thoughts and feelings connected to your workplace.  A related purpose is to increase 
emotional skills by building up confidence in effectively perceiving, using, understanding, 
and managing emotions.  This can be done by evaluating one‟s own ability to master a 
situation either by noticing how one effectively perceives, uses, understands, or regulates 
emotions; by observing how another person manages to do this; or by receiving 
encouragement from others.  A further means is by being aware of how one‟s physiological 
or emotional arousal can contribute to the effective perception and management of emotions.   
 
Start out by writing about your deepest thoughts and feelings related to your 
past workday; or an important workday in the more distant past.   
Then, if you find it useful, explore whether by analysing your thoughts and 
feelings you can build confidence in your ability to perceive and manage emotions in 
yourself and others.  A beneficial way of doing this may be to identify instances of 
emotion and relate these to future events.  Below are a number of examples plus some of 
the types of emotional situations that may occur routinely in many organizations.  Also 
included are examples of the benefits gained by handling a situation in a particular 
fashion.  The following examples are just some of the types of emotional experiences and 
outcomes that an individual might write about.  It is of course completely up to you 
what you write about in your journal.  
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  Example 1: 
I was given a promotion today and I felt enthused and happy.  I had good insight into 
my emotions and understood why I felt them. 
Example 1 relates to a sense of mastery that is built up from one’s own 
personal experiences. 
  
Example 2a: 
I observed the reactions of a number of people today who also put in for the 
job and I felt embarrassed when one person swore and stormed out of the office. 
 
Example 2b: 
I however also observed the reaction of one particular person who managed 
her emotion effectively, even though she expressed she was disappointed.  I felt 
inspired because this is the example I prefer to follow.   
 
 Example 3  
I noticed that one of the male staff members started ranting and raving over not 
being given an important phone message.  This verbalization only created tension in 
the office.  I suggested he speak directly with the person in case there was a good 
reason he did not receive the message.  He did so and found out the reason why.  He 
immediately calmed down and the office returned to a relaxed state once again. 
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Examples 2a and 2b are different aspects to the same situation.  Example 
2a involves perception of one’s own emotions.  Example 2b involves 
learning an emotional management skill by observing another person.  
Example 3 shows successful support of another person in managing his 
emotions 
 
Example 4 
I was given support from my supervisor today, when she stated that she believed in 
my ability to carry out my new work responsibilities.  I felt happy about these words 
of encouragement and decided there and then that I would keep trying.  I will also 
give myself similar encouragement by telling myself that I believe in my own 
abilities.   
Example 4 shows that when people are verbally persuaded that they have 
the ability to master a task then they are more likely to maintain the 
effort required to do so than those who are not encouraged.  That is 
because verbal persuasion can bolster people’s beliefs that they do have 
the capability to achieve their goals.   
 
Example 5 
I realize that I could have sworn and stormed out of the office when my computer 
broke down and I lost all the data I needed for a report.  I recognized the strong 
emotions that were brewing within me through the adrenaline rush I experienced.  
This recognition allowed me to manage my emotions by channelling my 
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physiological arousal into more productive emotions and behaviour.  I didn‟t retrieve 
the lost data, but a few people seemed to admire how I handled the situation and said 
that they could not have stayed calm under those circumstances.   
Example 5 relates to the beneficial outcome that occurs when a person is 
able to perceive how physiological states contribute to emotions and uses 
this information to manage emotions.  
 
 
NB:  Please write for at least 20 minutes a day for 3 days 
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Appendix C: Example Data Coding Sheet for Primary Variables Across Studies 
Variables in the database 
Demographic Variables: 
AGE_Q1 = Age of participant 
SEX_Q1 = Gender of participant (Male = 1, Female = 2, Other = 3) 
LAN_Q1 = Participant’s first spoken language 
LAN_Q2 =If English is not participant’s first language, number of years English has been spoken 
regularly 
 
Psychological Variables: 
EMO_Total = Total Assessing Emotions Scale/Questionnaire score 
MAX_Total = Maximisation total score 
PA_Total = Positive affect subscale score of the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
NA_Total = Negative affect subscale score of the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS) 
RTS_Total = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score 
 
Scoring Variables: 
EMO_Q1 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 1 “I know when to speak about my personal 
problems to others” 
EMO_Q2 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 2 “When I am faced with obstacles, I remember 
times I faced similar obstacles and overcame them” 
EMO_Q3 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 3 “I expect that I will do well on most things I 
try” 
EMO_Q4 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 4 “Other people find it easy to confide in me” 
EMO_Q5 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 5 “I find it hard to understand the non-verbal 
messages of other people” 
EMO_Q6 =Assessing Emotions Scale score question 6 “Some of the major events of my life have led 
me to re-evaluate what is important and not important” 
EMO_Q7 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 7 “When my mood changes, I see new 
possibilities” 
EMO_Q8 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 8 “Emotions are one of the things that make my 
life worth living” 
EMO_Q9 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 9 “I am aware of my emotions as I experience 
them” 
EMO_Q10 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 10 “I expect good things to happen” 
EMO_Q11 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 11 “I like to share my emotions with others” 
EMO_Q12 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 12 “When I experience a positive emotion, I 
know how to make it last” 
EMO_Q13 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 13 “I arrange events others enjoy” 
EMO_Q14 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 14 “I seek out activities that make me happy” 
EMO_Q15 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 15 “I am aware of the non-verbal messages I 
send to others. 
EMO_Q16 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 16 “I present myself in a way that makes a 
good impression on others” 
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EMO_Q17 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 17 “When I am in a positive mood, solving 
problems is easy for me” 
EMO_Q18 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 18 “By looking at their facial expressions, I 
recognize the emotions people are experiencing” 
EMO_Q19 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 19 “I know why my emotions change” 
EMO_Q20 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 20 “When I am in a positive mood, I am able to 
come up with new ideas” 
EMO_Q21 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 21 “I have control over my emotions” 
EMO_Q22 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 22 “I easily recognize my emotions as I 
experience them” 
EMO_Q23 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 23 “I motivate myself by imagining a good 
outcome to tasks I take on” 
EMO_Q24 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 24 “I compliment others when they have done 
something well” 
EMO_Q25 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 25 “I am aware of the non-verbal messages 
other people send” 
EMO_Q26 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 26 “When another person tells me about an 
important event in his or her life, I almost feel as though I experienced this event myself” 
EMO_Q27 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 27 “When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to 
come up with new ideas” 
EMO_Q28 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 28 “When I am faced with a challenge, I give 
up because I believe I will fail” 
EMO_Q29 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 29 “I know what other people are feeling just 
by looking at them” 
EMO_Q30 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 30 “I help other people feel better when they 
are down” 
EMO_Q31 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 31 “I use good moods to help myself keep 
trying in the face of obstacles” 
EMO_Q32 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 32 “I can tell how people are feeling by 
listening to the tone of their voice” 
EMO_Q33 = Assessing Emotions Scale score question 33 “It is difficult for me to understand why 
people feel the way they do” 
EMO_Q5_Rev = Reversed Assessing Emotions Scale score question 5 
EMO_Q28_Rev = Reversed Assessing Emotions Scale score question 28 
EMO_Q33_Rev = Reversed Assessing Emotions Scale score question 33 
MAX_Q1 = Maximization Scale score question 1 “Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine 
what all the other possibilities are, even ones that aren’t present at the moment” 
MAX_Q2 = Maximization Scale score question 2 “No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only 
right for me to be on the lookout for better opportunities” 
MAX_Q3 = Maximization Scale score question 3 “When I am in the care listening to the radio, I often 
check other stations to see if something better is playing” 
MAX_Q4 = Maximization Scale score question 4 “When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning 
through the available options even while attempting to watch one program” 
MAX_Q5 = Maximization Scale score question 5 “I treat relationships like clothing: I expect to try a 
lot on before finding the perfect fit” 
MAX_Q6 = Maximization Scale score question 6 “I often find it difficult to shop for a gift for a friend” 
MAX_Q7 = Maximization Scale score question 7 “Renting videos is really difficult. I’m always 
struggling to pick the best one” 
MAX_Q8 = Maximization Scale score question 8 “When shopping, I have a hard time finding clothing 
that I really love” 
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MAX_Q9 = Maximization Scale score question 9 “I’m a big fan of lists that attempt to rank things (the 
best movies, the best singers, the best athletes, the best novels, etc.)” 
MAX_Q10 = Maximization Scale score question 10 “I find that writing is very difficult, even if it’s just 
writing a letter to a friend, because it’s so hard to word things just right. I often do several drafts of 
even simple things” 
MAX_Q11 = Maximization Scale score question 11 “No matter what I do, I have the highest 
standards for myself” 
MAX_Q12 = Maximization Scale score question 12 “I never settle for second best” 
MAX_Q13 = Maximization Scale score question 13 “I often fantasize about living in ways that are 
quite different from my actual life” 
PANAS_Q1 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule Positive Affect subscale score question 1 
“Interested” 
PANAS_Q2 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule Negative Affect subscale score question 2 
“Distressed” 
PANAS_Q3 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule Positive Affect subscale score question 3 
“Excited” 
PANAS_Q4 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 4 
“Upset” 
PANAS_Q5 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Positive Affect subscale score question 5 
“Strong” 
PANAS_Q6 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 6 
“Guilty” 
PANAS_Q7 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 7 
“Scared” 
PANAS_Q8 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 8 
“Hostile” 
PANAS_Q9 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Positive Affect subscale score question 4 
“Enthusiastic” 
PANAS_Q10 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Positive Affect subscale score question 
10 “Proud” 
PANAS_Q11 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 
11 “Irritable” 
PANAS_Q12 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Positive Affect subscale score question 
12 “Alert” 
PANAS_Q13 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 
13 “Ashamed” 
PANAS_Q14 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Positive Affect subscale score question 
14 “Inspired” 
PANAS_Q15 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 
15 “Nervous” 
PANAS_Q16 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Positive Affect subscale score question 
16 “Determined” 
PANAS_Q17 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Positive Affect subscale score question 
17 “Attentive” 
PANAS_Q18 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 
18 “Jittery” 
PANAS_Q19 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Positive Affect subscale score question 
19 “Active” 
PANAS_Q20 = Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, Negative Affect subscale score question 
20 “Afraid” 
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RTS_Q1 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 1 “I find that my mind often goes 
over things again and again” 
RTS_Q2 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 2 “When I have a problem, it will 
gnaw on my mind for a long time” 
RTS_Q3 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 3 “I find that some thoughts 
come to mind over and over throughout the day” 
RTS_Q4 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 4 “I can’t stop thinking about 
some things” 
RTS_Q5 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 5 “When I am anticipating an 
interaction, I will imagine every possible scenario and conversation” 
RTS_Q6 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 6 “I tend to replay past events as 
I would have liked them to happen” 
RTS_Q7 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 7 “I find myself daydreaming 
about things I wish I had done” 
RTS_Q8 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 8 “When I feel I have had a bad 
interaction with someone, I tend to imagine various scenarios where I would have acted differently” 
RTS_Q9 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 9 “When trying to solve a 
complicated problem, I find that I just keep coming back to the beginning without ever finding a 
solution” 
RTS_Q10 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 10 “If there is an important 
event coming up, I think about it so much that I work myself up” 
RTS_Q11 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 11 “I have never been able to 
distract myself from unwanted thoughts” 
RTS_Q12 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 12 “Even if I think about a 
problem for hours, I still have a hard time coming to a clear understanding” 
RTS_Q13 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 13 “It is very difficult for me to 
come to a clear conclusion about some problems, no matter how much I think about it” 
RTS_Q14 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 14 “Sometimes I realize I have 
been sitting and thinking about something for hours” 
RTS_Q15 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 15 “When I am trying to work 
out a problem, it is like I have a long debate in my mind where I keep going over different points” 
RTS_Q16 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 16 “I like to sit and reminisce 
about pleasant events from the past” 
RTS_Q17 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 17 “When I am looking forward 
to an exciting event, thoughts of it interfere with what I am working on” 
RTS_Q18 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 18 “Sometimes even during a 
conversation, I find unrelated thoughts popping into my head” 
RTS_Q19 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 19 = “When I have an important 
conversation coming up, I tend to go over it in my mind again and again” 
RTS_Q20 = Ruminative Thought Styles Questionnaire score question 20 “If I have an important event 
coming up, I can’t stop thinking about it” 
AAQ2_Q1_Rev = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 1 “My painful 
experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I would value.” 
AAQ2_Q2_Rev = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 2 “I’m afraid of my 
feelings.” 
AAQ2_Q3_Rev = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 3 “I worry about not 
being able to control my worries and feelings.”  
AAQ2_Q4_Rev = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 4 “My painful 
memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life.” 
AAQ2_Q5_Rev = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 5 “Emotions cause 
problems in my life.” 
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AAQ2_Q6_Rev = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 6 “It seems like 
most people are handling their lives better than I am.” 
AAQ2_Q7_Rev = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 7 “Worries get in 
the way of my success.” 
AAQ2_Q1_Rev = Reversed Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 1 “My 
painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I would value.” 
AAQ2_Q2_Rev = Reversed Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 2 “I’m 
afraid of my feelings.” 
AAQ2_Q3_Rev = Reversed Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 3 “I worry 
about not being able to control my worries and feelings.” 
AAQ2_Q4_Rev = Reversed Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 4 “My 
painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life.” 
AAQ2_Q5_Rev = Reversed Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 5 
“Emotions cause problems in my life.” 
AAQ2_Q6_Rev = Reversed Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 6 “It 
seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am.” 
AAQ2_Q7_Rev = Reversed Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version 2 score question 7 “Worries 
get in the way of my success.” 
 
Computations: 
EMO_Pre_Total = EMO_Q1_Pre + EMO_Q2_Pre + EMO_Q3_Pre + EMO_Q4_Pre + EMO_Q5_Pre_Rev 
+ EMO_Q6_Pre + EMO_Q7_Pre + EMO_Q8_Pre + EMO_Q9_Pre + EMO_Q10_Pre + EMO_Q11_Pre + 
EMO_Q12_Pre + EMO_Q13_Pre + EMO_Q14_Pre + EMO_Q15_Pre + EMO_Q16_Pre + 
EMO_Q17_Pre + EMO_Q18_Pre + EMO_Q19_Pre + EMO_Q20_Pre + EMO_Q21_Pre + 
EMO_Q22_Pre + EMO_Q23_Pre + EMO_Q24_Pre + EMO_Q25_Pre + EMO_Q26_Pre + 
EMO_Q27_Pre + EMO_Q28_Pre_Rev + EMO_Q29_Pre + EMO_Q30_Pre + EMO_Q31_Pre + 
EMO_Q32_Pre + EMO_Q33_Pre_Rev 
EMO_Post_Total = EMO_Q1_Post + EMO_Q2_Post + EMO_Q3_Post + EMO_Q4_Post + 
EMO_Q5_Post_Rev + EMO_Q6_Post + EMO_Q7_Post + EMO_Q8_Post + EMO_Q9_Post + 
EMO_Q10_Post + EMO_Q11_Post + EMO_Q12_Post + EMO_Q13_Post + EMO_Q14_Post + 
EMO_Q15_Post + EMO_Q16_Post + EMO_Q17_Post + EMO_Q18_Post + EMO_Q19_Post + 
EMO_Q20_Post + EMO_Q21_Post + EMO_Q22_Post + EMO_Q23_Post + EMO_Q24_Post + 
EMO_Q25_Post + EMO_Q26_Post + EMO_Q27_Post + EMO_Q28_Post_Rev + EMO_Q29_Post + 
EMO_Q30_Post + EMO_Q31_Post + EMO_Q32_Post + EMO_Q33_Post_Rev 
MAX_Total = MAX_Q1+ MAX_Q2+ MAX_Q3+ MAX_Q4+ MAX_Q5+ MAX_Q6+ MAX_Q7+ MAX_Q8+ 
MAX_Q9+ MAX_Q10+ MAX_Q11+ MAX_Q12+ MAX_Q13 
PA_Total = PANAS_Q1+ PANAS_Q3+ PANAS_Q5+ PANAS_Q9+ PANAS_Q10+ PANAS_Q12+ 
PANAS_Q14+ PANAS_Q16+ PANAS_Q17+ PANAS_Q19 
PA_Pre_Total = PANAS_Q1_Pre + PANAS_Q3_Pre + PANAS_Q5_Pre + PANAS_Q9_Pre + 
PANAS_Q10_Pre + PANAS_Q12_Pre + PANAS_Q14_Pre + PANAS_Q16_Pre + PANAS_Q17_Pre + 
PANAS_Q19_Pre 
PA_Post_Total = PANAS_Q1_Post + PANAS_Q3_Post + PANAS_Q5_Post + PANAS_Q9_Post + 
PANAS_Q10_Post + PANAS_Q12_Post + PANAS_Q14_Post + PANAS_Q16_Post + PANAS_Q17_Post + 
PANAS_Q19_Post 
UWES_Pre_Total = UWES_Q1_Pre + UWES_Q2_Pre + UWES_Q3_Pre + UWES_Q4_Pre + 
UWES_Q5_Pre +  UWES_Q6_Pre + UWES_Q7_Pre + UWES_Q8_Pre + UWES_Q9_Pre 
UWES_Post_Total = UWES_Q1_Post + UWES_Q2_Post+ UWES_Q3_Post + UWES_Q4_Post + 
UWES_Q5_Post +  UWES_Q6_Post + UWES_Q7_Post + UWES_Q8_Post + UWES_Q9_Post 
WAAQ_Pre_Total = WAAQ_Q1_Pre + WAAQ_Q2_Pre + WAAQ_Q3_Pre + AAQ2_Q7_Pre_Rev + 
WAAQ_Q5_PRe + WAAQ_Q6_Pre + WAAQ_Q7_Pre 
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WAAQ_Post_Total = WAAQ_Q1_Post + WAAQ_Q2_Post + WAAQ_Q3_Post + AAQ2_Q7_Post_Rev + 
WAAQ_Q5_Post + WAAQ_Q6_Post + WAAQ_Q7_Post 
NA_Pre_Total = PANAS_Q2_Pre + PANAS_Q4_Pre + PANAS_Q6_Pre + PANAS_Q7_Pre + 
PANAS_Q8_Pre + PANAS_Q11_Pre + PANAS_Q13_Pre + PANAS_Q15_Pre + PANAS_Q18_Pre + 
PANAS_Q20_Pre 
NA_Post_Total = PANAS_Q2_Post + PANAS_Q4_Post + PANAS_Q6_Post + PANAS_Q7_Post + 
PANAS_Q8_Post + PANAS_Q11_Post + PANAS_Q13_Post + PANAS_Q15_Post + PANAS_Q18_Post + 
PANAS_Q20_Post 
RTS_Pre_Total = RTS_Q1_Pre + RTS_Q2_Pre + RTS_Q3_Pre + RTS_Q4_Pre + RTS_Q5_Pre + 
RTS_Q6_Pre + RTS_Q7_Pre + RTS_Q8_Pre + RTS_Q9_Pre + RTS_Q10_Pre + RTS_Q11_Pre + 
RTS_Q12_Pre + RTS_Q13_Pre + RTS_Q14_Pre + RTS_Q15_Pre + RTS_Q16_Pre + RTS_Q17_Pre + 
RTS_Q18_Pre + RTS_Q19_Pre + RTS_Q20_Pre 
RTS_Post_Total = RTS_Q1_Post + RTS_Q2_Post + RTS_Q3_Post + RTS_Q4_Post + RTS_Q5_Post + 
RTS_Q6_Post + RTS_Q7_Post + RTS_Q8_Post + RTS_Q9_Post + RTS_Q10_Post + RTS_Q11_Post + 
RTS_Q12_Post + RTS_Q13_Post + RTS_Q14_Post + RTS_Q15_Post + RTS_Q16_Post + RTS_Q17_Post 
+ RTS_Q18_Post + RTS_Q19_Post + RTS_Q20_Post 
UWES_Vigor_Post_Total = UWES_Q1_Post + UWES_Q5_Post + UWES_Q2_Post 
UWES_Vigor_Pre_Total = UWES_Q1_Pre + UWES_Q5_Pre + UWES_Q2_Pre 
UWES_Absorp_Pre_Total = UWES_Q6_Pre + UWES_Q8_Pre + UWES_Q9_Pre 
UWES_Absorp_Post_Total = UWES_Q6_Post + UWES_Q8_Post + UWES_Q9_Post 
UWES_Ded_Pre_Total = UWES_Q6_Pre + UWES_Q8_Pre + UWES_Q9_Pre 
UWES_Ded_Post_Total = UWES_Q6_Post + UWES_Q8_Post + UWES_Q9_Post 
AAQ2_Pre_Total = AAQ2_Q1_Pre_Rev + AAQ2_Q2_Pre_Rev + AAQ2_Q3_Pre_Rev + 
AAQ2_Q4_Pre_Rev + AAQ2_Q5_Pre_Rev + AAQ2_Q6_Pre_Rev + AAQ2_Q7_Pre_Rev 
AAQ2_Post_Total = AAQ2_Q1_Post_Rev + AAQ2_Q2_Post_Rev + AAQ2_Q3_Post_Rev + 
AAQ2_Q4_Post_Rev + AAQ2_Q5_Post_Rev + AAQ2_Q6_Post_Rev + AAQ2_Q7_Post_Rev 
 
Notes: AQ1 and AQ2 reverse scoring so that higher scores indicate more psychological flexibility.  
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Appendix D: Mood Induction Velten Statements and Film Clips 
Positive Statements 
1. When I have the right attitude, nothing can depress me. 
2. The world is full of opportunity and I‟m trying to take advantage of it. 
3. When it comes right down to it, I‟m just too cool. 
4. Nothing can bum me out now. 
5. My parents brag about me to their friends. 
6. My future is so bright I‟ve got to wear shades. 
7. Most people like me. 
8. Life‟s a blast: I can‟t remember when I felt so good. 
9. It‟s great to be alive. 
10. It doesn‟t get any better than this. 
11. I‟m going to have it all! 
12. I know if I try I can make things turn out fine. 
13. I know I can do it; I‟m going to seize the day! 
14. I can make things happen. 
15. I feel creative. 
16. I feel completely aware. 
17. I can make any situation turn out right. 
The positive induction film clip (Singing) is publicly available on youtube at: 
https://youtu.be/Z7aO9ntV9hs  
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Neutral Statements 
1. The rug was made according to an old Navajo pattern. 
2. The movie theater was located downtown. 
3. The Gulf Islands are in British Columbia. 
4. New York City is in New York state. 
5. Some think that electricity is the safest form of power. 
6. Some baseball bats are made from the wood of the ash tree. 
7. She walked over to the shop and knocked on the door. 
8. Perennials bloom every year. 
9. Olympia is the capital of the state of Washington. 
10. Many buildings in Washington are made of marble. 
11. It snows in Idaho. 
12. Mules hauled the supplies up the mountain. 
13. Santa Fe is the capital of New Mexico. 
14. Diamonds really can cut glass. 
15. Elephants carried the supplies. 
16. Basket weaving was invented before pottery making. 
The neutral induction film clip (Nature) is publicly available on youtube at: 
https://youtu.be/NOt8A6hypwQ   
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Negative Statements 
1. Why should I try when I can‟t make a difference anyway. 
2. What‟s the point of trying? 
3. Today is one of those days when everything I do is wrong. 
4. When I talk no one really listens. 
5. Sometimes I feel so guilty that I can‟t sleep. 
6. Sometimes I feel really guilty about the way I‟ve treated my parents. 
7. There is no hope. 
8. I feel I am being suffocated by the weight of my past mistakes. 
9. Nobody understands me or even tries to. 
10. Life is such a heavy burden. 
11. I feel worthless.  
12. I feel like my life‟s in a rut that I‟m never going to get out of. 
13. I feel cheated by life. 
14. Everyone else seems to be having more fun. 
15. I don‟t think things are ever going to get better. 
16. I doubt that I‟ll ever make a contribution in the world. 
17. I wish I could be myself, but nobody likes me when I am. 
18. Every time I turn around, something else has gone wrong. 
19. Even when I give my best effort, it just doesn‟t seem to be good enough. 
The negative induction film clip (Network) is publicly available on youtube at: 
https://youtu.be/NOt8A6hypwQ 
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Appendix E: Mood Induction Outlier Treatment 
No. Condition Response_ID Reasons for Exclusion 
1 Positive R_1eRJ4vJrca1uJHs Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
2 Positive R_1mPNLaR0ZrL6Mpr Distribution outlier (RTS <47 total score)  
Extreme responding (AAQ-II) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
3 Positive R_22zPZJLnJ7ABMcv Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
4 Positive R_2DZfKUSJQ61Qo1H Shipley performance < 50% comprehension 
5 Positive R_2QyXB90Q20T7OVu Max string length/identical responses (PA) 
6 Positive R_2TRfB9ehvGQcha5 Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
7 Positive R_2uPBLSpf1mVvx0m Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
8 Positive R_2wBUb6yfA2t7DHi Shipley performance < 50% comprehension 
9 Positive R_2xLXKiAVq0ktINH Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
10 Positive R_30wW5p7VCUDWyA8 Shipley performance < 50% comprehension 
11 Positive R_3mabDZgppWm14Rh Distribution outlier (SEIS) 
12 Positive R_3PdXfu4RmkcpmUt Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
13 Positive R_7QfDWHMcEFxgMG9 Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
14 Positive R_8HdBh8JkgjylMad Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
15 Positive R_AoIDNXCVZOrGZmF Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
16 Positive R_2VR3JgXKg5Qvzl1 Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
17 Positive R_1DTnjdDeCR9CUqx Distribution outlier (False recall > 3 words) 
18 Positive R_32LaEoEPkW1qZDj Word generation unrelated to category 
19 Positive R_3fORD8UDRpLDOQf NESB <3 years English 
20 Positive R_STv9qL2kNjsEa7n NESB <3 years English 
21 Positive R_QgirmF0fIT9Ok1z NESB <3 years English 
22 Positive R_27QcxUXZYxONEGR Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
22 Positive R_8q3rYhKlJQ5iCE9 Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
23 Positive R_BKB3Yn3hedZvbEZ Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
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No. Condition Response_ID Reasons for Exclusion 
1 Neutral R_08mW5rAI5LMSOIN Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
Extreme responding (AAQ-II) 
Max string length/identical responses (SEIS) 
2 Neutral R_1M4BmyZvd3BuhAA Distribution outlier (RTS <38 total score) 
3 Neutral R_1ogSAsg8jOc8H0r Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-II) 
4 Neutral R_29lZPGv7WwOMrnW Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
5 Neutral R_2P7QlOSdGScusv7 Shipley performance < 50% comprehension 
Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
6 Neutral R_2TQLYreW0mapJtu Extreme responding (AAQ-II) 
Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-II) 
7 Neutral R_2wuCf5LuGSLHh81 Extreme responding (AAQ-II) 
Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-II) 
8 Neutral R_3Dp9updT2Dqz6t9 Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-II) 
9 Neutral R_3dYfanruNPNijPb Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
10 Neutral R_3gR5wJEuFBgeVqJ Extreme responding (AAQ-II) 
Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-II) 
11 Neutral R_3HU2fZ29ZeZooH2 Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
12 Neutral R_4MzHKv8Akq7ecCJ Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
13 Neutral R_6X5PCpV4IyzgGSB Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-II) 
14 Neutral R_1QMbx9W4AVsmVib Word generation unrelated to category 
Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
15 Neutral R_a3sNYwMbURqGzrb Word generation unrelated to category 
16 Neutral R_T6FVAbIsJJ6cRsl Word generation unrelated to category 
17 Neutral R_UygpsbYKGRBHPDX Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
18 Neutral R_ZIRSoCIcPR9grYJ Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
19 Neutral R_2rSgWqVzFvrc3x9 NESB <3 years English 
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No. Condition Response_ID Reasons for Exclusion 
1 Negative R_1BQ4DeSyNRQmrHk Extreme responding (NA) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
2 Negative R_1CBhGAUIhxNXWDl Extreme responding (NA) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
3 Negative R_1eRIVgAAEoyflcJ Extreme responding (AAQ-II) 
4 Negative R_1fg76zLb6LEfOuf Extreme responding (NA) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
5 Negative R_1ML1nQhMu3pWwxr Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
6 Negative R_1Nnce1hmdQiJ7wN Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
7 Negative R_1oF0PkzJUiSE8Vm Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
8 Negative R_1QhpnABVXtjGyUm Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
9 Negative R_1QMG716ZfjVapEn Extreme responding (NA) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
10 Negative R_2rxrAcuyISgoVbk Extreme responding (RTS) 
11 Negative R_2scdr2a8NnP8uO4 Extreme responding (NA) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
12 Negative R_2VEDs4YpE2mzkKl Extreme responding (NA) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
13 Negative R_31ZVEaQx4KNPGnr Shipley performance < 50% comprehension 
Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
14 Negative R_3HpDcyHYPWWsvle Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
15 Negative R_3koi7PNdu8i3bZM Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
16 Negative R_3OzhE0xk0RNDc3L Extreme responding (NA) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
17 Negative R_3P60H0a6OpwuYvv Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-
II/NA) 
Extreme responding (NA) 
18 Negative R_8FZnKn1iAcIJX2h Extreme responding (AAQ-II) 
Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-II 
/NA) 
19 Negative R_8HCRouBmgoF9SBX Distribution outlier (Recall < 4 words) 
20 Negative R_Oe4KSrHClthWhOh Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
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No. Condition Response_ID Reasons for Exclusion 
21 Negative R_tLI17TsN9VkyDwB Extreme responding (NA) 
Max string length/identical responses (NA) 
22 Negative R_UhdYYltaVKYqTsZ Distribution outlier (word generation<3 words) 
Max string length/identical responses (AAQ-II) 
23 Negative R_12D8SemkftLwU1d Word generation unrelated to category 
24 Negative R_2sZsVHv750JC3Da Distribution outlier (False recall > 3 words) 
25 Negative R_yJZXtjUGzYYVAPL Distribution outlier (PA/AAQ-II) 
26 Negative R_1IKQy8TLxbozHFY Word generation unrelated to category 
27 Negative R_1FfbBXiG9EKDqmQ Scatter outlier (SEIS and PA) 
 
 
 
